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ABSTRACT
Cyber-attacks on SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems used by in-
dustrial control systems (ICS), e.g., power grids, can cause severe damage. In December
2015, remote intruders penetrated a Ukrainian power grid and caused a blackout that af-
fected 225,000 residents. Mitigating physical damage from cyber attackers for SCADA can
be very challenging because attackers can penetrate internal SCADA communication net-
works and use syntactically correct network messages to deliver compromised measurements
or commands that can cause destructive physical perturbations.
In this dissertation, we first provide in-depth analysis of control-related attacks that aim at
introducing physical damage on power systems. We use theoretic approaches, e.g., control-
theory and power flow analysis, and numerical simulations to obtain solid understanding
of malicious activities that adversaries can use during the penetration, preparation, and
execution stages of an attack. Based on the analyses, we combine the knowledge from both
cyber and physical domains of power system to disrupt attackers activities in each stage and
ultimately to prevent physical damage.
To detect malicious activities that adversaries use to execute attack strategies, we integrate
a DNP3 analyzer in Bro and develop a semantic analysis framework. The DNP3 analyzer is
the first network IDS that fully supports communication protocols used by SCADA systems
in power grids. The analyzer leverages a newly proposed adaptive power flow analysis
algorithm to perform timely and accurate detection of malicious control commands observed
from a vulnerable SCADA network.
To restore lost measurements from devices compromised by the control-related attacks,
we present an innovative self-healing mechanism for communication networks used in power
systems. After a cyber-attack is detected, the mechanism uses software-defined networking
(SDN) to change the configuration of the network switches so that the compromised devices
are isolated to prevent further propagation. Meanwhile, the uncompromised devices are
ii
reconnected to the network to self-heal and therefore restore the observability of the power
system. Specifically, integer linear programming (ILP) models are formulated to minimize
the overhead of the self-healing process while considering the constraints of power system
observability, hardware resources, and network topology. In addition, we propose a greedy
heuristic to reduce computational complexity. We evaluate the self-healing scheme, including
both the ILP models and the heuristic algorithm, on communication networks used by both
IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems.
To preemptively foil adversaries in the attack’s preparation stage, we present the design
of Raincoat, which randomizes data acquisitions performed in SCADA systems. Raincoat
manipulates network flows to transform a single deterministic data acquisition request into
multiple rounds of data acquisitions of randomly selected online/offline devices. While online
devices respond with real measurements, Raincoat spoofs measurements on behalf of offline
devices. To spoof measurements that follow physical models of power systems, we include
in Raincoat an algorithm that generates decoy measurements. Decoy measurements mislead
attackers into designing (i) false data injection attacks that cannot pass the state estimation,
and (ii) control-related attacks whose probability of generating physical damage is reduced
to less than 5% in a real-world power system.
iii
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In today’s power grids, SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems are used
to collect sensor measurements to monitor system state and deliver control commands for
maintenance or business purposes. To boost monitoring and control efficiency, SCADA
systems integrate off-the-shelf computing and communication technologies into intelligent
electronic devices (IEDs) deployed in substations, e.g., remote terminal units (RTU), human-
machine interfaces (HMI), and relays. This integration opens up new attack vectors: IEDs
can become the target of cyber-attacks.
Even though SCADA systems are not open to the public Internet, they can be remotely
penetrated through corporate networks or personal devices used by employees. Current
incidents and studies show that corporate networks can be penetrated by using stolen pass-
words [1], breaking poor encryption [2], installing and exploiting backdoors [3][4], and using
Trojans [5]. Also, attackers can compromise employees’ personal devices, such as laptops or
USB drives, which can be connected to SCADA systems [6]. Because many communication
protocols used by SCADA systems, e.g., the DNP3 protocol [7], still lack security features,
e.g., authentication and encryption, attackers can sniff the network and use the obtained
information to make malicious changes to physical configurations.
SCADA systems use internal control networks to exchange information between a con-
trol center and remote substations. After penetrating SCADA systems’ control networks,
attackers can cause severe physical damage by compromising control commands and mea-
surements. In December 2015, remote intruders penetrated a Ukrainian power grid and
caused a blackout that affected 225,000 residents [8]. Because IEDs in a power system are
connected by communication networks, attacks can be propagated quickly in a large geo-
graphical area [9]. To make matters worse, the analysis presented in [10] claims that even
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small-scale attacks can have impact over a wide area.
1.2 Threat Model
While both sensor measurements and control commands can be transmitted by control
networks, the existing research, e.g., on false data injection attacks [11][12][13], focuses on
attacks that exploit corrupted sensor measurements of voltages, currents, and power usage;
the impact of compromising control fields of network packets, e.g., the index of the breakers
to disconnect transmission lines or substations, has not been well studied.
In this dissertation, we study a class of attacks referred to as control-related attacks, in
which attackers modify control fields in network packets exchanged between a control center
used by SCADA systems and remote substations. Instead of focusing on extreme outage of
power system components [14][15][16][17], we are considering perturbations on the system
that are within a normal range of legitimate operations or can be combined with normal
operations.
Figure 1.1: Timeline of control-related attacks.
To better explain the challenges of detecting control-related attacks and the contributions
presented in this dissertation, we break down the life cycle of control-related attacks into
three stages, which are shown in Figure 1.1:
• Penetration stage. Attackers bypass the barrier between corporate networks and
SCADA’s control networks and establish a foothold in the control networks.
• Preparation stage. After obtaining access to the control networks, the attackers use
the existing measurements collected by SCADA systems to learn the electrical state
of power systems. Based on the state, the attackers can prepare a strategy that can
introduce physical damage.
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• Execution stage. Attackers execute the designed strategies on physical devices, by
injecting or modifying control commands crafted in legitimate formats.
1.3 Challenges
In this dissertation, we consider a severe remote insider threat model. We assume that the
attackers can bypass the barrier (or perimeter protection) between corporate networks and
control networks and establish footholds in the control networks. In other words, we assume
that attackers have successfully bypassed the “penetration” stage shown in Figure 1.1.
Under this threat model, using today’s security approaches would be challenging to accu-
rately detect the control-related attacks and effectively remedy the physical damage to the
targeted power systems. In the following paragraphs, we summarize the challenges faced in
each stage of the control-related attacks after the adversaries have penetrated into SCADA
systems.
• Preparation stage. Attackers can use the existing periodic data acquisitions per-
formed by SCADA systems from all field devices to monitor the power grid’s physical
state and prepare attack strategies. After compromising devices in SCADA control
networks, attackers can perform both active and passive monitoring from the compro-
mised devices. The active monitoring relies on attackers’ ability to issue a valid and
even authenticated request to IEDs to retrieve measurements. To be stealthy (i.e.,
hide their presence), attackers can passively monitor the measurements when they go
through the compromised devices, even if the measurements are transmitted between
devices in encrypted traffic.
• Execution stage. To execute the designed strategies, attackers can use malicious
control commands crafted in legitimate formats. Executing those commands can be-
come a serious threat to power grids for two reasons: (1) it can directly result in
catastrophic losses or other consequences, e.g., overloaded transmission lines or gener-
ators, and (2) it is undetectable by anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems
3
(IDS) because the modified control fields in a data packet can be encoded in the legit-
imate format. As smart grid technology introduces more control functionalities over
network communication, this family of attacks will continue to grow in the near future.
• Post-execution. Appropriate responses after detecting control-related attacks play
another critical role to maintain power system’s physical operations. In general, there
are two categories of response mechanisms: delay command and reverse command.
Each of them has challenges to deploy in practice. The command-delaying mechanism
prevents initiation of malicious physical changes, but it requires that attack detection
be completed before suspicious commands reach their destination. In addition, de-
laying a command requires the interception of every normal power system operation.
The reverse-command mechanism needs to be designed and implemented differently
depending on which suspicious commands the attackers are using. As a result, it is
difficult to apply this mechanism to a new strategy that has not been observed before.
1.4 Contributions
This dissertation focuses on improving the security of the cyber-physical infrastruc-
ture of power grids against remote insider attacks by addressing the aforementioned
challenges and mitigating the control-related attacks at each stage of their life cycles. To
overcome the associated challenges, we developed unprecedented methods that distinguish
our research from others’:
• Cyber-physical interdisciplinary design. We combined knowledge of both the
cyber and physical domains to detect attacks that introduce only small anomalies
in either domain in power systems. We have applied this concept to solve different
problems: (i) to detect attacks that introduce physical damage, by combining network
IDS with a newly designed power flow analysis algorithm; (ii) to reconnect isolated
power grid devices (due to attacks) to maintain the availability of grid operations,
by designing an original self-healing network; and (iii) to preemptively disrupt and
mislead attackers, by obfuscating network configurations and physical measurements.
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• Real data to drive research. We analyzed data related to SCADA operations,
including logs and alerts from campus computing and network infrastructures and
operational measurements from real power systems at the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign. The data, which were used to construct experiment benchmarks,
help to reshape the research into practical approaches that can be applied in real
SCADA systems.
• Evaluations that combine theoretical analysis and a real-world test-bed.
We have used theoretical methods, including both power flow analysis and control
theory, to study the impact of control-related attacks on power systems’ physical op-
erations. To couple the physical operations with network communications at runtime,
we have built a simulation platform that seamlessly integrates power simulation tools,
i.e., PowerWorld and MATPOWER [18][19], with a network evaluation test-bed, e.g.,
the Geni testbed, which consists of real hardware switches at different geographical
sites [20].
Figure 1.2: Contributions of this dissertation.
Figure 1.2 highlights the contributions of this dissertation, which are summarized in the
following sub-sections.
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1.4.1 Detection: Semantic Analysis of Malicious Commands Crafted in
Legitimate Formats
To execute attack strategies, attackers can issue malicious commands crafted in legitimate
formats. Because those malicious commands do not introduce any anomalies in operating
systems and communication networks, existing IDSs will be ineffective in detecting them.
Deep packet inspection. We developed the first IDS that fully supports the communi-
cation protocols used in power systems [21]. The IDS is now included in Bro, an open-source
network analyzer [22][23], and can be freely downloaded by utility companies. The IDS can
fully extract from network packets the semantics related to control operations of power sys-
tems. Its capability for deep packet inspection can detect anomalies in networks, such as
inconsistency between operational measurements (caused by attacks or accidents) observed
at different locations [24].
Extending a network IDS with adaptive power flow analysis. To detect malicious
commands crafted in legitimate formats, we extended the IDS with a power flow analysis
algorithm to estimate the consequences of executing suspicious commands [24]. A critical
challenge in using the existing power flow analysis algorithm in IDSs is that the algorithm
is based on iterations of computation, so can take a long time to finish. To reduce detection
latency while preserving accuracy, we proposed a new algorithm that dynamically adapts
the parameters of power flow analysis, e.g., the number of iterations of computations to
perform, based on information from network communications. This algorithm reduces the
computation time by 50 percent relative to the classic AC power flow analysis, and increases
the accuracy by two orders of magnitude relative to DC power flow analysis.
1.4.2 Response: Self-healing Network for Phasor Measurement Units
In power systems, phasor measurement units (PMUs) are IEDs that can collect measure-
ments of voltage phasor approximately 60 to 120 times per second. To improve data col-
lection efficiency, a phasor data concentrator (PDC) combines measurements from multiple
PMUs and delivers them to a control center. When a PDC is compromised by attacks and
quarantined from communication networks, all connected PMUs and their measurements
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are lost.
Self-healing network for power systems. To restore the lost measurements from
PMUs, we designed a new self-healing network infrastructure [25]. This network infrastruc-
ture uses SDN (software-defined networking) to reconnect PMUs to uncompromised PDCs
at runtime [26]. To determine the optimal reconnection scheme, we used an integer lin-
ear programming (ILP) model that simultaneously (i) reduces the performance overhead of
reconfiguring communication networks and (ii) increases the redundancy of measurements.
The ILP model considers resource constraints in both communication networks and physical
infrastructures. ILP solvers can suffer from the dimensionality of the problem; we pro-
posed a greedy heuristic that reduces the computation time by one order of magnitude while
maintaining near-optimal results.
1.4.3 Preemption: Randomize Network Communications for Power
Systems
In addition to detecting attacks during their execution and remedying the impact after
attacks occur, we also detect attacks in their “preparation” stage, which can remove potential
threats and prevent physical damage.
Randomize network communications of physical devices. To prevent attackers
from preparing attacks, we have developed a moving target defense (MTD) mechanism to
randomize the cyber and physical infrastructures of a power system. Instead of collecting
measurements from all devices, a control center collects measurements from randomly se-
lected devices at remote field sites. Specifically, we allow network traffic to reach “online
devices,” which send real measurements. Meanwhile, we disallow traffic to “offline devices,”
but intelligently spoof the measurements on behalf of the “offline devices.” Because of this
design, attackers’ observations are limited, as they lack the knowledge to distinguish real
and spoofed measurements.
Construct decoy measurements. To mislead attackers, we spoof decoy measurements
for “offline devices.” We modify the state estimation algorithm used for power systems to
craft the decoy measurements. The crafted decoy measurements strictly follow the physi-
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cal model of a power system. Being misled by the decoy measurements, attackers fail to
design effective strategies for physical damage, and the attack can become easy to detect.
Our evaluations demonstrate that the decoy measurements are effective against two major
threats to power systems, i.e., false data injection attacks and control-related attacks. The
probability that attacks succeed is reduced from 70% (achieved by attackers with complete
system knowledge targeting critical devices) to 5%, which is even less than the probability
observed in random attacks.
1.5 Dissertation Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we use both control
theory and numerical simulation to analyze the impact of control-related attacks on power
systems. Chapter 3 presents the semantic analysis framework, which can detect attackers
when they execute attack strategies by issuing malicious commands crafted in legitimate
formats. In addition to passively monitoring power system networks, we present in Chap-
ter 4 high-level analysis on using SDN to preemptively increase system resilience. Based
on this analysis, we present in Chapter 5 the design of self-healing networks for power sys-
tems, which aims to recover the lost measurements and restore physical operations by using
SDN. Additionally, Chapter 6 describes the design of an MTD mechanism (based on SDN),
which obfuscates data acquisitions in SCADA systems to disrupt attackers’ preparations and
mislead them into designing ineffective strategies before they execute malicious activities.
While previous chapters propose original designs for power systems, we generalize the pro-
posed cyber-physical interdisciplinary design in Chapter 7. We extend the design into other
industrial control systems, e.g., surgical robotic systems, to demonstrate its broad impact.
We conclude and describe future research directions in Chapter 8. Note that in this disser-
tation, we start each chapter with a “Preamble” section, in which we explain the relation of





As shown in Figure 1.1, control-related attacks can go through three stages: penetration,
preparation, and execution. In this chapter, we present in-depth analysis of these attacks.
Based on analyses of adversary behavior during the different stages, we propose original
designs that target (1) detecting attacks in their execution stage (Chapter 3), (2) recov-
ering compromised grid operations after attacks occur (Chapter 5), and (3) preemptively
disrupting attacks and misleading their designs in the preparation stage (Chapter 6).
2.2 Introduction
SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems monitor and control geographi-
cally distributed assets in power grids, water plants, and other critical infrastructures. Mod-
ern SCADA systems are increasingly adopting Internet technology to boost control efficiency.
Exposing such control systems to public networks increases the risk of attacks and of fail-
ures inherited from the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) network infrastructures. However,
many companies operating critical infrastructures lack sufficient protections against failures
caused by accidental events and malicious attacks. Consequently, the cyber threat to indus-
trial control operations, as cited by US government, “is one of the most serious economic
and national security challenges we face” [27]. This threat no longer exists just in theory.
For example, in December 2015, attackers penetrated a Ukraine power plant and caused a
blackout that affected more than 225,000 residents [8].
In contrast to regular enterprise systems, SCADA systems have unique security objectives.
Although the confidentiality of system data is crucial, SCADA systems are more concerned
with the availability and integrity of industry control operations, which play an important
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role in continuously balancing power generations and load demands.
The security of SCADA systems in power grids can be manifested in both steady states and
dynamic states. In a power system’s steady state, the system reaches equilibrium between
the generation of the electric powers and the demands made by the load units. The security
of the system can be guaranteed because no mechanical and electrical components operate
beyond their physical limits, e.g., transmission lines will deliver power below their power
flow limit (will not overload). During a power system’s dynamic (or transient) states, its
physical components experience oscillations when the system moves from one steady state
to another. To ensure that the power system’s transient states are secure, the oscillations
should occur within a secure range, and the system should be able to regain its equilibrium
after the oscillations.
In this chapter, we study the impact of control-related attacks on a power system’s steady
and transient states. Specifically, we use a control-theoretic approach and numerical simula-
tions to evaluate the dynamic responses of power systems to attacks. Also, we demonstrate
that it is possible for attackers to follow the analysis to identify malicious perturbations.
In addition to analyzing the impact of attacks on a steady state, we study the case in
which control-related attacks (1) do not reveal any physical violations based on steady state
analysis and (2) introduce out-of-band oscillations that cause violations during the system’s
transient period.
To achieve these objectives, we make the following contributions:
• Threat model and an example attack scenario. On top of the SCADA communication
architectures that are commonly used in power systems, we provide details on the
threat model mentioned in Section 1.2 and present the life cycle of control-related
attacks in a sequence of steps. Through the example, we demonstrate how physical
components can be exploited to prepare and launch the attacks.
• Theoretic analysis of control-related attacks. We use electromechanical models of gen-
erators to formulate power systems into linear time-invariant systems. Based on the
mathematical representations, we illustrate how compromises of control fields in net-
work packets propagate step by step in a power system and ultimately cause physical
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perturbations.
• Identify discrepancies between steady state and transient stability analyses. We use
the aforementioned theoretic approach to identify multiple cases in which steady state
analysis reveals no physical damage but the system actually experiences vulnerable
state oscillations during its transient period.
2.3 Control-Related Attacks Overview
2.3.1 Communication Structure of SCADA Systems
Figure 2.1 presents components of SCADA systems commonly used in electrical power grids.
Other industry control systems, such as gas pipelines and waste water control systems, share
a similar communication structure [28].
The control center includes human-machine interface (HMI) computers and network com-
munication equipment. The major responsibility of the control center is to acquire measure-
ment data from connected remote sites. Based on the collected data, operators estimate the
state of the remote sites and issue control operations. All the process information is logged
locally by data historians.
The field site is a remote environment that contains proprietary field devices, actuators,
and sensors, such as substations in power grids. The field devices, usually running COTS
workstations, act as a gateway that communicates with actuators and sensors. To avoid
point-to-point connections, field devices, actuators, and sensors are usually connected by a
physical communication medium referred to as a fieldbus. In the current configuration, a
fieldbus is usually implemented as a network switch or router.
The control network is a long-distance internetwork connecting the control center and the
field site. Historically, information transmitted over the control network is carried by pro-
prietary network protocols. To increase communication efficiency, many of those proprietary
protocols, such as DNP3 and Modbus [7][29], are integrated into the TCP/IP stack.
11
Figure 2.1: Communication structure of SCADA systems used in electrical power grids.
2.3.1.1 DNP3: Distributed Network Protocol
In SCADA systems, we can find different types of communication protocols used to connect
hardware devices from different vendors. In this dissertation, we focus on a highly structured
protocol called DNP3. DNP3 (Distributed Network Protocol) provides interoperability be-
tween various hardware devices in electrical power grids, water controls, and other industry
control systems [7]. Compared to the Modbus protocol [29], which most previous research
worked on, the DNP3 protocol is packed into the TCP/IP stack in a complicated manner
and contains much more diverse structures. These approaches make it difficult to manually
extract information from DNP3 network packets.
Figure 2.2: DNP3 over TCP/IP.
DNP3 was initially built over serial lines; it defined its own application layer, transport
layer, and data link layer. This hierarchy cannot directly be matched to the TCP/IP stack.
As a result, all three DNP3 layers are packed together into a single application layer payload
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over the TCP layer, which is shown in Figure 2.2.
The original application layer of the DNP3 protocol introduces complex structures as well.
Each DNP3 network fragment in this layer starts with an application header, which includes
a function code field. In a request, the value of the function code indicates what operations
are to be performed on field sites, e.g. an operation with a read function code to retrieve
measurement data. In a response, the value of the function code distinguishes different
response types, such as general responses to the requests or unsolicited responses directly
initiated by field sites.
In certain situations, a DNP3 network packet is related to multiple devices. So, an ap-
plication header can be followed by several object headers that index target devices. For
example, if an operation is applied to multiple sensors, we only need to send a single request
including all device indices, instead of sending several requests independently.
Furthermore, the operation can be performed on a specific property of a device, which is
specified by the data object following the object header. For example, a data object with
group number 1 and variation number 1 only requests binary inputs from a hardware device.
To support various control components, DNP3 defines diverse structures for different data
objects.
2.3.2 Mathematical Representations of a Power System
In Figure 2.3, we integrate mathematical representations of a power system into the com-
munication structure shown in Figure 2.1. We use Figure 2.3 to (1) briefly demonstrate
the mathematical representation of a power grid; (2) illustrate how attacks on the control
fields in network packets (i.e., control-related attacks) can be mapped to the mathematical
representation in order to analyze their impacts; and (3) position the control-related attacks
with respect to two types of more broadly studied attacks, which are denoted by A and B
in Figure 2.3.
Generally, we can classify SCADA operations into two types: reactive and preemptive op-
erations. In the reactive operation, state-estimation software collects from sensors the mea-
surements of voltages, currents, and power usage to estimate the power system’s state [30].
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Figure 2.3: Control operations in SCADA systems.
The result of the state estimation can lead to a feedback-control operation, denoted by
u in Figure 2.3, which is performed via commands issued by the SCADA master. More
commonly, power system operators use the SCADA master to preemptively issue control
commands for maintenance purposes, e.g., scheduled line outages.
A power system is composed of buses (representing substations) that are connected through
transmission lines. In our discussion, the power system is represented by two mathematical
models, as shown in Figure 2.3: (1) power flow equations with parameters that capture the
system’s physical configuration, e.g., G and B, which denote the conductance and suscep-
tance of transmission lines; and (2) a control-theoretic formulation with parameters that
capture the system’s dynamics, e.g., A and D, which denote the state transition and control
matrices.
The steady state of the system is specified by the voltage magnitude and the angle for
each bus, i.e., (Vj,θj) in equations 2.1 to 2.4. For each bus j, two power flow equations are
formulated based on the fact that the generated power (PGj and Q
G
j ), the consumed power
(PLj and Q
L
j ), and the power delivered to other buses (indexed by k) are balanced at each
timestamp [31].
PGj − PLj =
∑
k





(VjVk(Gjksin(θj − θk)−Bjkcos(θj − θk)) (2.2)
Pjk = −V 2j Gjk + VjVkGjkcos(θj − θk) + VjVkBjksin(θj − θk) (2.3)
Qjk = V
2
j Bjk + VjVkGjksin(θj − θk)− VjVkBjkcos(θj − θk) (2.4)
The power system’s steady state is obtained by solving equations 2.1 to 2.4. Because
equations 2.1 to 2.4 are nonlinear, there are two groups of approaches to solving them:
(1) AC power flow analysis uses iterative algorithms, e.g., Newton-Raphson algorithm, to
calculate solutions that are within a predefined error threshold; (2) DC power flow analysis
solves the linear approximation of equations 2.1 to 2.4 in order to get a solution more quickly.
2.3.2.1 Evaluate Power Systems’ Dynamic Responses
When we use the equations 2.1–2.4 to estimate the consequence of control commands issued
to substations, we assume that a power system always moves to a new steady state follow-
ing the perturbations caused by the malicious commands. Under this assumption, if the
commands cause overloaded transmission lines, we regard them as insecure.
However, when power systems move from one steady state to another, many physical
components can experience oscillations on their outputs. An anomaly that occurs in the
oscillation can introduce a consequence that steady state analysis fails to predict before the
fact. For example, after a perturbation, generators may adjust mechanical power setpoints.
Before generators reach the new setpoints, the rotor frequency oscillates around synchronous
frequency (e.g., 60Hz in the United States). If the oscillation becomes too big, the generator
can lose synchronism with other physical components and introduce physical damage to
power grids. Also, a big oscillation can automatically trigger circuit breakers to disconnect
and shut down generators, causing further power losses. Even though power measurements
from generators used for steady state analysis can indicate the disconnection of generators,
the steady state analysis fails to predict and estimate the consequence.
In addition to steady state analysis, we also use transient analysis to evaluate the impact
of control-related attacks. To this end, we formulate the electromechanical behavior of rotors
in each generator by differential algebraic equations (DAEs). In Figure 2.4, we demonstrate
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Figure 2.4: IEEE 14-bus system with the classical models of generators.
how the electromechanical model of the generator at Bus 8 is integrated into the power
system’s transmission network. In this dissertation, we use the classical model, which models
a generator as a voltage source of constant magnitude connected in series with a constant
reactance. Even though the classical model contains two DAEs, the methods applied in this
dissertation can also be used for more complicated models. As we focus on the transient
activities of generators, we use a single constant impedance to simulate a load unit.
In the classical model, we formulate two DAEs, referred to as swing equations, for each gen-
erator. Swing equations establish mathematical relationships between the frequency/angle
of the mechanical rotors and the generated electrical power. To help discussion, we add a
reference point (referred to as a virtual bus) between the voltage source and the reactance;
this point is denoted by Bus 8′ in Figure 2.4.









sin(δk − θk) and Ek is the voltage at the virtual bus k′. We use ωs to
represent the synchronous angular frequency of rotors, e.g., ωs = 2πfs with fs = 60Hz in
United States. The parameters Hk and Dk (representing the inertial constant and damping
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coefficient) are related to rotors only.
The power flow equations (equation 2.1–2.4) on each bus and the swing equations (equation
2.5 and 2.6) on each generator are correlated by the electrical power generated on that bus
(denoted by PGk for bus k). Consequently, when a perturbation occurs that causes a change
in generated electrical power, it can introduce oscillations on the generator’s rotor angular
frequency (denoted by δk). For example, if the topology of transmission networks is changed,
we can calculate the new power flow injected at each bus based on the solution of power flow
equations. The updated power flows are used in swing equations to estimate the accurate
trajectory for power flows given the change from the old values to these new values.
2.3.2.2 Linearizing Swing Equations
By using equations 2.1–2.6, we can obtain the trajectory of power systems moving from
one state to another. However, solving nonlinear DAEs can take a long time to finish. To
identify malicious perturbations at runtime, we linearize equation 2.1–2.6. Another benefit
of the linearization is that we can analytically decide whether power systems reach a stable
state following the attacks.
We linearize equation 2.1–2.6 based on the same assumptions that are used as the founda-
tion for the DC power flow analysis. Specifically, (1) the system states are close to nominal
values, i.e., Vj ≈ 1, |θj − θk| ≈ 0; and (2) the power network is lossless, i.e., Gjk ≈ 0.
When we linearize swing equations for generators and group them together, we can rep-







where the derivations of the parameters and variables are included in Table 2.1. To formulate
equation 2.7, we use power flow equations (equation 2.1 and 2.2) to obtain the expression of
the voltage angle at each bus (denoted by θj). Then, we use these expressions to replace θj in
all swing equations. Consequently, equation 2.7 is only related to the rotor frequency/angle of
each generator. Note that matrix A, which is referred to as the state transition matrix, hides
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the detailed topological aspects, e.g., the line’s conductance and susceptance. Nonetheless,
it establishes the mathematical relations between the generators’ rotors and simplifies the
analysis of the power system’s transient stability.
Table 2.1: Variables and parameters used in equation 2.7.
∆δ(t) =
[








































D = diag(D1, . . . , Dn)
Lgg = −diag(z−11 , . . . , z−1n )









Current power systems use feedback control (e.g., automatic generation control or turbine
governor control) to ensure states converge to a stable value after they encounter distur-
bances. In this dissertation, the impact of the control is described by variable u in equa-
tion 2.7. This variable is a vector of 2n, which describes a linear feedback control based on




. To simplify the discussion, we consider E as
a diagonal matrix. The minus sign is added to indicate that a negative feedback control is
applied. In other words, we can have E = diag(e1, . . . , e2n), where ek > 0 with 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n.
After adding the control inputs, the LTI model of the power system becomes:
∆δ̇(t)
∆ω̇(t)





2.3.3 Overview Impacts of Control-Related Attacks
In this section, we use mathematical representation of the power system and the SCADA
system communication structure (see equations 2.1–2.8 and Figure 2.3) to qualitatively de-
scribe the impact of control-related attacks. Control-related attacks exploit legitimate com-
mands, which include both reactive and preemptive ones issued by the SCADA master,
e.g., scheduled line outages, generation control, or load demand adjustments. Direct mali-
cious modification of the control fields in the commands can significantly change the power
system’s physical configuration (e.g., the topology of the transmission network), alter the
power flow, and put the system in an insecure state. The changes in the grid’s physical
configuration can be mapped in the corresponding modifications of:
1. Entries in matrices G and B; as a result, the power system transits into different steady
states as dictated by the solution of equations 2.1–2.4; and
2. Entries in matrices A and D; as a result, the power system’s dynamics, which are
manifested in the form ẋ = Ax+Du, are transformed into a different form, ẋ = A′x+
D′u′, and the dynamic behavior of rotor frequency and angles become unpredictable
to system operators.
The change in the power system’s steady state can make power flow on the transmission
lines exceed their physical constraints and cause them to overload. Similarly, a large devi-
ation of the rotor frequency can violate the generator’s physical constraints and cause the
generator to overload. Because overloaded transmission lines and generators can be auto-
matically disconnected by circuit breakers, these cascading changes can quickly degrade grid
operations and lead to catastrophic consequences, such as blackout.
2.4 Threat Model
In this dissertation, we present the following threat model based on the communication
structure shown in Figure 2.1. Note that in the following chapters, we may also highlight
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threat models that contain slightly different assumptions that are used for certain other
protection designs.
• In the control center, we assume that attackers can remotely penetrate the local area
network environment and thus are capable of sniffing and injecting network packets
that are received and delivered to remote substations. Remote penetration does not
grant the attackers the same capabilities that operators in the control center have; it
becomes practical to make such penetration in today’s SCADA systems. Even though
it is not open to the public Internet, the network used in the control center can be
penetrated indirectly through corporate networks or personal devices. Recent incidents
and studies show that corporate networks can be penetrated in many ways [3][4]. For
example, [1] demonstrates that attackers can use social engineering techniques, e.g.,
spamming emails or phishing, to obtain credentials that allow them to remotely log in
to computers used in SCADA systems. By exploiting the vulnerabilities in workstations
or switches in the control centers [4], the attackers can further obtain the privileges
necessary to install malware and to sniff, inject, and even modify network traffic.
Another common approach is to penetrate employees’ personal devices, e.g., laptops,
smart phones, or USB drives, which usually do not have sufficient protection. When
these devices are brought to work, i.e., “bring your own device” (BYOD) policies,
they can be connected to the network of the control center and start distributing
malware [6].
Even though it is challenging for attackers to penetrate the control center, the con-
sequences are severe once they have done so. The attackers may remain undetected by
network monitoring for a long time while they collect sufficient information to launch
attacks. Recent reports show that even after a vulnerability has been identified, it can
still take a long time to patch it [32]. Currently, SCADA systems collect information on
substations (such as measurements of power usage and the status of circuit breakers)
using communication protocols that usually lack security features such as authenti-
cation or encryption. Consequently, attackers can choose to passively sniff network
communications to learn the system configuration, such as the topology of the trans-
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mission network, without affecting normal operations. Using the collected information,
the attackers can estimate the system states [30][33], design an attack strategy, and
then at the right time, inject malicious traffic to cause physical damage [6].
• In the substations, we do not trust “intelligent” devices, e.g., data aggregators, that can
run full-featured operating systems (OS). As most proprietary SCADA protocols lack
security features such as authentication or encryption, we assume that an attacker can
install malicious software on those devices to modify the control commands when they
are received and delivered by these devices. Similarly, untrusted intelligent devices
can compromise measurements and combine false-data-injection attacks with control-
related attacks (see the scenario in Figure 2.5).
We trust devices equipped with proprietary industrial control functionality, e.g., sen-
sors and actuators. Consequently, we can collect trusted measurements from sensors.
As discussed in [11], false-data-injection attacks can be made through two major chan-
nels: (1) manipulation of measurements before they are used for state estimation, or
(2) physical tampering with sensing devices. Although we do not make any assump-
tions about the trustworthiness of data from intelligent devices upstream of sensors,
we trust the information, e.g., voltage, current, and power usage, at the sensors. Con-
current physical accesses to and tampering with a large number of distributed sensors
(across multiple substations) are hard to achieve in practice. Also, as indicated in [34],
it is sufficient to protect “a strategically selected set of sensor measurements” to detect
false-data-injection attacks.
We classify control commands into two types: manual commands, issued by the
control center through an IP-based network, and automatic commands, issued through
hardwired connections in substations to protect physical components against short-
circuit faults. We assume that only manual commands can be maliciously exploited.
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2.4.1 Example Attack Scenario
As shown in Figure 1.1, we classify the life cycle of a control-related attack into three stages:
penetration, preparation, and execution. In this section, we present an example attack
scenario as a sequence of steps to demonstrate a possible procedure in each stage (shown in
Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5: Attack steps to impact the physical infrastructure of a power grid.
Attack penetration stage. An attacker may penetrate a control center or field devices
in substations as an insider or by remote access, e.g., by exploiting vulnerable software.
Attack preparation stage. An attacker can obtain data on power usage and breaker
status, and based on this information, estimate system state and determine network topol-
ogy [30][33]. Then, the attacker can decide on the attack strategy, e.g., which transmission
lines to open to cause maximum damage with minimum effort.
Alternatively, an attacker can open transmission lines at random when a power system
operates under high generation and load demand. Our study (see Section 2.5.1 for details)
demonstrates that the random attack strategy can put the system into an insecure state. To
avoid possible detection, the attack preparation stage can be performed offline.
Attack execution stage. The attacker can generate legitimate but malicious commands
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by replaying or modifying proprietary network packets. In this dissertation, we use the
DNP3 protocol, a proprietary protocol widely used in power grids [7]. In step 1, shown
in Figure 2.5, a single DNP3 network packet includes four control relay objects to operate
four breakers located in the same substation. Each control relay object uses a 1-byte device
index to indicate which breaker to operate and a 1-byte control code to indicate the command
to be performed. By modifying the device indices and the control codes, an attacker can
change the selected breakers and the operations performed on them. In step 2, to hide the
system changes, the attacker can intercept network packets and/or use the technique of false
data injection to alter the packets’ payloads sent to the control center in response to the
commands. If successful, the attacker can open four transmission lines simultaneously and
put the system into an insecure state. Meanwhile, the false data injection can provide the
control center with measurement data indicating error-free operation of the substation.
2.5 Impacts of Control-Related Attacks on Power Systems’ Steady
State
In this section, we focus on the impact of control-related attacks on a power system’s steady
state. Specifically, a power system is in an insecure state if at least one transmission line
violates its physical constraints as determined by the power flow limit.
To evaluate the impact of control-related attacks on power systems’ steady state, we
present numerical analysis of the simulation of power systems in different scales. We simulate
small-scale power systems using IEEE 24-bus, 30-bus, and 39-bus systems, whose baseline
configurations are included in MATPOWER, a MATLAB toolbox for power flow analy-
sis [19]. We also used a 2736-bus power system in MATPOWER to simulate a large-scale
power system. That power system represents the Polish 400-, 220-, and 110-kV networks
during the summer of 2004.
The control-related attack was mimicked by perturbing physical components of the sim-
ulated power network as follows: (1) selecting a set of generators (excluding the generator
with the slack bus) and increasing or decreasing their outputs by at most 50%; (2) selecting
a set of load units and increasing or decreasing their demands by at most 50%; (3) opening
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a set of transmission lines; and (4) combining the three types of perturbations introduced in
steps 1-3. The threshold of 50% was set based on the figures for load/generation changes in
[35]. As shown in [35], such variation of load/generation can happen within one week. Direct
observation of such variation requires an intelligent attack plan, such as the one in [6], in
which the attackers penetrate and stay in the power grids during the period when generations
or load demands change. A smart attacker, however, can indirectly estimate the variations
of load/generation based on environmental factors, such as the local temperature. For each
perturbation, we used AC power flow analysis to determine whether the perturbation put
the system into an insecure state.
We further considered two scenarios of perturbation. In Scenario 1 (random attacks), we
separately perturbed generators, altered load units, or opened transmission lines at random.
In Scenario 2 (targeted attacks), we perturbed vulnerable components, e.g., opened trans-
mission lines carrying an amount of power more than 70% of the power flow limit. In both
scenarios, we regarded an attack as successful if the system was put into an insecure state,
i.e., at least one transmission line was overloaded, and the probability of successful attacks
(denoted by pa) was measured. The value of pa reflects how easily attackers can perturb a
power system even if they obtain only a little knowledge related to the grid.
2.5.1 Scenario 1: Random Attacks
Random attacks targeted generators, load units, and transmission lines separately. We
performed 1000 random attempts for the small-scale test systems (24-bus, 30-bus, and 39-
bus systems) and 100 attempts for the large-scale test system (2736-bus system). After each
run, we measured the probability (pa) of successful attacks, which is defined as the ratio
between the number of successful attacks and the total number of attempts.
The plots in Figure 2.6 present the probability of successful attacks (pa) as a function of
the number of perturbed components (ka). For the attacks on generators and load units,
results of which are shown in Figure 2.6.(a) and 2.6.(b), the x -axis indicates the percentage
of perturbed components. For attacks on transmission lines, results of which are shown in
Figure 2.6.(c), the x -axis indicates the number of transmission lines that were disconnected.
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Generally, the value of pa increases as the value of ka increases. An exception is the
30-bus system, where no successful attack was observed when we perturbed the generation.
As a result, there is no curve corresponding to the 30-bus system in Figure 2.6.(a). Further
analysis of the 30-bus system indicates that 29 out of 41 transmission lines carried an amount
of power that was less than 30% of the line power flow limit. Consequently, after the
generation was increased because of the simulated attack, there were sufficient margins for
the transmission lines to carry more power without violating the power flow limits. In Figure
2.6.(c), the value of pa for the 2736-bus system is small compared to the values for the three
small-scale test systems. For the 2736-bus system, 10 transmission lines correspond to less
than 0.3% of all the transmission lines in use. As a result, opening 10 transmission lines




Figure 2.6: The probability of successful attacks as a function of the number of perturbed
components.
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We also performed coordinated attacks by randomly opening ka transmission lines while
simultaneously increasing or decreasing the power generation and load demand. For small-
scale test systems, we randomly selected 3 generators and 3 load units. For the large-scale
test system, we randomly selected 20 generators and 20 load units. Figure 2.6(d) shows how
pa changes as a function of ka, i.e., the number of line outages. Compare Figures 2.6.(c)
and 2.6.(d). For the coordinated attacks, pa is two to three times greater than if only lines
were simply opened. However, the coordinated attack requires more perturbed components,
and hence it is easier to detect malicious activities. To avoid detection, an opportunistic (or
smart) attacker may wait until the system becomes heavily loaded, i.e., the grid devices are
working close to their physical limits, and then force additional outages of transmission lines
to cause cascading failures or, potentially, a blackout. Note that a significant fluctuation
in energy demand can happen naturally; e.g., in the Midwest on June 28, 2012, the energy
demand was about 70% higher than it was on June 2, 2012 [35].
2.5.2 Scenario 2: Targeted Attacks
To perform the targeted attacks, we opened ka vulnerable transmission lines without chang-
ing the power generations or load demands.
Figure 2.7: The attack that selectively opened multiple transmission lines.
Figure 2.7 plots pa as a function of ka. Compare this with the results in Figure 2.6.(d).
In Figure 2.7, the probability of a successful attack, pa, is greater for the same value of ka.
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Most interestingly, for the large-scale test system in which opening fewer than 10 randomly
selected transmission lines is considered a small disturbance, one can see a dramatic increase
in pa, above 90%, when only 3 vulnerable lines are opened simultaneously. Also, for the
30-bus system whose transmission lines have sufficient margins to carry more power, pa
increases to above 90% when 6 vulnerable lines are opened simultaneously.
2.6 Impacts of Control-Related Attacks on Power Systems’
Dynamic Responses
In this section, we use the mathematical representations of power systems to analyze the
impacts of attacks on power systems’ dynamic responses. To verify the analysis, we also
present the evaluation results based the numerical simulations.
2.6.1 Theoretic Analysis
To quantify the consequence of the control-related attacks, we propose two properties related
to the state variable of the power system:
Definition 1 (stability property). The state variables, i.e., ∆δ and ∆ω in equation 2.7,
are bounded with the bounded input, e.g., ∆P0 in equation 2.7. 
Definition 2 (security index). To measure the severity of the generator frequency









We can use the peak value of ∆ωk during a system’s transient response and also the steady
state value of ∆ωk to calculate Sdev respectively.
Definition 3 (physical violation). When the rotor frequency of at least one generator
at its stable state deviates more than 0.5Hz, i.e., |∆ωk| > 2π× 0.5 rad/s, the corresponding
generator is regarded as having a physical violation. 
We focus on two changes on power system’s physical configuration that can be achieved
through the communication network [7][37][38], i.e., the outage of multiple transmission lines
and generation or load demand adjustment.
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2.6.1.1 Scenario I: Outage of Multiple Transmission Lines
By exploiting control commands to operate relays in substations, the attacker can put mul-
tiple transmission lines out of service simultaneously. In this attack scenario, the changes
are reflected in the value in the admittance matrix, which further impacts matrix B. In our
physical models, the change of B can impact matrix A in the LTI model. Notably, matrix
A plays an important role in the system’s control functionality, such as system stability,
controllability, system steady states, and so on.
Theorem 1. Matrix B, including the consideration of the line shunt capacitance, is a
negative definite matrix.
Proof. We consider the power system network as a connected graph. The work in [39]
demonstrates that with line shunt capacitance ignored, Y is a weighted graph Laplacian
with complex weights given by the admittances of the transmission lines. Similarly, B is
also a weighted graph Laplacian with real weights given by the line susceptance. As a result,
with line shunt capacitance ignored, B is negative semi-definite. With the consideration of
shunt capacitance of each transmission line, the value of diagonal elements in B is reduced
accordingly. As a result, we can represent B = B0 − diag(b1, . . . , bn), where B0 is the
construction of B without considering the shunt capacitance.
The matrix [−diag(b1, . . . , bm)] is a Hermitian and also a triangle matrix. We denote its
eigenvalues as λ1 = −b1, λ2 = −b2, . . . , λm = −bm. Without loss of generality, let us assume
that −b1 ≤ −b2 ≤ · · · ≤ −bm < 0. Also, because B0 is also Hermitian (semi-definite), the
matrix B is a Hermitian matrix. Similarly, we can represent eigenvalues of B and B0 in an
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where k = 1, . . . ,m. As a result, B is a negative definite matrix. 
Remark 1 (system stability). If the power network is still connected after malicious
line outage, the system remains stable.
We could not find a strict proof of this property. However, we mapped the line outage into
the mathematical model we considered and found that it is impractical, if not impossible,
for an attacker to construct a specific line outage (that does not disconnect) that can make
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the system unstable.
If the power network is still connected after the line outage, B is still a negative definite
matrix based on Theorem 1. Because Lll = B − diag((z−11 , . . . , z−1n ,0Tm−n)) and the matrix
[−diag((z−11 , . . . , z−1n ,0Tm−n))] is a negative semi-definite matrix, Lll is also a negative definite
matrix, which makes Lll full rank, and thus, L
−1
ll exists.
If we consider the LTI model in Laplace domain, the pole of the system is decided by the















Is− (A− E) =
 Is+ E1 I
M−1(Lgg − LglL−1ll Llg) Is−M−1D + E2
 (2.9)
If ek with 1 ≤ k ≤ n is a system pole, s = ek satisfies the equation det(Is− (A−E)) = 0.
Note that when s = ek, we also have det(Is + E1) = 0. This system pole is only related to
the feedback control applied to the power grid. How this pole is changed depends on how
feedback control can be modified by the attacks, which we leave as future work.
Other poles such that det(Is+ E1) ̸=0 satisfy the following equation:
det(sI + E1)det((Is−M−1D + E2)−M−1(Lgg − LglL−1ll Llg)(sI + E1)
−1I) = 0 (2.10)
After simplification, this equation becomes:
det((Is−M−1D + E2)(sI + E1)−M−1(Lgg − LglL−1ll Llg)) = 0 (2.11)
Based on the equation 2.11, we study how the line outage can impact the system poles.
When the line outage does not disconnect the power network, Lll is still full rank and its
inverse exists. Based on the construction of Y , the elements of matrix Lll cannot be changed
arbitrarily by the outage of transmission lines. For example, if the line connecting bus k and
bus l is disconnected, the value of the element at k-th row and l-th column and the element
at l-th row and k-th column is increased by the amount of the line admittance. At the same
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time, the value of both k-th and l-th diagonal elements is decreased by the same amount of
line admittance.
When attackers introduce the outage of multiple transmission lines, the change on Lll
can only impact the constant part of the characteristic polynomial at the left side of equa-
tion 2.11. At this stage, there is a lack of closed-form relationship between entries in L−1ll and
Lll and also of a closed-form solution to derive the changes of the solution of equation 2.11
based on the change of the constant part of the characteristic polynomial. Furthermore,
intuitively, the changes made in Lll due to line outage are distributed among all the ele-
ments in its inverse. Consequently, it is challenging, if not impossible, for an attacker to
analytically construct a strategy that makes the system unstable.
Remark 2. Another informal way to understand Remark 1 is to note that when the
power system network is connected after a multiple-line outage, the system load demands
and generations remain unchanged and balanced (by ignoring line losses). Consequently, it
is easy for the system to remain stable.
Limitation. The mathematical dynamics describing the power system transient activities
failed to describe the case when a power system network is disconnected into several islands.
For each island, matrix B is all negative definite, which makes the corresponding matrix Lll
still full rank. As a result, equation 2.11 still holds for each island. However, for each island,
the power balance between the load and the generation is disturbed. This is equivalent to
modifying ∆P0 in the equation; the impact of this on the system’s control performance is
shown in Section 2.6.1.2.
In a special case, when a bus k with only load units is isolated due to a line outage,
the derivation of equation 2.11 becomes invalid. Under this scenario, the k-th column and
the k-th row in B become zero vectors. In our bus index for the power system, we have
(n + 1) ≤ k ≤ m. Based on the derivation Lll = B − diag((z−11 , . . . , z−1n , 0Tm−n)), the k-th
column and k-th row of Lll become zero vectors accordingly. Consequently, Lll is not full
rank and the inverse of Lll does not exist. The impact of this special attack case can be easily
identified: the isolated load units experience a blackout because there is not any generation
for them. 
Remark 3. We can use x̂(t) to estimate the value of the system state x(t) based on
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systems output measurement, i.e., y(t). In this case, an observer of the power system,
defined as ˙̂x(t) = (A − BK)x̂ + ∆P0, is used to estimate the system changes. Based on
property 1, the system observer is also stable as long as a line outage does not “island”
(make an island of) the power system. As indicated in [40], this property can help attackers
avoid detection by the observer itself.
2.6.1.2 Scenario II: Change of Power Generation and Load Demands
From equation 2.11, we can see that the changes made to both power generation and load
demands can affect the value of ∆P0, which can be regarded as an input variable to the
LTI system. The state feedback control is usually designed based on the type of the input.
For example, if the inputs are constant, then a proportional control is usually added in the
feedback loop so that the state or the outputs can keep track of the input and reach a steady
state.
∆P0 is a 2n vector with the values of the first n elements being 0. If an attacker changes
the power generations or load demands, the values of the first n elements remain as 0 and
only the values of the last n elements are changed. Because the last n elements correspond
to the change of ∆ω, the security index proposed in Definition 2 can be changed.
If an attacker’s changes make ∆P0 as constant, ∆δ(t) and ∆ω(t) converge to other non-
zero values. Consequently, system states, i.e., δ(t) and ω(t), continue increasing, which can
destabilize the power system. In practice, however, the power generations or the demands
from load units can only be adjusted within a specific range. As a result, destabilizing the
power system based on the change of generations or load demands is impractical.
In addition to system’s transient activities, a power system’s steady states can also be
changed under this attack scenario. When a power system reaches a steady state, ∆δ̇ and





Equation 2.12 provides the closed-form relationship between ∆P0 and the deviation of
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system steady states. ∆P0 is also related to Lll, which can be changed by the attacker
correspondingly. As a result, we can see that attacking the system in terms of line outage
and perturbations of generation and load demands can affect the system’s steady state values.
Practical implication. Equation 2.12, which describes the relations between ∆P0 and
the steady system states, can provide a new way to rank the high-order contingency based
on the proposed security index. From an attacker’s perspective, this can help to decide
on severe perturbations that can introduce significant deviations on system states. On the
other hand, the system administrator can use it to identify vulnerable generators and provide
corresponding protections.
2.6.2 Numerical Simulation
The evaluation is performed from an attacker’s perspective to find an attack strategy, i.e.,
perturbations on the physical configuration of a power system, that can (1) put the sys-
tem into unstable states or (2) violate physical constraints on rotor frequency deviation as
specified in Definition 3.
The evaluation is performed on the IEEE 14-bus test system. This power system has 5
generators, which are attached to bus 1, 2, 3, 6, and 8; the dimension of the system states is
10. The parameters related to the physical configuration of the power system, such as line
admittance, base load demands, and power generations, are referred to the case file provided
in MATPOWER [19]. The parameter of the classical model that simulates each generator
is listed in Table 2.2. Based on these parameters, matrix A is calculated accordingly.








1 31.66 12.3 0.0487
2 3.924 1.2 0.3083
3 3.924 1.2 0.3083
6 1.265 0.5 0.9280
8 1.265 0.5 0.9280
We implement the linear approximation of the power system, i.e., equation 2.8, in MAT-
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LAB Simulink and use this linear model to calculate security index, rank malicious sys-
tem changes, and select strong attack strategies. The two attack scenarios are mimicked
by perturbing physical components of the simulated power network: (1) randomly open 4
transmission lines that do not island the transmission network, and (2) randomly select half
load units or generators and increase or decrease the demands or outputs by at most 20%.
2.6.2.1 The Impact of Line Outage on System Stability
In this section, we focus on finding the combination of line outages that can potentially
destabilize the system, i.e., put the pole of the system’s LTI formulation in the open right-
hand plane.
For each outage of 4 transmission lines, we recalculate matrix A, matrix M , and calculate
the solutions of equation 2.11, which are system poles. If one solution contains a real
part that is strictly larger than zero (located in the open right hand plane), we regard the
corresponding line outage as malicious and, thus, an attack strategy is found. To simulate
normal variation of generator models, we vary the parameter values in the range of -50% to
200% of the base values provided in Table 2.2. The diagonal entries of matrix E are also
randomized. We selected 30 sets of random values for generator model and matrix E; for
each set of parameter values, we randomly analyze 1000 combinations of the outage of up
to 4 transmission lines.
In all our experiments, we cannot find any attack strategy to destabilize the system. In
other words, we cannot find the solution of equation 2.11 on the open right-hand plane by
opening multiple transmission lines.
We also further study how much the solution is changed under this attack scenario. We
do this by measuring the average standard deviations of all solutions from our experiments.
There are 10 unknowns for equation 2.11, and each of them is a system pole. In Table 2.3,
we list the poles in descending order of their standard deviation (specified as “SD”). Based
on the result, we can see that the impact of line outage on the state variable is small, which
makes it very challenging for the attacker to destabilize the system by disconnecting multiple
transmission lines simultaneously.
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Table 2.3: Standard deviation of system poles under the outage of multiple transmission
lines.
Pole 1 Pole 2 Pole 3 Pole 4 Pole 5
SD 0.0113 0.0149 0.0134 0.0173 0.0112
Pole 6 Pole 7 Pole 8 Pole 9 Pole 10
SD 0.0088 0.0165 0.0159 0.0129 0.0129
The experimental results are consistent with Property 2. Line outage only impacts matrix
B, which in turn impacts matrix Lll. But the changes made on Lll tend to be distributed
across the entries of its inverse, which only impact the constant part of the characteristic
polynomial of equation 2.11.
2.6.2.2 Impact of Line Outage on Security Index
Even though line outage introduces little impact on system poles, it can disturb the system’s
transient activities (e.g., the peak values of its system states) and its steady states. In this
section, we evaluate how line outages can impact the security index calculated based on the
peak value and steady state values of ∆ω. For this purpose, we fix the parameter value of
each generator model as its base value in Table 2.2 and set the feedback control E as an
identity matrix.
In Figure 2.8, we demonstrate the variation of the security index against the line outage.
The x -axis displays the index of 100 randomly selected combinations of 4-line outages, while
the y-axis represents the value of the security index. The solid line shows the variation
in the security index calculated based on the steady state values of ∆ω, while the dotted
line shows the variation based on their peak values. From Figure 2.8, we can see that the
security index varies for different combinations of line outages. Compared with the security
index calculated based on steady states, the variation is more dramatic when based on peak
values.
Based on the value of the security index shown in Figure 2.8, we can identify the relative
severity of the line outages. To validate the analysis based on the derived LTI model, we
select the 10 line outages with the largest security index and smallest security index, and
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Figure 2.8: The variation of security index based on the steady state value and the peak
value of ∆ω against the random line outage.
then evaluate them in the Transient Stability toolbox in PowerWorld [18]. In PowerWorld,
we use the classical model with the same parameter values presented in Table 2.2. For each
generator, we add turbine governors, which can adjust the mechanical power of a generator,
i.e., PMk .
Based on the responses calculated from PowerWorld, we find that the security index and
the LTI model can be used to identify severe system perturbations. For the 10 line outages
with the smallest security index, we usually observe a 0.1–0.2Hz deviation of the rotor
frequency. However, for the 10 line outages with the largest security index, the steady state
value of rotor frequency can increase up to 0.4–0.5Hz on average. The most severe frequency
deviation is found when line 2, line 3, line 4 and line 12 are disconnected (the line index of
the case file in MATPOWER is used [19]). Also, the least severe frequency deviation occurs
when line 12, line 15, line 16, and line 17 are disconnected. Figure 2.9 presents the transient
responses of these two cases for comparison. In the figure, the x -axis specifies a timeline
from 0 to 20 seconds; the y-axis specifies the value of rotor frequency in Hz. The responses of
all 5 generators are represented by different line patterns. After the line outage, the steady
state frequency of the rotor at all buses stays around 60.5 Hz, while the peak value of rotor
frequency can increase to as high as 61 Hz.
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.9: Transient response for (a) outage of line 1, 8 10, and 17, and (b) outage of line
12, 15, 16, and 17 based on the non-linear simulation.
In practice, big deviations of rotor frequency, such as those out of the 60± 0.5Hz range,
can either directly damage a generator or introduce a trip on physical devices. With the help
of the turbine governor, the steady state of the frequency deviation caused by the outage of
line 2, line 3, line 4, and line 12 can be kept within the “safe margin.” However, the rotor
frequency of generators on Bus 1 and Bus 6 deviate significantly for almost 8 seconds.
Another impact of the deviation of the rotor frequency is that the voltage angle for each
bus (∆θ) is changed correspondingly, which further impacts the power injected into each
transmission line from the bus. For example, the real power injected into the source end
of the transmission line connecting bus k to bus j can be estimated in the DC model by
the expression: ∆Pkj = sin(∆θk −∆θj)/Xkj, where Xkj is the reactance of the considered
transmission line. If the increased power injected into each transmission line exceeds physical
constraints in terms of power flow limit (i.e., the line is overloaded), protection relays may
automatically trip a breaker to isolate the transmission line. This automatic reaction can
further introduce cascading changes to the power system.
In MATPOWER, we evaluate the steady states of the IEEE 14-bus system after the
two attack scenarios considered in Figure 2.9 are performed. The results are presented in
Figure 2.10. The x -axis specifies the index of all transmission lines. The y-axis specifies the
real power injected into each transmission line at the sending end. For the line outage with
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the small security index (the outage of line 12, 15, 16, 17), we find very little variation on
the injected real power for each line. However, the line outage with bigger security index
(the outage of line 1, 8, 10, and 17) causes the real power carried by 9 transmission lines to
increase more than 100%. Also, the real power carried by line 2 and line 7 is increased to 279
MW and 183 MW. This analysis based on the transient behavior of the systems is consistent
with the results in our previous work [24], which relies exclusively on steady states analysis.
Figure 2.10: The impact of transmission line real power due to line outage
2.6.2.3 The Impact of Changing Load Demands and/or Generation on Security Index
Both changing load demands and changing power generation change ∆P0 in equation 2.8,
which further changes the values of the system’s state variables. Thus, in this section, we
change ∆P0 with different constant values and study how the system steady state value may
vary.
We randomly select up to 7 PQ buses and change their load demands by ±20%. Simi-
larly, we randomly select up to 3 PV buses and change their power generations by ±20%.
When load demands or power generations from the selected buses are changed, the power
generations from unselected buses may adjust automatically based on the AGC (automatic
generation control) algorithm. In our implementation, we only allow the generator from the
slack bus to automatically adjust its power generation.
Changes in load demands and/or power generations introduce dramatic variations in the
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security index, which is similar to what is shown in Figure 2.9. We validate these changes in
PowerWorld. Similarly, we select two changes that yield the maximum security index and
the minimum security index. Specifically, when load demands at bus 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, and
14 are increased by 20%, the maximum security index is found. When load demands at bus
5, 10, 11, and 12 are increased by 20%, the minimum security index is found. In both cases,
only the generation from the slack bus is adjusted to balance the load demands. Figure 2.11
presents the responses in PowerWorld. For the load demand change with the small security
index (shown in Figure 2.11.b), the steady state value of the rotor frequency is around 59.95
HZ. On the other hand, for the load demand change with the big security index (shown in
Figure 2.11.a), the rotor frequency decreases to 59.1HZ, which is also beyond the range of
±0.5 HZ. Compared to Figure 2.9, we can see that in both cases, the rotor frequency changes
produce smaller oscillations than we see in response to line outages.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.11: Transient response for increasing load demands at (a) bus 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 13, and
14 and (b) 5, 10, 11, and 12 based on non-linear simulation.
In today’s power systems, the change of load demands can be achieved through the load-
shedding techniques, which are proposed to deploy over the IP-based network [37][38]. In
practice, it is usually unlikely to observe the change of load demands on 7 buses simultane-
ously. However, an opportunistic, smart attacker can introduce small disturbances in some
extreme weather conditions, such as cold weather, when loads or generations are increased
by system operators.
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2.6.3 Case Study of IEEE RTS-96 System
In this experiment, we use IEEE RTS-96 systems to demonstrate how attacks can bypass
the steady state analysis and cause insecure oscillations during transient periods. The case
file of IEEE RTS-96 systems and the parameters of dynamic characteristics of generators
are set based on data in [41].
Attack scenario. We consider the attack scenario discussed in Section 2.6.1.1. Specifi-
cally, we disconnect 4 transmission lines (out of a total of 120). Under the threat model in
this dissertation, this can be achieved by issuing or compromising commands through control
networks. Because many communication protocols, e.g., DNP3, support operations of con-
necting and disconnecting transmission lines, the malicious commands can be implemented
using a few network packets (see an example in [24]). Because attacks can use legitimate
network packets, traditional network intrusion detection systems that rely on anomalies in
communication patterns cannot detect the attacks.
Transient (dynamic) responses. We used the presented linearized model to identify
malicious perturbations that do not introduce any overloading of transmission lines based
on steady state power flow analysis. Under this condition, we find a few attack strategies
that can introduce significant oscillations during a power system’s transient periods. We
have selected two attack strategies and presented them in Figure 2.12. Because the RTS-
96 system has 33 generators, we show in the figure the responses of 5 selected generators,
which experience more oscillations than others do. Note that disconnecting 4 transmission
lines (out of a total of 120) is a small disturbance and introduces no safety violations in the
system’s steady state. However, these disturbances, which occur in different locations, can
disrupt the interactions among generators and cause significant oscillations for them. From
the figure, we can see that rotor frequencies can be as large as 62 Hz after they become
stable. In practice, such oscillations can cause the immediate tripping of the generators.
If no appropriate remedy responses are applied, the attacks can even cause some physical
damage.
Steady state analysis. In both attack scenarios, we used the power flow analysis in-
cluded in MATPOWER to estimate the consequences of executing the attacks. In both
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.12: Transient response for (a) outage of line 1, 10, 102, and 109, and (b) outage of
line 1, 10, 102, and 107 based on the non-linear simulation.
cases, the power flow analysis can converge successfully. In addition, the power flows deliv-
ered in remaining transmission lines are all within their power flow limit, i.e., no remaining
transmission lines are overloaded. Consequently, even if the intrusion detection systems rely
on steady state analysis to estimate the execution consequences of the commands, they are
not able to detect the insecure oscillations that can occur during a power system’s transient
period.
Detection suggestions. Because the presented attacks do not introduce any anomalies
into communication networks or cause any physical violations in a system’s steady state, de-
tecting them requires the upgrade of current monitoring and analysis methodologies. First,
we can make use of real-time measurements, e.g., those from phasor measurement units, to
directly obtain system’s dynamic responses. Based on the responses, we can monitor real-
time oscillations happening in substations and reveal the trajectory of malicious activities.
However, the monitoring can only detect the attacks after the fact; it is difficult to apply
response mechanisms to remedy potential physical damage. Second, we can rely on simu-
lations of power systems’ dynamic models to estimate oscillations in their transient period
before an attack’s impact becomes irreversible. One challenge of using existing simulations
to do this is that they use iterative computations, which can take a long time to finish. To
reduce a simulation’s latency and maintain its accuracy, we can identify parameters that are
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critical (based on the observed commands) and use these parameters as dominating variables
(while treating other parameters as constants) in estimating system responses.
2.6.4 Discussion
In this dissertation, we have chosen the classical model and the open-loop dynamic responses
of power systems to demonstrate the impact of control-related attacks. Based on our anal-
yses, we can see that these attacks can introduce significant and malicious oscillations for
generators even without overloading any transmission lines based on the steady state analy-
sis. We believe that using more complex electromechanical models and integrating feedback
control mechanisms can help to increase our understanding of control-related attack. We
leave these efforts to future work.
However, we argue that the results presented in this chapter are significant for two reasons.
First, control-related attacks can change the open-loop characteristics of a power system
(encoded in matrix A in equation (6)). This change can impact not only the responses of a
power system but also the performance of the control mechanisms, which are designed based
on the system’s original open-loop characteristics. Second, because many feedback control
mechanisms rely on measurements delivered over communication networks to perform their
operations, attackers can use false-data-injection attacks to compromise measurements while
performing the control-related attacks discussed in this chapter. By disabling the control
mechanisms by compromising measurements, attackers can achieve the same perturbations
as those analyzed based on the open-loop performance.
2.7 Related Work
In this section, we position the control-related attacks relative to previously studied attack
scenarios, which are denoted by A and B in Figure 2.3.
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2.7.1 Attacks on Feedback-Control Loops
We classify the malicious attacks that target the feedback-control loop into two types (see
Figure 2.3). In Type A attacks, often referred to as false or bad data injection attacks, attack-
ers introduce malicious measurements that affect the outcome of state estimation [11][42].
[12][43][34] studied the range of measurements that need to be compromised in order to
make the injected measurement undetectable. Qin et al. proposed a different attack strat-
egy that further reduces the number of compromised measurements [44]. In their strategy,
even though the attack can be detected, it is challenging to identify the compromised mea-
surements and thus perform a corresponding remedy. Under a Type A attack, incorrect
system states are estimated and can have negative impacts on power grids. For example,
Xie et al. studied the economic impacts of the compromised measurements [45]. But insuf-
ficient research has been done on how the incorrect system states can lead to damage of the
physical infrastructure.
Type B attacks, shown in Figure 2.3, are mainly discussed by DeMarco et al. [40]. They
exploited a control-theoretic approach to studying the impact of malicious feedback control
algorithms on a power system, i.e., the expression of u = F (x) in Figure 2.3. The modified
control algorithms could mislead system operators into issuing the wrong commands. This
paper assumed that the attackers have full control over a generator, which can be challenging
to achieve in practice through the control network.
Both Type A and Type B attacks perturb the feedback-control loop of the power system
and thus can indirectly impact the issued control commands, i.e., reactive commands. How-
ever, in today’s power grid, commands, including both reactive and preemptive ones, are
more frequently transmitted over an IP-based control network. Consequently, after gaining
access to the control network, attackers have more incentives to compromise control com-
mands, which can directly change the state of the power system. That is not to say that
attacks on sensor measurements are not important. Quite the opposite, as compromised
measurements can be used to hide the real (potentially anomalous) state of the power grid
and thus delay detection of attacks until after damage to the system has been done (as seen
in the example of Stuxnet [6] and in [8]).
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2.7.2 Compromise of the Physical Infrastructure of Power Grids
The risk that the physical infrastructure of a power grid will be compromised by attackers
has drawn the attention of many researchers. One of their goals has been to identify and
rank the vulnerable physical components of the power grid, e.g., substations or transmis-
sion lines. To achieve that goal, the metrics of a power system’s electrical characteristics,
e.g., the load of substation or transmission lines, can be used. For example, high-order
contingencies have been selected and ranked based on different DC power flow analysis algo-
rithms [46][47]. In addition, characteristics of the transmission network, e.g., connectivity or
the length of the shortest path between substations, have been used to identify vulnerable
components [48][49][50]. Recently, the computer system vulnerabilities identified by network
IDSs have also been included as a selection and ranking metric [51].
A similar risk analysis can also be applied to cascaded attacks, in which an adversary
perturbs a power system by a sequence of events. A brief discussion on the risks of cascaded
outages caused by accidents or attacks was presented in [52]. Zhu et al. experimentally
demonstrated that cascaded attacks can introduce more significant damage than attacks
that perturb multiple physical components simultaneously [14]. In addition to the inde-
pendent selection and ranking of physical components, the inter-dependencies among these
components, such as their outage order, have also been used to identify power systems’
vulnerable components [15][16][17]. In [53], the authors further compared the analyses of
cascading failures based on the steady state and on the transient state.
In practice, because of limited computational capabilities, usually only top-ranked inci-
dents are considered for further analysis. However, the decision to attack is based not only
on the damage the attack may cause but also on the practicality and cost of implementing
the attack, and the chances of its being detected [54]. For example, to cause the outage
of a single substation is not a trivial task, as it may require compromising multiple net-
work packets, which can introduce a detectable network-level anomaly. To avoid detection,
the attacker may intentionally avoid the strategy that causes the most severe damage. For
control-related attacks, we take the possibility of being detected into account and study
perturbations on the power system that are within its normal range of legitimate operations
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or can be combined with normal operations. We believe that a more comprehensive study of
attacks, one that considers the characteristics of both the cyber and physical infrastructure
of the power grid, could be especially beneficial; we leave this for future work.
2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyze control-related attacks in SCADA systems for power grids. These
attacks introduce a serious threat to power systems because attackers can directly change
the system’s physical configuration using malicious control commands crafted in a legitimate
format. Based on the study of existing incidents of attacks in industrial control systems, we
present an example attack scenario in which attackers use cyber-attacks to cause physical
damage, e.g., overload transmission lines. Furthermore, we use mathematical models that
describe the static and dynamic behavior of power systems to demonstrate the potential
impacts of control-related attacks on systems’ electrical state. In this chapter, we used the
simulation of real-world power systems, e.g., a 2000-bus system that represents the Polish
national transmission network, to show that attackers can put a system into insecure states
with sufficient knowledge of the system’s electrical state.
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CHAPTER 3
RUNTIME SEMANTIC ANALYSIS TO DETECT
AND MITIGATE CONTROL-RELATED ATTACKS
3.1 Preamble
As shown in Figure 3.1, control-related attacks are executed by issuing malicious commands
crafted in legitimate formats. In this chapter, we present the design of a semantic analysis
framework that aims at detecting attackers during the execution stage of the attack. The
design includes two major components: (1) a DNP3 analyzer, which is included in Bro to
increase the visibility of the cyber domain of power systems and (2) an adaptive power
flow analysis algorithm to estimate, ahead of time, the consequences of executing malicious
commands.
Figure 3.1: Chapter 3 overview.
3.2 Introduction
In power grids, SCADA systems are used to collect sensor measurements to monitor the
system state and deliver control commands for maintenance or economic purposes. The
control commands can change the physical configuration of the power grid, e.g., the topology
of the transmission network.
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While both sensor measurements and control commands can be transmitted by commu-
nication networks, the existing research, e.g., on false-data-injection attacks [11][12][13],
focuses on attacks that exploit corrupted sensor measurements of voltages, currents, and
power usage; the impact of compromising the control fields of network packets, e.g., the
index of breakers to disconnect, has not been well studied.
In the previous chapter, we presented an in-depth study of a class of attacks referred to as
control-related attacks, in which attackers modify control fields in network packets exchanged
between SCADA and power substations. Because a control-related attack do not introduce
anomalies in the syntax of network communications, detecting them requires understanding
the semantics of the payloads carried by network packets, e.g., the consequences to the power
grid of delivering and executing the payload.
For this purpose, we propose a semantic analysis framework to detect control-related at-
tacks using knowledge of both the cyber and physical infrastructures of the power grid [24][55].
Specifically, in the semantic analysis framework, the IDS (intrusion detection systems) iden-
tifies control commands on the SCADA network, extracts control fields in network packets,
and at runtime, invokes power flow analysis software to perform look-ahead evaluation of the
execution consequences of the control commands issued by SCADA. The proposed semantic
analysis framework detects malicious commands at their first appearance, which makes it
possible to deploy a timely response.
Figure 3.2: Illustration of relations among monitoring, detections, and responses presented
in this chapter.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions, and we use Figure 3.2 to present the
high-level relations among these contributions:
• DNP3 analyzer in Bro. We developed the first IDS that fully supports the commu-
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nication protocols, e.g., the DNP3 protocol, used in power systems [7][21]. The IDS
is now included in Bro, an open-source network analyzer [22][23], and can be freely
downloaded by utility companies.
• A semantic analysis framework. We proposed a semantic analysis framework to mon-
itor the control network, in order to identify control commands. Semantics related to
the control commands, e.g., which breakers to open, and the updated measurements
are extracted from the network and delivered to power flow analysis tools to evaluate
the physical consequences of executing the identified commands.
• A rapid adaptive power flow analysis algorithm for runtime detection. To accurately
detect an attack with short latency, the general AC power flow analysis algorithm dy-
namically adapts its parameters, e.g., the number of iterations, based on the semantics
extracted from the control commands.
• An intrusion response mechanism and its evaluation. We propose a response mecha-
nism that exploits existing reclose logic in relays to prevent physical damage caused
by an attempt to disconnect multiple transmission lines. Based on this response mech-
anism, we demonstrate the benefits of using the rapid adaptive power flow analysis
algorithm.
3.3 DNP3 Analyzer
In this section, we present three main components of the DNP3 analyzer, the proposed
intrusion detection framework based on Bro.
Bro is a real-time network traffic analyzer widely used in forensic analysis, intrusion detec-
tion, and other network-related analyses [22][23]. It is designed based on the specification-
based technique [56]. Necessary modifications made to adapt Bro for SCADA systems are
highlighted in Figure 3.3. A new parser of the DNP3 protocol is integrated to generate
SCADA-system-specific events. The semantics carried by each event are delivered into the
corresponding event handler. To implement system policies, event handlers are defined to
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analyze the semantic information through Bro’s specific scripts, which are executed by the
policy script interpreter.
Figure 3.3: Adapt Bro into SCADA systems.
3.3.1 DNP3 Parser
The main responsibility of the network packet parser is to decode byte streams into mean-
ingful data fields according to the protocol definitions. The main body of Bro is written in
C++. The DNP3 parser, however, exploits a compiler-assisted tool named binpac to shorten
the development period and to ensure logical correctness [57].
To design the new parser, the definition of DNP3 protocol is first represented by the
binpac scripts, which are specifically designed to represent the hierarchical structure of a
network protocol. With the help of the binpac compiler, the binpac scripts are automatically
translated into C++ and integrated into Bro.
3.3.2 Event Handlers
Event handlers are used to analyze network events generated from parsing of each DNP3
network packet. The semantic information associated with each event is also extracted during
parsing. For example, a dnp3 crob event is generated by the DNP3 parser if an operation
to control relay outputs is found in a DNP3 request [58]. The parameters associated with
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this operation, such as the type of the operation, duration, and number of repeats of the
operation, are extracted from the data packet and delivered to the corresponding event
handler.
A declaration of a single event handler, including its name and arguments, provides an
interface between the DNP3 parser and the policy script interpreter. During the parsing
at runtime, the value of each argument is updated by semantic information related to this
event. An event handler is declared and associated with each type of data field defined
in the DNP3 protocol to cover all semantic information from any type of DNP3 network
packet. Although the declarations of event handlers are fixed, their definitions are left to be
implemented in terms of Bro scripts written by security experts. As a result, system policies
can be dynamically adjusted. At runtime, only selected event handlers are necessarily defined
based on the operational context, e.g. operations in power grids, to perform accurate and
efficient analysis.
3.3.3 Protocol Validation Policy
In addition to defining the hierarchical structure of a network packet, DNP3 protocol intro-
duces additional requirements regarding network traffic. Specifically, dependencies between
data fields within a single network packet are defined, and certain communication patterns
between different network packets have to be maintained. The purpose of this policy is to
use intra- and inter-packet validation to ensure observance of such requirements.
3.3.3.1 Intra-Packet Validation
Intra-packet validation is used to ensure dependency between different data fields in a single
network packet. Similar to tear drop attacks, the malformed network packets can be used to
directly perform denial of service attacks. During our experiment, such an attack occurred
in which malformed DNP3 network packets were used to crash the Wireshark [59], an open
source network traffic monitor.
A DNP3 network packet consists of different data fields, such as the link layer header and
the function code. Some data fields are critical for decoding the other part of the network
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packet. For example, the “length” field in the link layer header defines the length of the
following payload.
During this validation process, we analyzed the value range for certain data fields and used
the out-of-bound values to detect attacks. For example, DNP3 uses an 8-bit byte to repre-
sent a function code, and 37 out of 256 possible combinations are defined in the protocol.
However, in a real control system, only a subset of the 37 values would be supported. Con-
sequently, a DNP3 request with an abnormal function code can be a result of reconnaissance
scanning by an adversary.
3.3.3.2 Inter-Packet Validation
In addition to defining rules for the data fields within a network packet, DNP3 defines
communication patterns between packets. For example, an “OPERATE” packet is always
issued right after a “SELECT” packet (unless configured) to control the field devices chosen
by the previous “SELECT” packet.
Unmatched requests and responses are often the result of denial of service attacks or re-
play attacks; for example, an adversary can flood the communication channel with previously
transmitted network packets in an attempt to unexpectedly repeat certain operations. The
DNP3 analyzer can maintain the contents of parsed network packets. The incoming packets
are further correlated with previous ones for analysis to guarantee appropriate communica-
tion patterns.
3.3.4 Example Security Policies
The original DNP3 protocol does not include any authentication or encryption mechanism.
In this section, two security policies are proposed to target simulating attack scenarios that
exploit these vulnerabilities. In this section, the proposed policies specifically target SCADA
systems operating electrical power grids.
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3.3.4.1 Authentication Policy
In the first attack scenario, we assume that the control center is compromised while the field
devices are trusted. We specifically target HMIs (human machine interfaces) and COTS
(commercial off-the-shelf) workstations that are responsible for issuing control operations
and receiving measurement data. The legacy OS and software running in HMIs are costly
to patch or update, making the control center vulnerable to cyber-attacks. If an attacker is
able to penetrate the control center, he or she can maliciously control the remote field sites
through DNP3 network packets.
Consequently, we propose an authentication policy to verify that DNP3 network packets
contain authenticated and authorized operations. Specifically, the authentication policy
includes two steps:
(1) We validate that each DNP3 network packet is issued from a user that is properly au-
thenticated by the HMI that issues the packet. The HMI uses a user/password pair for local
authentication, which is logged by its operating system. Consequently, we temporally cor-
relate those system logs contained in the HMI with the DNP3 packets observed in networks
for authentication.
(2) We further authorize that the authenticated user has the privilege to issue the opera-
tions observed in the control network. Without this step, the strength of the authentication
policy relies exclusively on the host authentication. However, with the existing vulnerabili-
ties found in the control center, an attacker can avoid host authentication easily, for example
by exploiting system vulnerabilities or directly using unexpired or stolen credentials to mas-
querade as an insider. To make this step work, we assume that there are at least two levels of
users in the HMI and that privileged-level users are assigned to perform critical operations.
We believe that this assumption is reasonable, since general operating systems are usually
equipped with at least two types of user accounts: a normal user and a root or administrator.
Figure 3.4 presents the state diagram for the authentication policy consisting of the two
aforementioned steps. In the figure, we use shaded boxes to represent the actions triggered
by the observed events (noted with arrows) that are observed by the HMI or the DNP3
analyzer.
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Figure 3.4: State diagram of an authentication policy.
In the first step, whenever the DNP3 analyzer detects a request, it searches for the user’s
local authentication entries in the system logs within a certain time frame. The DNP3
analyzer can work with syslog analyzer that was already built into Bro to perform the
analysis.
In the second step, the DNP3 analyzer relies on the DNP3 parser to decide what type of
operation is included in the request. Then the decision is made by matching the type of the
user with the type of the operation.
Specifically, the two-step authentication policy is specified as:
(1) Verify that a host authentication is found before each DNP3 operation within a pre-
defined period.
(2) Verify that each DNP3 operation is authorized by the correct user; measurement-
collection operations can be performed by all users and control operations can only be
performed by privileged users.
With the help of the authentication policy, we passively restrict permissions of each user
over the remote field sites. When a DNP3 request is issued and no host authentication is
found, the system can ask for authentication again. Even if an attacker masquerading as
an insider passes the authentication step, their actions can still be detected if they perform
unauthorized control operations to change the states of field sites.
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3.3.4.2 Integrity Policy
In the second attack scenario, we assume that the field devices are compromised while
the control center is trusted. Even though a DNP3 request is generated properly from
the control center, the compromised field devices can modify it and forward a different
request to actuators or sensors. Similarly, correct and accurate measurement data generated
from sensors can also be compromised and forwarded to the control center. Consequently,
compromised field devices perform a man-in-the-middle attack.
To apply the integrity policy, we assume that field devices, actuator, and sensors are
connected through network switches or routers. Some legacy configurations use serial links
to make point-to-point connections; these devices require a more complicated configuration
to apply the DNP3 analyzer with the integrity policy.
The DNP3 analyzer exploits the integrity policy to track each DNP3 packet whenever it
passes a field device. When being processed by a field device, a single DNP3 packet may
be divided into several packets, and the original network header may be replaced with new
ones. However, the payload of each DNP3 packet, such as issued operations or measurement
data, should not be changed. Specifically, the integrity policy is specified as follows: payload
values contained in the same ingress and egress DNP3 packets of every field device must not
be modified.
Monitoring the payloads of each DNP3 network packet requires parsing of the whole
network packet. This functionality is fully supported by the built-in DNP3 parser.
Figure 3.5: State diagram of an integrity policy.
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Figure 3.5 presents the state diagram of the integrity policy. The DNP3 analyzer can rely
on the source or destination IP addresses to distinguish ingress and egress network packets.
Then it extracts the payload from each network packet. Through basic comparisons, the
DNP3 analyzer can validate that the payloads are not changed while being processed by a
field device.
3.4 Semantic Analysis Framework
In this section, we present the overall architecture of the semantic analysis framework that
enables detection and mitigation of control-related attacks.
Why do we need the semantic analysis framework? Control-related attacks are hard to
detect based solely on either of the following:
• Monitoring the power system’s electrical state, because (1) traditional contingency
analysis considers low-order incidents, e.g., the N-1 contingency 1; (2) traditional state
estimation is performed periodically, detecting attacks after physical damage; (3) an
attacker can hide changes in the physical system by replaying (or modifying) measure-
ments that mislead the operator and indicate an error-free system state [11][60]; (4)
building a blacklist or whitelist of control commands in advance [61] is insufficient; and
(5) evaluating the consequences of all control commands requires accurate, high-order
contingency analysis, which is impractical due to limited computation power.
• Using a network IDS, because the maliciously crafted control commands are encoded
in the correct syntax and hence are not detectable by a traditional network IDS, which
validates command syntax or monitors statistical anomalies in the command’s control
fields [21][62].
To detect a control-related attack, the proposed semantic analysis framework estimates at
runtime the execution consequences of network packets by (1) combining system knowledge
1Frequently, DC power flow analysis is used to rank high-order contingencies based on different criteria,
e.g., the loss of real power. Because of limited computational time, only a small number of contingencies are
accurately evaluated, and hence system changes introduced by malicious attackers can easily be missed
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on both the cyber and physical infrastructures in the power grid and (2) integrating network
monitoring with look-ahead power flow analysis. By monitoring actual messages in the
network and obtaining the ground truth regarding the state of the power system, we can
look ahead to the actual physical state transitions caused by commands (delivered as part
of the packet payload) and thereby detect and mitigate attacks upon the first appearance of
the maliciously crafted command instead of identifying the physical damage after the fact.
3.4.1 Architecture of the Semantic Analysis Framework
In Figure 3.6, we present the architecture of the semantic analysis framework. In Figure 3.6,
we distinguish trusted and untrusted components with different shades of gray based on our
threat model (presented in Section 2.4). Note that because we use DNP3 as an example
network protocol, the “DNP3 slave” in Figure 3.6 represents the intelligent field devices used
in substations, e.g., data aggregators that receive network traffic and deliver the commands
to sensors or actuators. Because the DNP3 slave can run a full-featured OS, as demonstrated
in a video demo, it is possible to install malware on such devices to perform man-in-the-
middle attacks on measurements and commands.
Figure 3.6: Semantic analysis framework.
In the semantic analysis framework, a network IDS monitors the communication of the
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control network. In this dissertation, we focus on the detection of malicious manual com-
mands (see Section 2.4 for details). Even if the attacker gains physical access to relays or
actuators and issues automatic commands, e.g., by connecting to the relay through a serial
port, the commands’ executions should be reported through broadcast messages to other
neighbor substations or to the control center, as recommended by IEEE standard 1646 [63].
Consequently, the semantic analysis framework can rely on the broadcast messages to detect
malicious automatic commands.
The control network usually adopts proprietary network protocols to transmit commands.
To support proprietary network protocols, we have implemented a DNP3 analyzer on top
of Bro, a specification-based IDS [22][23]. The DNP3 analyzer is now included in Bro’s
standard distribution. With the help of the DNP3 analyzer, Bro can efficiently validate the
syntax of the network packets and detect cyber-attacks that result in observable anomalies
at the protocol level. Moreover, the DNP3 analyzer allows Bro to extract semantics related
to control commands, which are further evaluated by power flow analysis.
To integrate power flow analysis into network IDSs, we introduce two IDS instances with
different functions and make them work collaboratively in a master/slave configuration (as
shown in Figure 3.6). In practice, a master IDS can be deployed in the local area network
of the control center. The centralized master IDS can be connected to multiple slave IDSs
deployed in the local area networks of remote substations.
3.4.2 Master IDS
To accurately look ahead to the state changes caused by a command’s execution, the master
IDS performs analyses on both the cyber and physical infrastructures of the power system.
The cyber analysis monitors the control network, extracts specific parameters related to the
control command, e.g., the device indices and the control codes in the DNP3 network packets
that control relays, as shown in Figure 3.6, and verifies the integrity of the network packets
(see Section 3.4.3 for details).
The DNP3 analyzer allows Bro IDS to select critical SCADA commands. Table 3.1
presents a classification of commands in the context of the DNP3 protocol. The read com-
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Table 3.1: Command classification based on DNP3.
Command Type Description
Read Retrieve measurements from remote substations, e.g., read binary outputs
Write(Critical)
Configure intelligent field devices, e.g., open, edit, and close a configura-
tion file
Execute(Critical) Operate actuators or sensors, e.g., open or close a breaker of a relay
mands are passive, meaning that they do not make any changes to substations. The write
and execute commands are invasive, meaning that they can reconfigure or change a substa-
tion. Consequently, we consider write and execute to be more critical commands than read.
Based on that classification, IDS can select critical commands to analyze. Those control
functionalities are common in power grids, so similar classifications can be applied to other
protocols as well.
Based on the parameters obtained from the cyber analysis, the master IDS performs look-
ahead power flow analysis on critical commands to evaluate their execution consequences;
this is specified as look-ahead analysis in Figure 3.6. In our threat model, the trusted mea-
surements are collected by sensors in substations at the location marked by D in Figure 3.6.
These measurements include the value of active/reactive power in substations with only load
units and/or the value of voltage magnitude and active power in substations with genera-
tors. Delivering the measurements over the control network (marked by B) may introduce
additional latency to semantic analysis. Such latency can be critical if an intrusion response
mechanism is to be triggered. Therefore, the master IDS performs the semantic analysis
based on the measurements collected at the control center (the location marked by A) and
validates the integrity of the measurements concurrently.
Some SCADA protocols can further reduce the effort to collect measurements. For exam-
ple, to lessen the network traffic, the DNP3 protocol allows the control center to retrieve
measurements with values that have changed since the last sampling time. Also, it was
recently proposed that the power system state can be locally estimated for a subset of con-




Under our threat model, sensor measurements can be corrupted during the transmission
from the substation to the control center, e.g., by the DNP3 slave in Figure 3.6. As a result,
the semantic analysis may use inaccurate measurements. Similarly, control commands can
also be modified after they pass the semantic analysis.
To address that problem, the slave IDS is deployed locally in the remote substation to
collect trusted measurements directly from sensors and to monitor the commands that are
executed on actuators (at the location marked by D). The slave IDS communicates with the
master IDS, so that the network packets observed at different locations, e.g., the ones marked
by A, C, and D in Figure 3.6, can be compared to reveal possible compromises. Although
the slave IDS is assigned a simple task, its deployment allows the semantic analysis to be
performed by the master IDS upon a command’s first appearance.
The communication between the master and slave IDS can be established over the existing
network with the protection provided by standard security protocols, such as SSL/TLS.
Furthermore, today’s sensing devices are deploying Ethernet interfaces [65], which make it
possible for a slave IDS to collect the trusted measurements from sensors and to monitor the
commands on actuators.
3.5 Adapting Semantic Analysis for Intrusion Response
In this section, we first adapt the classical AC power flow analysis algorithm to support low-
latency detection of malicious control commands. Then, we introduce an intrusion-response
mechanism that neither affects the system’s normal operations nor adds new vulnerabilities
that could be exploited by attackers. The purpose of proposing this response mechanism is
to demonstrate how the adaptive power flow analysis algorithm makes the trade-off between
detection accuracy and latency.
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3.5.1 Adapting the AC Power Flow Analysis Algorithm
The classical AC power flow analysis algorithm uses iterative algorithms, e.g., the Newton-
Raphson algorithm, to accurately calculate the power system’s state. In the iterative al-
gorithms, a long time is usually spent getting the solution to converge within a predefined
threshold.
To avoid iterative computations, different types of DC power flow analyses are used to
solve the linear approximation of the nonlinear power flow equations [46]. Because compu-
tation time is significantly reduced, these methods are used to select and rank high-order
contingencies. However, solutions obtained from DC power flow analyses can be inaccurate.
For example, the study in [66] demonstrates that the calculation error introduced by DC
power flow analysis can be as high as 35%. Consequently, if the semantic analysis frame-
work uses the DC power flow analysis algorithm, the resulting calculation errors can lead to
a large number of false detections on both malicious and normal commands.
Figure 3.7: Dynamically adapting the number of iterations
Instead of directly using AC or DC power flow analyses, we adapt the Newton-Raphson
iterative algorithm to find the trade-off between the calculation accuracy and latency. First,
we use the most recent known system state at the time a malicious command is issued as the
initial guess of the solution to the power flow equations. Second, the convergence threshold
is set such that the estimated system state is accurate enough to enable a correct decision
on whether the system is in an insecure state, i.e., whether one or more transmission lines
are overloaded. Those two approaches are commonly used in today’s power flow analysis
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Table 3.2: Comparisons of power flow analysis algorithms used in lower-order contingency
analysis (CA), high-order contingency selection (CS), and the semantic analysis.




Low latency to rank
contingencies for further
analysis
Medium latency and medium ac-
curacy by setting number of iter-
ations dynamically
Cons
Long latency to wait for
all solutions to converge
Low accuracy with lin-
ear approximation to es-
timate system states
Need to periodically profile the
number of iterations for each low-
order contingency
algorithm.
Third, we adapt the number of iterations that the iterative algorithm uses to estimate the
power system state. Instead of statically fixing this parameter, e.g., fixing it with one loop
of iteration as in [47], we dynamically adapt the number of iterations based on the control
fields of SCADA packets observed at runtime. Specifically, when a disturbance of multiple
devices is observed, the number of iterations that we decide on to analyze the disturbance
will be the average number of iterations that the classical AC power flow analysis takes to
analyze the disturbances of all the involved devices separately, i.e., the N − 1 contingency
analysis. Based on our experiments, we find that the number of iterations used to perform
N − 1 contingency analysis varies across a small range. Consequently, we can limit the
number of iterations used by the adaptive algorithm, thus reducing the detection latency.
Additionally, dynamic adaption allows for use of more iterations, if needed, to analyze one
of the involved devices; this approach can balance the detection accuracy and the latency.
As shown in Figure 3.7, for each N − 1 contingency, we record in a profile the number of
iterations after which the classical AC power flow analysis converges. When the disturbance
of devices 1, 3, and 4 is observed, the adaptive algorithm uses 4 iterations to calculate the
system states, which are further used for detection.
In Table 3.2, we summarize positives and negatives of the power flow analysis algorithms




Before proposing specific intrusion response mechanisms, we study the timeline of steps
that occur when a control command is executed (shown in Figure 3.8) or the steps of the
“execution stage” shown in Figure 1.1. We use this timeline to analyze two categories of
response mechanisms: delay command execution and reverse command execution.
Figure 3.8: Timeline of steps of executing a command.
The execution stage includes the delivery and the execution of a control command. Specif-
ically, substation devices make physical changes after receiving the command, e.g., opening
multiple circuit breakers. After the command’s execution, e.g., circuit breakers are opened
and the corresponding transmission lines are disconnected, the power system experiences
transient changes and may ultimately reach a new steady state. This period is represented
by the state transition stage. In the new steady state, if one or more transmission lines are
overloaded, the steady state is regarded as insecure. 2 When in the insecure steady state,
the power system further experiences the cascaded changes stage, in which the changes ini-
tiated by the malicious command propagate through the whole system. During this stage,
the protection relays automatically operate in an attempt to contain the spread of potential
damage. If that is not successful, the power system may collapse, e.g., causing a blackout.
Although the command-delaying mechanism prevents malicious physical changes from
being initiated, it requires the semantic analysis to complete before the command begins
its execution. This puts strict time constraints on the semantic analysis. In addition,
delaying a command may require the interception of every normal power system operation.
2After some system changes, the power system may lose synchronism and never reach a steady state [31].
To detect that phenomenon, methods other than power flow analysis should be used. We leave this for
future work.
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Consequently, it is very challenging to design and implement a response mechanism based
on this concept.
Instead, we use the command-reversing mechanism, which remedies the impact of mali-
cious commands. We take advantage of the fact that this mechanism is widely deployed
in practice to handle small system disturbances. For example, relays are usually equipped
with reclosing logic that can immediately auto-reclose an unwanted breaker trip command
to restore the system state. That existing logic can be reused to design and implement
a command-reversing intrusion response mechanism. Because it is challenging to remedy
damage spread to the whole power system, reverse commands need to be sent before the
malicious commands transition into the cascaded changes stage.
3.5.3 Intrusion Response: Case Study
In this section, we present an example intrusion response mechanism designed for the attack
scenario in which an intruder issues malicious manual commands to open one or more circuit
breakers to disconnect multiple transmission lines simultaneously. We assume that under
normal conditions those circuit breakers are closed.
The proposed intrusion response mechanism uses the command-reversing concept and
reuses a reclosing logic used in relays [67]. Specifically, when a command issued to open
circuit breakers is determined to be malicious, the response mechanism recloses the breakers.
Figure 3.9: Reclosing logic for accidental events and its extension (shaded part) to support
response to malicious commands.
We use an example protection scheme, shown in Figure 3.9, to explain how the original
reclosing logic reacts to a transient fault on a transmission line, e.g., lightning strikes a
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transmission line. In this protection scheme, a relay operates a circuit breaker to connect or
disconnect a transmission line through a hardwired connection.
To facilitate the explanation, we include in Figure 3.9 key components of the reclosing
logic based on the descriptions of real relays [67]. An overcurrent component is connected
through a hardwired connection to sensors that monitor line current. When a transient fault
occurs, the line is short-circuited to the ground, and its current magnitude dramatically
increases. When the current magnitude exceeds a predefined threshold, the overcurrent
component initiates an automatic command to open the breaker. To better describe the
reclosing procedure, we use texecute to denote the time that the relay needs to process and
execute a command. After the breaker is opened, the overcurrent component starts a timer
that expires after a period of time treclose and then recloses the breaker. During that period,
the transient fault can clear itself, so the original system state is restored after the breaker
is reclosed. Based on the relay design documents [67], the execution time of an automatic
command is usually restricted to no more than 10 clock cycles, i.e., approximately 167
milliseconds (ms) for a 60 Hz frequency; the reclose time is generally set at 500 ms [67].
To make the reclosing logic work for malicious commands, the relay initiates the timer
when it receives a manual command from the control center (as shown in the shaded part
of Figure 3.9). We use an AND gate (or similar logic) to combine the detection result of
the semantic analysis framework and the output of the timer. Consequently, when the timer
expires, the breakers are reclosed only if the control command is malicious.
As a result, the detection latency, which is defined as the time needed to complete the
semantic analysis, must satisfy the following condition: tsemantic ≤ texecute + treclose = 167 +
500 = 667ms. The adaptive power flow analysis algorithm described in Section 3.5.1 allows
us to meet this condition (see Section 3.8.3 for details).
If that intrusion response mechanism is used, a false-positive detection that requires man-
ual intervention can occur. When that happens, a manual command that opens a breaker
is mistakenly identified as malicious, the proposed response mechanism recloses the breaker,
and the intended command is not executed. To resolve the false-positive detection, the sys-
tem operator needs to disable detection, reissue the commands, and enable detection again.
Consequently, it is critical to use the adaptive power flow analysis algorithm (1) to reduce
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the rate of false-positive detections and (2) to complete the detections with short latency so
that the detections (including the false-positive ones) can be reported in seconds.
3.6 Evaluation Testbed Setup
To perform experiments, we set up a testbed consisting of a physical machine with an Intel
i3 (3.07 GHz) quad-core processor and 8 GB memory running the Ubuntu 12.04 operating
system.
Network Communication . The network communication was implemented based on
the structure shown in Figure 3.6. To produce different types of synthetic DNP3 network
traffic, e.g., the read, write, and execute commands in Table 3.1, a SCADA master and a
DNP3 slave were implemented based on the open DNP3 library [68] and run on two virtual
machines. 3
Specifically, the read command was issued every second and implemented by a DNP3
network packet that read all sensor measurements. The write command, simulated as a
Poisson process with an average arrival interval of 50 seconds, was implemented by a DNP3
network packet that set analog values, e.g., the values of generation and load adjustment
determined by an automatic generation control device or load-shedding controller [37][38].
The execute command, simulated as another Poisson process with an average arrival interval
of 100 seconds, was implemented by a DNP3 network packet that set binary values, e.g., the
status of a relay’s binary outputs, which usually control the status of electrical breakers.
In our attack scenario, the maliciously crafted commands are encoded in correct syntax.
Consequently, the same SCADA master was used to issue both legitimate and malicious
commands.
Power System Simulation . To simulate small-scale power systems, we used IEEE 24-
bus, 30-bus, and 39-bus systems whose baseline configurations are included in MATPOWER,
a MATLAB toolbox for power flow analysis [19]. We also used a 2736-bus power system
3In some experiments, we have used real physical devices that are used in power system substations as
DNP3 slaves, e.g., SEL-3530 Real-Time Automation Controller (RTAC) and SEL-421 Relay from Schweitzer
Engineering Laboratories(SEL) [69][67].
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in MATPOWER to simulate a large-scale power system. That power system represents the
Polish 400-, 220-, and 110-kV networks during the summer of 2004. In this chapter, the
semantic analysis framework detects the control-related attacks based on a system’s steady
state; it was not necessary to implement power system feedback control for our experiments.
Furthermore, we calculated the system state using the power flow analysis, which does not
perform bad data detection during the state estimation.
The parameters of the simulated power systems were modified based on control commands
in the simulated network communication. The power flow analysis module (provided by
MATPOWER) was used to analyze the power system’s steady state and identify the number
of overloaded transmission lines. The results were stored locally as a ground truth to be
used for validating the detection mechanism provided by the semantic analysis framework.
3.7 Evaluation of the DNP3 Analyzer
In this section, we present the evaluations of the DNP3 analyzer, which includes the DNP3
parser, the protocol validation policy, and two example security policies, i.e., the authenti-
cation policy and the integrity policy.
3.7.1 Implementation of the DNP3 Parser
First, we focus on robustness evaluation of the DNP3 parser. An unexpected hanging of
a parser would prevent it from analyzing DNP3 packets. As a result, the DNP3 analyzer
would fail to detect potential attacks.
The DNP3 parser is constructed by the binpac scripts, which express the structure of a
network protocol following a certain BNF grammar [57].
Table 3.3 shows a part of the binpac scripts that represent a DNP3 request. In binpac, a
record data structure, which is a user-defined composite type, describes a production rule in
a BNF grammar. For example, the “Dnp3 App Req Header” record can be regarded as the
following production rule:
Dnp3 App Req Header ::= application control function code
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Table 3.3: A part of the DNP3 parser in the binpac scripts.
type Dnp3 Request = record {
app header : Dnp3 App Req Header ;
data : case ( app header.function code ) of {
0x01 -> read requests : Read Req Object [ ] ;
0x02 -> write requests : Write Req Object [ ] ;
· · · · · ·
};
};
type Dnp3 App Req Header = record {
application control : uint8;
function code : uint8;
} &length = 2 ;
After the “app header” of the type “Dnp3 App Req Header” has been defined, the “data”
part can be defined by different new record types with internal structure that is varied
according to the function code field in “app header” (implemented by a “case” statement).
Similarly, whenever defining a new field inside the “data” part, we explicitly make a new
record type for this field instead of using predefined ones (even if this new field has the
same structure as the predefined ones). As a result, the DNP3 parser avoids using recursive
production rules, such as production rules with the form of A ::= Ax or A ::= Bx ; B ::=
A.
We evaluated the DNP3 parser using a sample traffic trace collected from a real electrical
power grid located in Ohio. We then evaluated it further using malformed synthetic network
traffic with the protocol validation policy. The latter experiment is described in following
sections.
3.7.2 Evaluation of the Protocol Validation Policy
The protocol validation policy is specifically defined based on the context of SCADA sys-
tems’ operating electrical power grids. Its implementation includes the definitions of three
event handlers: dnp3 app request header, dnp3 app response header, and dnp3 object header.
These event handlers extract values of the function code and the object type, and they extract
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other semantic information from the DNP3 request/response headers and object headers.
For example, an object with the group number 12 and variation number 1 describes a
CROB (Control Relay Output Block) object. This type of object can only be initiated by
requests with function codes 3, 4, 5, and 6. Consequently, we included the following Bro
scripts in the policy to validate this rule:
if ( ( obj type == 0x0c01 ) && ( ( function code < 0x03 ) || ( function code > 0x06 ) ) )
ALERT · · · ;
Other rules defined by the DNP3 protocols were verified through similar scripts. The
implementation details will be included in Bro’s source code repository [22].
3.7.2.1 Robustness Evaluation
To evaluate the robustness of the DNP3 analyzer and the protocol validation policy, we in-
tegrated in the SCADA testbed a “Fuzzy Engine,” which is shown in Figure 3.10. We used
protocol test harness [70], the software running in the control center, to generate DNP3 net-
work packets of different structures. The “Fuzzy Engine” is a self-developed program based
on the TCP/IP socket. In each round of communication, the “Fuzzy Engine” replaced each
byte of the generated packet with a random value. As a result, the control center issued both
well-formatted and malformed packets to the data aggregator (Figure 3.10). Corresponding
error detection codes (CRC values) were recalculated to simulate modifications made by an
attacker.
Figure 3.10: Integrate fuzzy engine into the evaluation testbed.
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For comparison, both Wireshark [59] and our DNP3 analyzer were used to monitor the
testbed at runtime. Notably, the two tools handled malformed network packets differently.
In one of our experiments, Wireshark looped for more than three hours when processing a
malformed packet that is shown in Figure 3.11. The fifth byte of the packet represented
the qualifier field that defines the hierarchical structure of the remaining part of the packet.
After it was replaced with the value 0x09, Wireshark hung for over three hours. Although
it is not clear what exactly caused the loop, we suspect that the injected errors resulted in
the misuse of a loop statement or a recursive procedure.
Figure 3.11: The malformed DNP3 network packet that makes Wireshark hang.
Our proposed DNP3 analyzer did not introduce such unreliable behavior during any of
our experiments. The DNP3 parser avoids using recursive production rules in its imple-
mentation. The protocol validation policy is implemented by fewer than 400 lines of Bro
scripts. Consequently, we can easily verify that the policy scripts avoid loop statements and
recursive function calls.
3.7.3 Evaluation of the Authentication Security Policy
Implementation. We created two groups of users, normal and privileged, in the con-
trol center. To simulate the correlation of host authentication and DNP3 operations, we
added a “Syslog Client” (Figure 3.12) to generate different syslog packets to simulate host
authentications for different users.
After the host authentication, DNP3 packets were sent immediately. We selected two
DNP3 commands to represent the measurement-collection and control operations. The
measurement-collection operation was represented by a DNP3 request to read all class 0
data objects in the field site. This request is assigned “0x01” function code followed by
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Figure 3.12: Integrate syslog servers with DNP3 analyzer to evaluate authentication policy.
class 0 data object as a parameter. 4 The control operation was represented by two DNP3
commands issued back to back: one assigned “0x03” function code (the SELECT function
code) and the other “0x04” function code (the OPERATE function code). The parameters
of both requests were the Control Relay Output Block object, which is used to set binary
outputs of relay devices.
Function Evaluation. To run the experiment, we randomly selected a user and ran-
domly issued one of the two representative DNP3 commands. The DNP3 analyzer worked
with Bro’s syslog analyzer to detect any violation of the authentication policy, i.e. either
lack of authentication for a DNP3 operation or an unauthorized DNP3 operation.
In the control center, we logged locally the generated syslog messages and the issued
operations. By comparing the local logs and alerts generated from DNP3 analyzer, we could
decide if the detection was a false positive or negative of this policy.
The experiment was carried out for approximately 20 hours. The latency between DNP3
requests was set to 1 second, which is the minimal interval that can be set in the real power
grid environment. During this period of experiment, the DNP3 analyzer generated no false
positives or false negatives.
3.7.4 Evaluation of the Integrity Security Policy
Implementation. To simulate the attack scenario in which the DNP3 slave is compromised,
we developed a “Trojan DNP3 slave” to replace the original software that is responsible for
4In the DNP3 protocol, class 0 data refers to static data or values in field sites.
69
forwarding measurements and control commands (Figure 3.13). The Trojan DNP3 slave was
written in the C programming language and relied on the TCP/IP socket API. In addition
to performing the same packet forwarding done by the original DNP3 slave, it also modified
the forwarded DNP3 packets at random locations with random values. Corresponding error
detection codes (CRC values) were recalculated to simulate an attacker’s modifications. The
Trojan DNP3 slave was cross-compiled and installed in the real physical machine from SEL
(Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories) [69]. By deploying the Trojan DNP3 slave, an attacker
can perform a man-in-the-middle attack to corrupt control operations and measurement
data.
Figure 3.13: Integrate trojan DNP3 slave in the testbed to evaluate integrity policy.
In this experiment, we used the Trojan DNP3 slave to inject errors into the measurement
data carried by responses to the control center. Injecting errors into the control operation
carried by requests can be performed similarly.
To detect such silent corruption, the integrity policy was implemented by including the
definitions of four groups of event handlers: dnp3 analog input, dnp3 analog output, dnp3 bi-
nary input, and dnp3 binary output. These event handlers are responsible for extracting
different types of measurement data, which are encoded in diverse format.
In the testbed, the control center, the Trojan DNP3 slave, and the sensors were assigned
different IP addresses. Based on the source and destination IP addresses, the DNP3 ana-
lyzer distinguished the measurement data from the ingress and egress network traffic of the
Trojan DNP3 slave. A comparison of these two sets of data was made to validate whether
measurement data were corrupted during processing.
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Function Evaluation. In this experiment, the Trojan DNP3 agent was further instru-
mented to log modifications made to all forwarded DNP3 network packets. Based on the
alerts generated by the DNP3 analyzer and the logs, we can determine the detection to be
false positive or negative.
The Control Center Workstation issued DNP3 read requests continuously for about 20
hours, and the latency between DNP3 requests was set to 0.5 seconds. During our experi-
ment, no false positive or negative alerts were generated from the DNP3 analyzer.
3.7.5 Performance Evaluation
Because the DNP3 analyzer is used to analyze industry control environments passively,
it must process network packets in real time to provide useful detection results. In this
section, we evaluate the throughput of the DNP3 analyzer. We adopt two throughput
metrics for evaluation: the number of bits processed per second (bps) and the number of
packets processed per second (pps).
We used the evaluation testbed shown in Figure 3.10, Figure 3.12, and Figure 3.13 to
generate different traces of DNP3 network packets in order to evaluate the performance of
the DNP3 analyzer when it is loaded with different policies. To achieve better explanations,
we use P -trace, A-trace, and I -trace to refer to the network traces collected from experiments
when we evaluate the protocol validation policy, the authentication policy, and the integrity
policy, respectively. The detailed description of these three traces is presented in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: DNP3 network traces.
Trace Description Size (MB) Size (# of packets)
P -trace
Contained both well-formatted and
malformed DNP3 network packets.
1200 3,789,120
A-trace
contained both syslog messages and
DNP3 network packets representing the




Contained DNP3 packets carrying mea-
surement data
995 2,040,000
The DNP3 analyzer processed the packet trace off-line on the monitor machine. The
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purpose of the offline analysis is to evaluate the ultimate processing capabilities of the DNP3
analyzer. The analysis results can suggest how the proposed DNP3 analyzer might fit into
real SCADA systems.
The monitor machine, where the DNP3 analyzer was installed and running, was a VMware
virtual machine with a single logical processor with two 3.07GHz cores and a 1GB RAM.
During the processing, we ran the monitor machine exclusively without starting other virtual
machines in the same host to avoid possible interference. We performed 10 experimental
runs to measure the average execution time.
3.7.5.1 Performance of the DNP3 Parser
To evaluate the performance of the DNP3 parser (the DNP3 analyzer without loading any
policy), we compared it to the FTP parser (parsing FTP control commands only) that was
initially integrated in Bro. The reason we choose the FTP parser is that FTP command
protocol uses an application layer functionality and payload size similar to those used by the
DNP3 protocol.
In this section, we used FTP traces from [71] as the workload of the FTP parser. We
selected 989 MB of such traces, which included 2,392,000 FTP packets. We ran the Bro’s
FTP analyzer against this FTP trace, and the DNP3 analyzer against the P -trace. We did
not load any policies for either analyzer. As a result, only the FTP parser and the DNP3
parser were processing the corresponding network trace. Each experiment was performed
for 10 runs to measure the average execution time.
Figure 3.14: Comparison of the performance of the DNP3 parser and the FTP parser.
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The evaluation results are presented in Figure 3.14. We used the FTP parser to process
the FTP trace with and without the DNP3 parser enabled. The results are presented in
the first two columns in the figure. A very slight performance overhead (less than 2%) was
generated by the DNP3 parser even if it did not process the FTP trace. This is because the
DNP3 parser will spend small amounts of time to decide whether to process the application
layer payload. In Bro, such decisions can be made according to the TCP port number or
“contents signatures” [22]. As a result, even if the DNP3 parser is enabled, it has only a
small impact on the work of other analyzers.
The third column represents the throughput of the DNP3 parser processing the P -trace.
Compared to the FTP parser, the DNP3 parser had better throughput based on both eval-
uation metrics. Even though DNP3 can have diverse structures, the commonly used DNP3
packets are usually small (the application layer payload is less than 250 bytes) and contain
small numbers of objects. With larger packet size, the throughput of the DNP3 parser may
be degraded. However, the processing capability of legacy hardware devices limits the size of
the DNP3 network packet. For example, some proprietary software used in power systems,
e.g., the protocol test harness [70], suggests that the size of a DNP3 packet should not be
larger than 1024 bytes.
3.7.5.2 Performance Overhead Due to Policies
To evaluate the additional performance overhead caused by policies, we loaded the DNP3
parser with three policies: the protocol validation policy, the authentication policy, and
the integrity policy. Then we ran the analyzer against the corresponding traces. Each
experiment was performed for 10 runs to measure the average execution time.
The evaluation results in terms of the two throughput metrics are presented in two sub-
figures of Figure 3.15, respectively. Since evaluations for each policy were made on different
network traffic traces, i.e., P -trace, A-trace, and I -trace (see Table 3.4), we separated the
results into three groups. In each group, we used “DNP3 Parser” to represent the scenario in
which the DNP3 analyzer processed the network trace without loading any policy; in other
words, only the DNP3 parser was working this scenario. In the other scenario, represented
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.15: The throughput of DNP3 analyzer with policies: (a) in Mbps; (b) in pps.
by “DNP3 Parser+Policy,” both the DNP3 parser and the policy script interpreter were
working to process the network trace.
The throughput degradation (per both metrics) ranges from 9% (authentication policy)
to 32% (protocol validation policy). To analyze the P -trace, the DNP3 analyzer used the
protocol validation policy to perform intense analysis on almost all fields of each DNP3 net-
work packet and generated a large number of alerts from malformed packets. Consequently,
the DNP3 analyzer experienced a large degradation when it used the protocol validation
policy to process the protocol validation policy.
The other interesting phenomenon is that the DNP3 analyzer processed less network traffic
when loading the authentication and integrity policy. The reason is that both A-trace and
I -trace contain a large number of DNP3 requests to retrieve measurement data from sensors,
which causes a response with a large packet size. Consequently, fewer DNP3 packets were
processed.
In the conducted experiments, more than 8000 DNP3 network packets were processed
every second. In an industrial control environment such as the power grid, legacy devices
usually issue one or two DNP3 network packets every second [72]. Based on those figures,
we anticipate that the proposed DNP3 analyzer can monitor a field site consisting of 4000
to 8000 devices. When more DNP3 analyzers are distributed into different host machines to
form a monitor cluster, a larger-scale control environment can be monitored. Furthermore,
it is possible to design an intrusion prevention system based on the proposed DNP3 analyzer
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to stop malicious operations.
3.8 Evaluation of the Semantic Analysis Framework
In this section, we evaluate the detection latency and accuracy of the proposed rapid adaptive
power flow analysis algorithm. The experimental results demonstrate that the adaptive
algorithm allows the semantic analysis framework to achieve rapid detection and timely
intrusion response.
3.8.1 Detection Accuracy
We use the false-positive and false-negative ratio to estimate the detection accuracy of the
adaptive power flow analysis algorithm. Specifically, we used the classical AC power flow
analysis algorithm, the adaptive power flow analysis algorithm, and the DC power flow
analysis algorithm to calculate the system states. Then, the same set of power flow limits
included in MATPOWER was used to decide whether the system was in an insecure state.
We regard the power system state calculated from the classical AC power flow analysis as
ground truth, and we regard the corresponding detection as accurate. Both adaptive power
flow analysis and DC power flow analysis make a false-positive detection if they identify at
least one overloaded transmission line when there are actually no overloaded lines. Similarly,
a false-negative detection is made if no overloaded lines are found, but actually at least one
line is overloaded according to the calculations of classical AC power flow analysis.
We used the Newton-Raphson algorithm for the classical AC power flow analysis. The
flat voltage profile was used as the initial solution (i.e., Vi = 1 and θi = 0
◦ for each bus); the
maximum number of iterative loops to be used in calculating power system states was set
to 50; and the convergence threshold was set as 10−6 per unit for the resultant real power
and reactive power of each transmission line.
To configure the adaptive power flow analysis algorithm, we first used the aforementioned
classical AC power flow analysis to calculate an accurate system state on the base power
generation and load demand. Then, we used that state as the initial solution to analyze the
75
considered system changes. We set the convergence threshold as 10−3 per unit, which is the
same precision level that the power flow limit included in MATPOWER has.
To choose the number of iterations to use in evaluating malicious perturbations on multi-
ple devices, we first used the same AC power flow analysis to perform an N − 1 contingency
analysis on the perturbations of each single device and recorded the number of iterations to
calculate the accurate system state. In our experiments, we found that even when all gen-
erations and load demands were increased or decreased up to 50%, the number of iterations
did not vary significantly. Consequently, we only adjusted the iterations when the outage of
multiple transmission lines was observed. Specifically, when the outage of multiple lines was
evaluated, the number of iterations was set as the average number of iterations that were
used to analyze the outages of all the involved transmission lines separately.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.16: Real power errors caused by adaptive and DC power flow analyses.
Both the proposed adaptive algorithm and the DC power flow analysis can introduce
calculation errors. To compare the calculation errors, we followed the evaluation procedure
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used in [66]. In each perturbation, we used the adaptive algorithm and the DC power flow
analysis to calculate the real power of each transmission line. As suggested by [66], we filtered
out the perturbations for which the classical AC power flow analysis did not converge and
focused on the real power of the transmission line that was loaded above 70% of its power
flow limit.
Figure 3.16 compares the calculation errors, both positive and negative, caused by the
proposed adaptive algorithm and the DC power flow analysis algorithm. The x -axis indi-
cates the types of the simulated systems; for each system, we put the results from the two
algorithms, which are represented by bars of two different shades of gray, side by side. The
y-axis specifies the real power errors, which are normalized to the results obtained by using
the classical AC power flow analysis. In Figure 3.16.(a), we present the maximum positive
and negative errors when the two algorithms are used. Because of the large number of
perturbations in our experiments, we selected the top 1000 maximum positive and negative
errors, and present the average of these errors in Figure 3.16.(b). As shown in Figure 3.16,
the real power errors caused by the proposed adaptive algorithm are at least one order of
magnitude smaller than those caused by the DC power flow analysis. Furthermore, the cal-
culation errors caused by the adaptive algorithm are less than 15% in the worst case, i.e.,
the 24-bus system; such calculation accuracy can help reduce false detections.
In this section, we consider a system to be in an insecure state if there is at least one
overloaded transmission line. As a result, making the correct decision as to whether a
perturbation puts the system into an insecure state is decided by the calculated real power
and also by the power flow limit of each transmission line.
Table 3.5: Detection accuracy based on the adaptive power flow analysis and DC power
flow analysis.
24-bus 30-bus 39-bus 2736-bus
Adaptive
FP 0.00049% 0.78% 0 0
FN 0.012% 0.013% 0.012% 0.00048%
DC
FP 7.6% 2.6% 6.7% 5.3%
FN 1.3% 20% 0.3% 1.9%
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To demonstrate the accuracy of the detections of insecure perturbations, Table 3.5 shows
the rate of false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN ) for the adaptive power flow anal-
ysis algorithm (Adaptive) and the DC algorithm included in MATPOWER (DC ). If the
DC power flow analysis is used in semantic analysis, large numbers of false positives and
false negatives are expected. The false negatives do not affect the power system’s normal
operation. However, in the worst case, e.g., with 20% false negatives for the IEEE 30-bus
system, the system is vulnerable to control-related attacks, i.e., the changes in the power
system caused by the malicious command may not be detected. On the other hand, false
positives usually require further action, e.g., manual inspection and a response to mitigate
the detected problem. With a high false-positive rate, an operator may intervene frequently
without there being an actual need for action.
With the help of the adaptive power flow analysis algorithm, the false-negative rate was
reduced to 0.01%, on average. The false-positive rate was reduced to 0.78% in the worst
case (the 30-bus system). For the 2736-bus and 39-bus systems, we did not find any false
positives in the experiments.
3.8.2 Detection Latency
For each attack, we measured the detection latency when the semantic analysis used the
classical AC power flow analysis (AC ), the adaptive power flow analysis (Adaptive), and
the DC power flow analysis (DC ). Figure 3.17 presents the average detection latencies for
all considered attacks with a 95% confidence interval (CI). The x -axis indicates the four
test systems; bars of different shades of gray distinguish the three algorithms. The y-axis
indicates detection latency. Because the 2736-bus system has a larger scale than the other
three systems, its detection latency is at least one order of magnitude longer than those of
the small-scale systems. Therefore, we show the detection latency for the 24-bus, 30-bus,
and 39-bus systems in a separate figure.
With the help of the adaptive power flow analysis algorithm, the detection latency was
reduced by approximately 50% for the 24-bus and 39-bus systems. The reduction rate was
higher, 66%, for the 2736-bus system. The reduction of latency is directly caused by the
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Figure 3.17: Execution times to calculate system states based on classical AC, adaptive,
and DC power flow analysis. (With 95% CI, error margins are within 10 ms for the
large-scale test system and within 0.01 ms for the small-scale test systems.)
reduced number of iterations performed in the adaptive algorithm. In our experiments, the
classical AC power flow analysis could take up to 10 iterations until the solution converged,
or 50 iterations if the solution did not converge. The proposed adaptive algorithm reduced
the calculation to two to four iterations for different perturbations. The smallest reduction
occurred for the 30-bus system, at merely 16%. With further analysis of the 30-bus system,
we found that the classical AC power flow analysis needed only three iterations, on average,
to evaluate attack attempts. Hence, the detection latency was already short when the
classical AC algorithm was used.
The DC power flow analysis uses a single iteration to calculate system state. As a result,
it requires much less time for the calculation. For the 2736-bus system, its latency could be
one or two orders of magnitude shorter than the latency caused by the classical AC power
flow analysis. However, the detection accuracy based on DC power flow analysis could be
unacceptable, as shown in Table 3.5.
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3.8.3 Integration of Intrusion Response Mechanism
Based on the analysis in Section 3.5.3, we assume 667 ms as the allowed latency for the
proposed semantic analysis framework to complete detection. For all our small-scale test
systems, the detection latency based on classical AC power flow analysis was usually less
than 10 ms. For the large-scale 2736-bus system, however, 600 ms (around 40 clock cycles)
was usually needed for the semantic analysis to make a detection based on the classical AC
power flow analysis algorithm. The safety margin between the detection and the response
was only about 67 ms, which may not be sufficient in practice. However, with the help of the
adaptive power flow analysis algorithm, we could reduce the calculation time to less than
200 ms, which would increase the safety margin to around 400 ms.
3.9 Related Work
To detect malicious activities in SCADA systems, previously proposed network IDSs usually
rely on deviations from predefined or profiled normal communication patterns in the control
network. For example, [21][73] define the normal patterns based on SCADA protocols, and
[74] adopts machine-learning techniques to cluster normal and abnormal communication
patterns. However, control-related attacks can rely on legitimate commands with malicious
contents, which can easily circumvent such detection mechanisms. In [75], local information
in smart grids is correlated to detect attacks; the distributed IDS proposed in [75] is based
on anomaly-based methods. In our work, the IDS instances use the specification-based
approach, which relies on knowledge of a grid’s physical infrastructure to detect cyber-
attacks [21][56].
To detect intrusions in a power grid, an IDS should take the grid’s cyber-physical char-
acteristics into consideration [76][77][78]. In [79][80], the statistical characteristics of the
sensor measurements or historical data are used to detect penetrations into power systems.
Based on those methods, detection takes place after the physical damage has been done to
the system, and it can require modification of existing SCADA systems. In [81], the authors
detect penetrations by combining information on network activities, e.g., data from logs of
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SCADA systems, with information on their possible physical impacts. Anomaly-based meth-
ods usually suffer from high false-positive rates, and the detection results can be difficult to
interpret [82]. In [36][61][62], the authors show that a blacklist for malicious system states
can be built through simulation. At runtime, the observed system change is compared with
the blacklist to detect malicious changes. Because the power system state is continuously
changing, it is challenging to cover all possible attack cases using the blacklist. Furthermore,
building a blacklist may not scale for larger systems, such as the 2736-bus system considered
in our experiments.
Carcano et al. propose a concept of a state-based network IDS that includes physical
information to detect attacks in power systems [83]. That concept is consistent with the
principle on which we designed the semantic analysis framework. However, the proposed
semantic analysis framework further includes the practical constraints encountered in the
power grid. First, [83] proposes use of alerts or static patterns from the network IDS to
trigger the analysis of network contents; however, in practice, the malicious commands may
be encoded in a legitimate format without introducing any anomaly at the network level.
The semantic analysis framework relies on the runtime network analyzer that we specifically
developed for SCADA systems, and it can extract and analyze all SCADA-specific seman-
tics [24]. Consequently, we can provide better accuracy and flexibility in deciding when and
how to use knowledge of the physical infrastructure. Second, [83] relies on a centralized
image to detect attacks, while we deploy IDS instances in a master/slave architecture to de-
tect the compromise of measurements or control commands during communication. Third,
the semantic analysis framework integrates the proposed adaptive power flow analysis algo-
rithm, which can balance detection latency and accuracy; the proposed algorithm plays an
important role if response mechanisms are deployed.
3.10 Conclusions
In this chapter, we propose a semantic analysis framework for detecting control-related at-
tacks. Network IDSs developed based on Bro leverage the proposed adaptive power flow
analysis algorithm to perform timely and accurate detection of malicious control commands
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observed from a vulnerable SCADA network. To demonstrate the use of the semantic anal-
ysis framework, we study an example intrusion response mechanism that targets malicious
commands attempting to open multiple transmission lines.
We present the implementation of the DNP3 analyzer, which is now included in Bro. We
evaluate the DNP3 analyzer and the proposed semantic analysis framework on IEEE 24-bus,
30-bus, and 39-bus systems and on a 2736-bus system. The proposed adaptive power flow
analysis algorithm introduced at most a 0.8% false-positive rate and a 0.01% false-negative
rate in our experiments. The semantic analysis could complete a detection in about 200 ms,
even for the large-scale test system, making response to the intrusion practical.
In future work, we will focus on control-theoretic approaches and formal methods to study
control-related attacks in a hybrid system model. We plan to include in the analysis the
factors extracted from both the cyber and physical infrastructure of the power grid and to




SMART GRID RESILIENCE: OPPORTUNITIES
AND CHALLENGES
4.1 Preamble
In Chapter 3, we presented the design of the semantic analysis framework, which can detect
malicious commands efficiently and effectively. However, it is challenging to respond to the
control-related attacks after they are detected, in order to remedy attacks’ physical damage.
We argue that using the software-defined networking (SDN) can help to increase the
overall resilience of power systems. In this chapter, we provide an initial understanding
of the benefits and risks of applying SDN to increase smart grid resilience. Based on the
initial understanding, we have applied SDN into two designs in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
respectively. In the first design, we use SDN to optimally and efficiently recover the services
of physical devices after they are compromised by malicious attackers, i.e., remedy and
respond to the physical consequence of control-related attacks after they are executed and
detected. In the second design, we use SDN to preemptively disrupt and mislead adversaries
when they prepare attacks during the “preparation stage” shown in Figure 1.1, such that
we can ultimately prevent physical damage in power systems from happening.
4.2 Introduction
As a fundamental part of the smart grid infrastructure, a communication network connects
massive grid devices over vast geographic areas to support the grid’s SCADA (supervisory
control and data acquisition) system. Current grid communication networks are based on
the standard IP networking paradigm, where the network functionality (e.g., routing) is
mostly fixed at the design phase. At run time, it is often tedious, cumbersome, and even
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impossible to reconfigure a network to react in time to accidental and malicious events that
undermine grid efficiency and safety.
Moreover, such a non-adaptive paradigm can become a performance and resilience bot-
tleneck, because of the increasing adoption of modern smart grid technologies that request
higher and dynamic network bandwidth and, meanwhile, may expose a larger attack sur-
face because of the pervasive use of software. Examples include phasor measurement units
(PMUs) and customer smart meters, which are bandwidth-demanding and found to be vul-
nerable [84][85].
In this chapter, we consider the application of SDN to smart grids for enhancing system
resilience. SDN is a new networking paradigm whose key feature is the separation of the
control plane and the data plane [86]. In SDN, network switches are simple forwarding de-
vices, whose forwarding rules can be dynamically configured by a central controller. With
the switches and the controller conforming to a control plane protocol (e.g., the OpenFlow
protocol [87]), SDN empowers network operators to redefine the operations of a network at
run time. In general network environments, SDN has been employed for real-time optimiza-
tion of network quality of service (QoS) [88] as well as rapid response to detected failures
and performance degradation caused by accidental failures [89] and malicious attacks [90].
Several studies [91][92][93][94][95] advocate adopting SDN to enrich functionality and im-
prove QoS of smart grid communication networks by leveraging SDN’s run-time configura-
bility. While QoS is an important issue, system resilience, i.e., the ability of a system to
recover and maintain critical services despite accidental failures and malicious attacks, is also
a key consideration for critical infrastructures like power grids. In particular, the resilience
to attacks has received significantly heightened attention given recent security incidents in
national critical infrastructures, such as Stuxnet [6] and Dragonfly [96].
Nonetheless, without a systematic understanding of the resilience benefits and risks that
SDN can bring to smart grids, as well as the approaches to manage the risks, the power
grid industry is unlikely to adopt SDN technologies. A key challenge in understanding
these issues is the need to respect power-engineering-specific requirements and the complex
cyber-physical coupling in the sensing-control-actuation closed loops in smart grids.
In this chapter, we provide an initial understanding of the benefits and risks of SDN for
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smart grid resilience. Specifically through illustrative examples, we discuss the following
three questions:
(1) What are the opportunities for SDN to enhance smart grid resilience? In this context,
a key advantage of SDN is its ability to dynamically configure the network (e.g., to
create and delete routing paths) to prevent failures and attacks, mitigate their impact
if they occur, and isolate them if possible. Although in principle this advantage applies
to a broad class of accidental failures and malicious attacks, our focus in this chapter
is on attacks. Specifically, we discuss three use cases.
First, we propose to use SDN to establish dynamic routes for grid control commands,
only when the commands are to be transmitted from a control center to grid devices.
This approach significantly shrinks the time window in which the attacker can inject
malicious commands. Moreover, it also prohibits malicious rerouting and denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks.
Second, we propose to use SDN to reset switches or re-establish the routing of a
grid control application upon the detection of compromised switches, to maintain grid
control quality.
Third, we propose to use SDN to hot-swap certain grid communication channels from
grid-owned communication networks to the public Internet with sufficient encryption,
in the presence of devastating attacks in the grid-owned networks.
In summary, SDN can significantly raise the bar for attacks to be successful and
provide fast network recovery for sustainable grid operations in the presence of attacks.
(2) What are the security risks that SDN brings to smart grids? System complexity often
engenders both features and vulnerabilities. SDN brings two major risks. First, its
control plane may contain vulnerabilities in its software. Second, its central controller
is subject to single-point failures and DoS attacks [97][98]. As SDN is an emerging
technology, its security is still being investigated and improved in the general network
context [99][100]. However, it is also imperative to examine its security in smart grid
environments with due consideration of the grid-specific requirements and the cyber-
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physical coupling. For instance, malicious rerouting of a sensor/control data flow using
a long-latency path may be valid from a pure networking perspective, but may reduce
the operational quality of grid control systems [101][102][103].
In this chapter, we discuss three concrete security issues and possible countermea-
sures. First, a compromised SDN controller may issue malicious SDN control messages
to undermine network performance and even destroy the network topology. We pro-
pose to examine each outgoing SDN control message by predicting its potential cyber
and physical impact on the grid. Second, we propose to leverage several unique charac-
teristics of grid communication traffic for early detection of DoS attempts. Third, we
discuss a potential attack in which the attacker can deploy inside the communication
network a “darknet” that hides its malicious activities (e.g., to send malicious com-
mands to grid devices) from monitoring channels. Recent research results on rootkit
detection [104][105] may shed light on detection of such darknets in SDN.
All the above security issues call for important future research to make SDN more
viable for smart grids.
(3) How do we validate and evaluate the above proposals? Validation and evaluation of
resilience solutions for complex cyber-physical systems like smart grids remain diffi-
cult problems. Integration of SDN will create additional challenges. In that regard,
we describe our ongoing research in establishing a smart grid testbed that integrates
Mininet (an SDN emulator), PowerWorld (a power system simulator), and a Bro-based
semantic intrusion detection system (IDS) that analyzes the DNP3 traffic of a power
grid SCADA system. The Mininet-PowerWorld co-simulator provides the cyber and
physical “ground truth”, while the IDS provides attack detection results for triggering
SDN counteractions as well as a base framework to implement SDN control message
verification.
In summary, the testbed provides a handy and extensible environment that facilitates
the exploration and validation of innovative ideas and solutions for smart grid resilience
by SDN techniques.
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4.3 Overview of SDN-enabled Grids
With run-time configurability, SDN can bring significant benefits to the smart grid landscape.
We envisage a future in which, by adopting SDN, grid operators will gain greater power
and flexibility in defeating or mitigating cyber-attacks. This section describes a simplified


































Figure 4.1: A simplified architecture of an SDN-enabled grid.
Figure 4.1 illustrates an SDN-enabled smart grid with three major components: a control
center, a communication network, and a power grid (exemplified by the IEEE 14-bus test
system).
The grid is mainly controlled by the SCADA system involving computers, networks, con-
trol devices, and software. The control center runs the SCADAmaster commodity computers
and servers to perform various grid control applications, e.g., grid status monitoring, under-
frequency load shedding, frequency and voltage controls, and so forth. The SCADA master
collects measurement data and transmits control commands from/to SCADA slaves in the
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grid via the grid communication network; the SCADA slaves, in turn, interact with various
control devices. Recently, control devices in smart grids are increasingly being equipped with
advanced computing capabilities, COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) operating systems and
application software, and various communication interfaces. Such “smart” control devices,
e.g., IEDs (intelligent electronic devices) and RTUs (remote terminal units), collect readings
from sensors, e.g., traditional meters and PMUs, and issue commands to actuators, e.g.,
circuit breakers and tap changers.
With SDN technologies, the communication network shared by the SCADAmaster, SCADA
slaves, and control devices, sensors, and actuators can be controlled by the SDN controller,
with certain legacy network segments using legacy switches. The SDN controller runs various
SDN applications to reconfigure the communication network at the right times to optimize
QoS and implement resilience support.
In addition, the control center may run an IDS to analyze all incoming and outgoing
packets to detect potential malicious activities. More specifically, the SCADA master, the
SDN controller, and the IDS can communicate with each other for coordinated actions.
We note that the proposed architecture does not mandate specific means of communication
among the SCADA master, the SDN controller, and the IDS. The different communication
channels are explained as follows (see Figure 4.1 for details): (1) The SCADA master and
the SDN controller can coordinate their actions to ensure correct and timely retrievals of
sensor measurements and deliveries of control commands. (2) The IDS can notify the SDN
controller upon the detection of attacks, possibly with attack profiles (e.g., which data flow
paths have been compromised), such that the SDN controller can reconfigure the network
accordingly; meanwhile, the SDN controller can provide the IDS with the overall network
status to help with attack detection. (3) The IDS can notify the SCADA master upon
the detection of the attacks, such that the SCADA master can tune control parameters to
mitigate the impact of attacks; meanwhile, the SCADA master can provide the IDS with
detailed run-time information to help detect attacks.
Although our discussions in this chapter are independent of how the interactions (1), (2),
and (3) are substantiated in the control center, as a general security practice, we assume
that they are directly connected via a separate LAN from the SDN-controlled network. Since
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our focus here is on SDN for grid resilience, our discussions in this chapter mainly involve
(1) and (2). For the interaction (3), we refer readers to existing studies (e.g., [21]) for more
details.
A smart grid faces various cybersecurity threats due to device and system vulnerabilities,
careless vendor software upgrade, disgruntled employees, etc. To facilitate our discussion
on the opportunities and challenges of SDN in improving grid resilience, we specifically
categorize related threats to an SDN-enabled smart grid into the following classes (also
illustrated in Figure 4.1). The categorization is mainly based on the components targeted
by the attacks:
(A1) Compromised network switches;
(A2) Compromised grid devices, e.g., RTUs, relays, or SCADA slaves;
(A3) Compromised SDN controllers and/or SDN controller applications.1
The threats A1 and A2 are faced by any smart grid, while A3 is specific to SDN-enabled
smart grids. Note that the threat A1 may become more credible in SDN-enabled smart
grids, because of the software-based switch control and reduced switch heterogeneity [106]. In
Section 4.4, we discuss how to leverage SDN to defeat or mitigate A1 and A2. In Section 4.5,
we discuss the challenges brought by A1 and A3, as well as the approaches to manage them
to make SDN more viable for enhancing smart grid resilience.
4.4 Grid Resilience Enhancement Opportunities with SDN
This section discusses three use cases to demonstrate how SDN can be leveraged to improve
smart grid resilience to attacks.
4.4.1 Efficient Detection of Attacks on Critical Control Devices
Smart control devices, e.g., IEDs and RTUs, are playing a major role in smart grid oper-
ations. At the same time, such advanced computing and networking devices can expose a
larger attack surface to attackers, who can penetrate the control network via various means,
1In the rest of this chapter, we use the labels A1 to A3 to refer to the three classes of threats.
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e.g., an imperfect “air gap” from the Internet, USB devices, and vendor software updates.
Traditional security mechanisms (e.g., firewalls) are inadequate, as seen in recent security
incidents [6][96], because they often reside on network boundaries and cannot protect the
system once they are bypassed.
Figure 4.2: Illustration of SDN-enabled defense against attacks on control devices in a
smart grid. (A: Disabled path to prevent compromised RTUs from redirecting commands to
unwanted relays. B: Filtering packets to mitigate DDoS attacks.)
SDN techniques enable unprecedented capabilities for preventing such attacks by dynam-
ically reconfiguring the network to filter out unwanted and potentially malicious traffic due
to the threats A1 and A2. For example, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, the SCADA master and
the SDN controller can coordinate to automatically establish a route to transmit control
commands only when necessary. That will significantly shorten the time window during
which an attacker can inject malicious control commands from a compromised grid control
application or a compromised network switch. Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 4.2.A, even
if an attacker compromises a critical RTU that forwards control commands to relays, he/she
will not be able to maliciously reroute the commands to a different relay to cause damage
to the grid.
As another example, an attacker can spoof packets that request sensors or relays to send
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measurements to a certain RTU or a data aggregator. That could, in turn, trigger flooded
traffic from many sensors or relays to the victim RTU or data aggregator. As illustrated in
Figure 4.2.B, with SDN, the control center can dynamically configure the switch, so that
dynamic monitoring can be implemented to filter out suspiciously excessive traffic towards
a certain destination. That can significantly alleviate the load of the victim RTU under
such attacks, and maintain the overall availability of the grid communication network. In
summary, we envision that SDN can provide handy support in constructing more flexible,
precise, and efficient prevention and countermeasures against threats to critical devices in
smart grid SCADA systems.
4.4.2 Resilient Virtual Network Layer for Grid Control Applications
Compromised network switches (A1) may launch a class of attacks that cannot be easily
detected and confirmed. A representative example is malicious packet delay, which can
lead to synchronization issues, performance degradation of grid controls [101][103], and even
destabilization [102]. It is often hard to recognize the presence of delay attacks, especially
when the attacker strategically and perhaps mildly delays sensor measurement and/or control
command packets to undermine the operation optimality. That is in contrast to integrity
attacks, which can be detected by cryptographic mechanisms and out-of-band verification.
Other examples of such hard-to-confirm attacks include selective packet drop and replay.
Nevertheless, detection and confirmation of this class of attacks often involve cumbersome
manual investigation and take an undesirably long time. Thus, it is desirable to ensure
sustainable grid operation performance in the presence of such hard-to-confirm attacks.
SDN provides a mechanism for building a virtual network layer on top of physical commu-
nication links [93]. This additional layer can help mitigate the impact of the hard-to-confirm
attacks. A virtual network is often defined to connect devices and convey packets that belong
to a certain grid control application. By leveraging the control plane functionality, an SDN
virtual network can enable finer-grained network status monitoring. For instance, an SDN
virtual network can implement adaptive calculation of QoS metrics, e.g., link-wise delivery
latency and packet loss rate, according to the dynamic evolution of the underlying physical
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network. Based on the monitoring result, the SDN controller can rapidly reset or even re-
establish a virtual network for a grid control application to isolate suspicious switches. This
is analogous to the “golden rule of thumb” of restarting a computer to quickly get rid of
suspicious or transient issues. Without SDN, such network reset and re-establishment can
be neither fast nor non-disruptive.
Fine-grained network status awareness and global control enable the SDN controller to
strategically reset or re-establish a virtual network. The controller can schedule which
switches to reset in phases to minimize disruption to the network traffic. It can also redirect
the affected flows to alternative routes, while avoiding suspicious switches. Moreover, the
global view of the network status will enable the SDN controller to re-establish a virtual
network without adversely impacting the QoS of other virtual networks that have shared
portion of physical communication links.
4.4.3 Hot-Swapping between Private & Public Communication Networks
One key aspect of grid resilience is the grid’s need to survive major failures caused by
catastrophic hazards and large-scale attacks (A1 and A2). Examples include distributed
DoS (DDoS) attacks that compromise various switches, relays, and RTUs, which can lead
to severe congestion of certain portion of the grid communication network. So far, the
power grid has been primarily employing dedicated cables or leased communication links and
networks [107][108]. While providing better isolation in general, such dedicated or leased
links may be less resilient to intensive attacks, as they have limited bandwidth and routes.
Some grid operators have started to embrace alternative means of communication (e.g.,
the Internet and wireless networks), for better (although shared) bandwidth and adoption
of recent cybersecurity advances, e.g., modern cryptography [109]. However, many are still
quite cautious of transmitting sensitive readings and grid control commands via the Internet,
as it is supposedly more susceptible to cyber threats.
SDN can provide a unique approach to leveraging both leased lines and the public Internet
to provide a highly robust survivability solution for grid operation communications, while
minimizing the potential risk of exposure to cyber attacks. For instance, grid operators may
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rely on the leased lines for routine communications. However, under devastating circum-
stances, e.g., a significant portion of the grid communication links has been paralyzed, we
can leverage SDN technologies to dynamically establish a faster route via the Internet as
an emergency response. During the process, the SDN controller can dispatch flows to the
remaining functional leased lines and the Internet according to their security requirements.
For enhanced security, the SDN controller can also instruct respective control devices to
enable encryption for packets being forwarded to routes via Internet. Such an approach en-
ables fast response to extreme situations where ordinary priorities (e.g., “safer” leased lines
versus fast recovery of grid operations) have changed.
4.5 Challenges in Using SDN for Grid Resilience
While enabling flexible reconfigurability, the separation of the control and data planes in SDN
may bring in additional challenges in defending against attacks that target the powerful and
centralized control plane. In particular, attackers may specifically target the control plane
of SDN-enabled grid communication networks for sabotage and hiding. Further research
on such potential issues is of great importance and urgency, to eliminate or alleviate the
technical hurdles for field trials and deployments of SDN in smart grids.
Topology destruction by malicious control: Because of the centralization of network
control, an SDN is susceptible to a compromised SDN controller and/or the SDN appli-
cations on top of it (A3). Compromised SDN controller and applications may maliciously
change the configurations of the communication network, with the goal of undermining the
performance of grid control applications or even destroying the whole network. As high
availability is a critical requirement for smart grids, such a potential vulnerability needs
to be carefully managed. Existing studies have applied model checking to examine SDN
control messages in the general networking context [110][111]. However, unique challenges
arise in the specific context of smart grids, because of the need to consider the implications
of SDN control messages for the physical and grid control systems. For instance, malicious
rerouting of a sensor/control data flow using a long-latency path may still be valid from a
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pure networking perspective. However, it may significantly undermine the quality of grid
controls [101][102][103]. To address this challenge, we propose to use IDS to examine the
cyber and physical implications of each outgoing SDN control message, e.g., by real-time
simulation [21] and machine-learning-based analysis [112].
DoS attacks accelerated by centralized control: The disproportionate network band-
width and processing capability between the control and data planes may significantly elevate
the magnitude as well as speed of DoS attacks. Existing studies (e.g., [99]) have shown that
such DoS attacks may be launched by compromised SDN switches (A1) and malicious end
hosts (A2), which flood the SDN controller with spoofed packets requesting a new flow rule.
In spite of existing studies [99] that monitor SDN messages and detect successful DoS attacks
by monitoring data plane traffic, detecting and counteracting DoS attempts at the control
plane is still a challenging problem. Fortunately, several characteristics of smart grids will
be helpful to development of robust techniques for detecting DoS attempts, e.g., rather reg-
ular SCADA traffic, static publisher-subscriber multicast data flows for PMU [92], and IEC
61850 Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) [94].
Darknet created by SDN “rootkits”: By strategically manipulating the forwarding
rules in different switches, an attacker who compromises part of the control plane of an SDN
system can surreptitiously create a “darknet” within it (A1). Such a darknet can be used
to control the communications to key field devices in the smart grid, such as RTUs and
relays, while being invisible to the rest of the network. We find such a darknet analogous to
rootkits in computer operating systems that are hidden in the kernel and completely evade
user-space monitoring mechanisms; we call them SDN rootkits. Such SDN rootkits would
paralyze the monitoring and control functions of the smart grid, like what happened in the
Stuxnet attack but with a much easier attack procedure. Passive monitoring approaches
will not be sufficient to detect SDN rootkits. We envisage development of countermeasures
through strategic deployment of out-of-band detectors in the grid communication network
and through leveraging of the latest progress on rootkit detection [104][105].
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4.6 An SDN-Enabled Smart Grid Testbed
We propose a testbed to provide an empirical platform for fast prototyping and quick valida-
tion of the advantages and challenges of the SDN-grid integration discussed in Sections 4.4
and 4.5. Such a testbed must involve realistic cyber (SDN) and physical (grid dynamics
and operations) aspects for simulating the cyber-physical nature of the SDN-enabled smart
grid. Although recent studies have developed various co-simulation testbeds based on power
system simulators and network simulators (e.g., ns-2) [113][114], none of them have explored
the implications and effects of a dynamically controllable communication network on a grid.
Figure 4.3: A cyber-physical co-simulation testbed.
Therefore, in the proposed testbed, we leverage Mininet, a popular OpenFlow-based SDN
emulator, to emulate SDN-based smart grid communications; we leverage PowerWorld, a
high-fidelity power generation and transmission system simulator, to simulate the physical
aspects of power systems. Our testbed will enable a co-simulation platform that integrates
and coordinates both networking and power system simulations from Mininet and Power-
World, allowing for experiments on the opportunities and challenges of enabling greater grid
resilience with SDN techniques. For instance, it will be able to provide a worst-case estimate
of how long it will take to reset or re-establish a virtual network (Section 4.4.2), and how af-
fordable such a delay would be for power systems. As another example, with such a testbed,
we can quickly test with different configurations of private/public network hot-swapping,
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and evaluate the extent to which they can improve the promptness of control commands,
and thus the power system quality (Section 4.4.3).
Figure 4.3 illustrates the architecture of the proposed co-simulation testbed, which consists
of a Power Grid Simulation Server (PGSS), a Control Center Simulation Server (CCSS), and
a Mininet. The PGSS leverages PowerWorld to simulate the physical processes of genera-
tors, a transmission system, and load units, which provide the “ground truth” of the physical
aspect of a power grid. We have used a Python wrapper of the PowerWorld COM API to
implement real-time manipulation and access to the internal state (e.g., status of generators,
loads, meters, and circuit breakers) of a PowerWorld simulation session. The CCSS can im-
plement several grid monitoring and control applications, SDN control applications based on
NOX, and IDS applications based on Bro [22], as described in [21]. Examples of grid mon-
itoring and control applications include state estimation, under-frequency load shedding,
and automatic generation control (AGC). The Bro-based IDS detects malicious outgoing
grid and SDN control commands by predicting their execution consequences through rapid
steady-state analysis using MATPOWER in GNU Octave [19], or through transient simu-
lations using PowerWorld. The communications between the CCSS and any simulated field
device in the PGSS go through Mininet, within which a node is associated with a field device
in the PGSS. To increase the realism of co-simulations, all simulated field devices and the
CCSS communicate in DNP3, a protocol widely adopted by power grids [7].
In summary, the testbed will support simulations of complete closed-loop grid controls
driven by the cyber and physical “ground truth” from Mininet and PowerWorld. It will
provide an environment to validate and evaluate innovative ideas and solutions of using
SDN to improve grid resilience.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we discuss the opportunities that SDN may bring to smart grids for improv-
ing resilience, and the corresponding challenges that still remain. With three illustrative use
cases, we demonstrate the potential of SDN in strengthening the resilience of smart grids,
even under catastrophic circumstances. On the other hand, there are several critical chal-
96
lenges that need to be further studied and addressed before SDN can be securely deployed in
smart grids. We hope that our discussion and our initial design of an experimental testbed
can trigger more profound research to make SDN more viable for resilient smart grids.
Based on the high-level analysis, we have applied SDNs into two concrete designs in
Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 respectively. While the first design is to use SDN to quickly
recover the services of physical devices after they are compromised, the second design is to
use SDN to preemptively disrupt and mislead adversaries when they prepare attacks, such




NETWORK FOR POWER SYSTEM OPERATIONS
5.1 Preamble
After control-related attacks are detected, it is critical to apply instant response mechanisms
to remedy the physical consequences that the attacks try to inflict on power systems. As
shown in Figure 5.1, in this chapter, we present a self-healing network that works in the
“post-execution” stage of the attacks, i.e., when the attacks have occurred and been detected
The self-healing network prioritizes the restoration of measurements of current, voltage,
and power usage, that are lost due to the control-related attacks. We propose the design
based on the cyber-infrastructure used to deliver phasor measurement measurements, which
have highly demanding requirements to deliver the measurements from remote sites to a
control center.
Figure 5.1: Chapter 5 overview.
5.2 Introduction
In today’s power grid, phasor measurement units (PMUs) are being deployed in the wide-
area monitoring systems (WAMSs) to monitor the state of a power system in real time
(e.g., static and dynamic state estimation, oscillation detection and control, and power line
outage detection) [115][116][117][118]. Based on the NASPInet architecture for a PMU
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network [119], the measurements collected by multiple PMUs are delivered and combined
at a phasor data concentrator (PDC), which then sends the measurements to the next-level
PDC or the control center.
Off-the-shelf computing and communication technologies are integrated with IEDs (in-
telligent electronic devices), including PMUs and PDCs, to boost monitoring and control
efficiency. However, this integration opens up new attack vectors: a PMU or a PDC can
become the target of the cyber-attacks. Recent studies reveal that PMUs or PDCs can
suffer different types of cyber-attacks, including denial-of-service or man-in-the-middle at-
tacks [120][121] and the control-related attacks as discussed in Chapter 2. To make things
worse, the network connections make the further propagation of attacks possible [9]. Conse-
quently, upon detection of attacks, compromised PMUs or PDCs can be disconnected from
the communication network. Although quarantine of the compromised devices can prevent
further propagation of the attacks, it can significantly reduce the system’s observability (i.e.,
the capability to estimate the state of each bus in a power system), and thus affect state
estimation and other power system applications.
Recent work has focused on the impact of compromised PMUs on the observability of
power systems; very little work has studied the impact of compromised PDCs. When a
PDC is compromised and quarantined from communication networks, it can cause more
severe consequences than a single compromised PMU can, as all measurements that the
PDC originally collected are lost. However, PMUs that originally report the measurements
to the PDC may not be compromised and can still collect trusted measurements. It is
possible to reroute these measurements to other PDCs immediately, instead of waiting for
the compromised PDC to be fixed.
To restore the services of PMUs that were disconnected because of compromised PDCs,
we propose a self-healing mechanism that exploits the feature of dynamic and programmable
configuration enabled by SDN (software-defined networking) technology. When a group of
PMUs or PDCs is disconnected, either by accident or because of a cyber-attack, logical
connections between uncompromised PMUs and PDCs are rearranged in order to restore
the observability of the power system. The logical reconnection is mapped into the con-
figuration of network switches, which establish new communication paths to deliver PMU
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measurements. After the reconnection, state estimation and other power system applications
can resume working.
We construct the proposed self-healing mechanism as a two-stage procedure in which each
stage is modeled as an integer linear programming (ILP) model. In the first stage, we min-
imize the latency of configuring communication networks to restore the observability of a
power grid. In the second stage, we further maximize the redundant observability in the
transmission network of power grids. In both ILP models, we consider the constraints of
hardware resources in both communication and transmission network infrastructures simul-
taneously, e.g., the size of the forwarding table in network switches and the connection space
of PDCs. Based on the ILP models, we also propose a heuristic algorithm that considers the
constraints of transmission and communication networks separately. The proposed heuris-
tic algorithm can reduce the computational complexity in both stages of the self-healing
mechanism, while maintaining near-optimal solutions which include the latency to configure
communication networks in the first stage and the redundant observability of power grids in
the second stage.
We evaluate the self-healing scheme, including both the ILP models and the heuristic
algorithm, on PMU networks over both IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems. To demonstrate
the optimality and the performance of the proposed methods, we compared them to a base-
line method, which randomly reconnects PMUs to uncompromised PDCs. The experimental
results show that the ILP model can reduce the latency of reconfiguring communication net-
works by up to 75% compared to the baseline method when hardware resources are limited.
Compared to the ILP model, the proposed heuristic algorithm takes less than 25% more
overhead on average to reconfigure communication networks, but it takes much less time
(by at least one order of magnitude less) to obtain the solution on how to reconfigure the
networks.
5.3 Research Idea
We consider a power system that relies on a PMU network to perform state estimation. For
each substation, we assume that a single, logical PMU is installed. This PMU can collect
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data on the state of the local substation (i.e., voltage magnitude and phasor angle). When
more PMUs are deployed, a PDC is used to collect measurements from several substations
and forward them to the next-level PDC or the control center.
Figure 5.2: The integration of a communications network and PMU network.
Regarding the deployment of communication networks, we consider the case in which
PMUs and PDCs are connected via an IP-based network. Even though in many of today’s
utility substations, PMUs and PDCs may still be connected through proprietary communica-
tions (e.g., serial links), the current trend suggests that the deployment of IP-based networks
in power systems is growing; research experiments are already being performed under this
assumption [121][122]. As shown in Figure 5.2, since PMUs are deployed on substations that
are distributed over the whole power system, PMUs and PDCs can be connected by a wide
area network (WAN). In a WAN, network traffic is manipulated by routing and forwarding
rules configured in each network switch. At the perimeter of a WAN, PMUs and PDCs are
first connected to edge switches (as highlighted in Figure 5.2). In this work, we assume that
each PDC is connected with a single edge switch. The edge switches can further connect to
the core switches, which are positioned within the backbone of the WAN.
Use of advanced communication network technology, e.g., SDN, can bring both benefits
and risks for a power system environment [123]. On the one hand, the communication
infrastructure allows attacks to easily propagate to other PMUs. As a result, attackers
can gain access to more measurements simultaneously when performing cyber-attacks (e.g.,
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false data injection attacks [11][12]). On the other hand, programmability enabled by SDN
can quickly isolate the compromised PMUs or PDCs and reroute the remaining devices to
self-heal the PMU network and recover the system observability.
5.4 Proposed Self-Healing Mechanism for PMU Networks
In this chapter, we assume that the cyber-attacks on the PMUs and PDCs have already been
detected. In practice, system administrators can perform those detections by using security
mechanisms, such as intrusion detection systems, designed for power grids. The detection of
cyber-attacks in SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems, which include
PMU networks, has been extensively studied in the literature (including this dissertation),
e.g., [21][24][42][78][124][125][126]. These methods utilize the information in communication
networks or the power system’s physical models to detect anomalies and intrusions.
In an IP-based network, malware at compromised PMUs or PDCs can infect other devices
through network connections [127][128]. As suggested by a report from the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [129], after system administrators detect compromised
devices, they can place temporary restrictions on network connectivity of those devices to
prevent further propagation of the attacks. In practice, system administrators can disconnect
the compromised devices by removing routing rules in network switches connected to them;
thus, network traffic initiated from the compromised devices can no longer reach any other
devices. The work in [130] addressed optimal response strategies for disconnecting nodes in
the network, to keep the network in a secure condition; [9] further extended the response
strategies in PMU networks.
When PMUs or PDCs are compromised and disconnected, the consequences can vary.
As shown in Figure 5.3, when system administrators detect that a PMU has been com-
promised (denoted by “X”), they disconnect it. The measurements collected by the PMU
are lost, which can impact the observability of the power system. Likewise, when a PDC
is detected as compromised and disconnected, all measurements that it originally collected
are lost. However, the PMUs that originally reported the measurements to the PDC may
not be compromised. In that case, we regard the measurements from the disconnected yet
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uncompromised PMUs, denoted by “?” in Figure 5.3, as trusted, unless they are directly
compromised. These trusted measurements can be used in power systems’ applications, e.g.,
state estimation, if we can reroute the PMUs into other remaining uncompromised PDCs.
Figure 5.3: Device condition after attacks.
To achieve self-healing in PMU networks, we use the programmability enabled by SDN to
reroute the remaining uncompromised PMUs and PDCs, and thus recover the observability
of a power system after a cyber-attack. The top priority of a PMU network is to collect
measurements from substations under the real-time communications requirements. For that
purpose, we find that the existing self-healing algorithms previously proposed for general-
purpose networks (e.g., the Internet) are not suitable for a WAN deployed in a PMU network
[131], as explained below:
• First, the optimization objectives of the existing self-healing algorithms are different from
those of PMU networks.
The existing self-healing algorithms focus on maximizing the connections of end hosts.
In the PMU network, however, the top priority is to restore measurements of the voltage
phasor at each substation. Because the voltage phasor at a substation can be measured
by the PMU deployed at the substation and also the PMU deployed at its neighbor
substations, restoring all lost measurements is not equivalent to restoring all disconnected
PMUs. Instead, the proposed self-healing algorithm needs to selectively reconnect PMUs,
which can restore the observability of power systems more quickly than reconnecting all
PMUs.
• Second, the performance requirements of general communication networks are different
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from those of PMU networks.
The existing self-healing algorithms put more priority on maintaining the network per-
formance, e.g., throughputs or communication latency, than on the availability of trans-
mitted data. Consequently, those algorithms always select the shortest path to reconnect
nodes. In contrast, PMU networks put the availability of phasor measurements at higher
priority than the network performance. In our experiments, we implemented in a base-
line method an existing self-healing mechanism that reconnects PMUs with the shortest
paths (see Section 5.5.1 for details); the experiments demonstrated that that algorithm
often ends up spending a long period of time to reconnect PMUs. Consequently, we pro-
pose the self-healing algorithm, which minimizes the time to restore the observability of
power systems and maximizes the redundancy of measurements to provide more accurate
estimation of system state.
• Third, the existing algorithm does not consider the constraints in the physical infrastructure
of power systems.
In PMU networks, the number of PMUs that can be connected to a PDC is limited by
the computation capability and storage space of the PDC. These constraints can impact
the paths selected to reconnect PMUs. The self-healing algorithm that we propose takes
into consideration the constraints of both the cyber and physical infrastructure in power
systems.
Based on that understanding, we propose a new self-healing algorithm that jointly re-
duces the performance overhead of reconfiguring the communication network and increases
the observability of power systems, taking into consideration resource constraints on PDCs
and network switches. Specifically, we focus on how to reroute the disconnected but un-




We use a graph Gt(V ,L) to denote the topology of a power transmission network, where
V denotes the set of buses and L denotes the set of transmission lines. We assume that
the system observability is achieved by the measurements from PMUs, and let U denote
the set of buses that have PMUs installed, so U ⊆ V . The IP-based PMU communication
network consists of PMUs (also denoted by the set U), PDCs (denoted by the set D), and
network switches (denoted by the set S). Thus, the topology of communication networks for
delivering PMU measurements is represented by a graph Gp(S ∪U ∪D, E), where E denotes
the set of network links connecting PMUs, PDCs, and network switches.
A PMU network is a cyber-physical system. From cyber systems’ perspective, a com-
munication network should make sure that measurements from PMUs can be delivered to
PDCs and the control center; from physical systems’ perspective, the PMUs should make
sure that the whole power system is observable, so that the state estimation and other
advanced power system applications can be performed. We integrate these cyber-physical
features into the design of our self-healing mechanism for PMU networks. These features
differentiate the proposed algorithm from the existing self-healing schemes, which emphasize
the maintenance of network performance and reconnection of end hosts in general communi-
cation networks [131][132][133]. In the remainder of this subsection, we will briefly describe
models of power system observability by PMUs and rules in network switches; these models
are integrated into the design of the self-healing scheme for PMU networks.
5.4.1.1 Power System Observability
When a PMU is installed at bus i ∈ U , the voltage phasor at bus i and current phasor of all
branches connected to it can be measured. The observability function of bus i is defined as






where xj is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a PMU is installed at bus j and 0 otherwise.
ai,j is the connectivity parameter, defined as:
ai,j =
 1 i = j or (i, j) ∈ L0 otherwise (5.2)
Oi ≥ 1 implies that bus i is observable, as the voltage phasor at bus i can either be measured
by the PMU at bus i, or be calculated by PMUs at neighbors of bus i (e.g., the buses
connected through transmission lines). The power system is observable if the observability
function Oi for each bus is greater than or equal to 1, i.e.,
Oi ≥ 1, ∀i ∈ V (5.3)
With the disconnection of some PMUs due to cyber-attacks, the observability function Oi
at some buses may become 0; thus, the system is no longer observable. However, by utilizing
the reconfiguration features enabled by SDN, it is possible to reconnect some disconnected
yet uncompromised PMUs to the communication network to restore the system observability.
5.4.1.2 Rules in Network Switches
The reconnection of disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs can be achieved by adding rules
in network switches. In a communication network, the switch can include rules that specify
both routing policies and endpoint policies [134]. Given a packet entering the network, the
routing policy specifies the path that the network packet should take to reach its destination.
The path is often expressed as a chain of ordered network switches. To implement a routing
policy, we add a forwarding rule in each switch on the path, to direct the network packet to
the appropriate following stop. A forwarding rule in a switch usually is uniquely decided by
destination addresses. In other words, a path always corresponds to a unique destination.
An endpoint policy often defines the access control between two hosts. In other words, the
policy specifies whether or not host A can communicate with host B, regardless of what path
the communication should follow (which is decided by the routing policies). As explained in
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[134], the endpoint policy often “views the network as one big switch that hides internal
topology details” and “specifies which packets to drop, or to forward to specific egress
ports, as well as any modifications of header fields.” In the PMU network, an endpoint
policy specifies to which PDC a PMU measurement should be delivered. Unlike the routing
policy, the endpoint policy is implemented once along the path that the packet travels. For
example, in the network topology shown in Figure 5.4, we want to deliver the measurements
from PMU 1 to PDC 1 through path 1. In this case, the routing policy destined for PDC 1
is implemented by adding a forwarding rule in each switch of path 1 (i.e., switches 1, 2, and
5). However, not all packets destined for PDC 1 and traveling through this path are from
PMU 1. To ensure that the measurements from PMU 1 are delivered to PDC 1 via path 1,
we need to add a rule for this endpoint policy along the path. This rule can be implemented
only once in switch 1, 2, or 5 before packets reach PDC 1.
Figure 5.4: An example network connection.
5.4.2 Optimization Formulation
In this subsection, we describe how we model the self-healing mechanism for PMU networks
as an integer linear programming problem. To better illustrate the optimization formulation,
in addition to the parameters defined in Section 5.4.1, we list key notations in Table 5.1.
We define four groups of integer variables in the optimization model:
• Variable xi indicates whether the PMU at bus i ∈ U is connected, regardless of which
path in the communication network Gp it has taken and to which PDC it is connected.
• Variable yp specifies whether path p ∈ P is used to achieve the reconnection, regardless
of which PMUs and PDCs use this path for reconnection. Instead of considering the
shortest path, we consider all paths that can be used to reconnect PMUs, as long as
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Table 5.1: Summary of notations
Sets and Indices:
U Set of buses with PMUs installed.
Ub Set of buses with compromised PMUs.
Ug Set of buses with uncompromised PMUs, U = Ub ∪ Ug.
Ud Set of buses with uncompromised but disconnected PMUs, Ud ⊂ Ug.
D Set of PDCs used in the PMU network.
Dg Set of uncompromised PDCs.
S Set of network switches in a communication network.
P Set of paths in the communication network, denoted by graph Gp, that can be used to
deliver measurements from a PMU to a PDC with the real-time requirements observed.
Up Set of buses with disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs that can be reconnected by
path p.
Dp Set of uncompromised PDCs that are connected by path p.
P i Set of paths that can be used to connect a disconnected yet uncompromised PMU at
bus i ∈ Ud.
Pd Set of paths that are connected to a remaining PDC d ∈ Dg.
Sp Set of network switches in path p.
Vz Set of zero-injection buses in the power system.
i, j, k Indices of buses.
d Index of PDCs.
s Index of network switches in set S.
p Index of paths in set P.
Parameters:
Cd Number of additional PMUs to which a PDC d ∈ Dg can connect.
Rs Number of additional rules that switch s ∈ S can accommodate.
Decision Variables:
xi Binary variable that equals 1 when the PMU at bus i is connected, and 0 otherwise.
yp
Binary variable that equals 1 when path p ∈ P is selected to reconnect PMUs, and 0
otherwise.
zps
Integer variable to specify the number of endpoint rules that are allocated for path p
and are implemented in switch s.
wds
Binary variable that equals 1 when a forwarding rule destined for the PDC d is added
in network switch s, and 0 otherwise.
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the delivery of PMU measurements over that path satisfies the timing requirement.
Finding all paths between two nodes is regarded as an “all simple paths” problem;
we use a “depth-first search” to search all paths that can be used for reconnections.
Although there is no efficient algorithm to solve this problem, we can find all paths
before running the optimization model at runtime.
• Variable zps , as used in [134], specifies the number of endpoint policies allocated for
path p and assigned in switch s. Since a switch can be shared by different paths, a
subscript p is used for each switch to distinguish the endpoint policies used for different
“PMU-PDC” connections.
• Variable wds indicates whether switch s contains a forwarding rule destined to PDC d.
Because a forwarding rule is indexed by the destination address, a switch can include
forwarding rules destined for different PDCs. Thus a subscript d is used to distinguish
the forwarding rules assigned for different destination PDCs.
To better understand these decision variables, we provide an example in Figure 5.4. If we
assume that three PMUs at three buses (i.e., buses 1, 2, and 3) are reconnected, while PMU
at bus 4 is not, we have x1 = x2 = x3 = 1 while x4 = 0. In addition, if we use two paths
(i.e., paths 1 and 2) for reconnection, we have y1 = y2 = 1. In addition, we assume that the
PMU at bus 1 is reconnected to PDC 1, while the PMUs at bus 2 and 3 are reconnected
to PDC 2, as illustrated by lines with different patterns in Figure 5.4. To appropriately
deliver measurements to the right destination, the forwarding rules destined for PDC 1 are
added to the switches of path 1, which consists of network switches 1, 2, and 5. Similarly, a
forwarding rule destined for PDC 2 is added to the switches of path 2, namely switches 1,













An endpoint policy is decided by the connection between PMUs and PDCs. Consequently,
there are three rules for the endpoint policy in this example, which are three specific “PMU-
PDC” connections: (PMU 1, PDC 1), (PMU 2, PDC 2), and (PMU 3, PDC 2). For each
connection, we need to add a rule once along the path that establishes the connection. For
example, if we add an endpoint policy that specifies a connection between PMU 3 and PDC
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2, we can add the endpoint policy at switch 5 of path 2, which is established by routing
policies. In that case, we should increase the value of variable z25 by one.
With those notations, we model the constraints and objectives of the ILP formulation for
our self-healing scheme as follows.
5.4.2.1 PMU Connection Status Constraints (PCSC)
After the disconnection of compromised PMUs and PDCs in response to cyber-attacks, the
PMU connection status needs updates. Let Ub denote the set of buses with compromised
PMUs. Because these PMUs will remain disconnected, decision variable xi for i ∈ Ub should
be set to 0, i.e.,
xi = 0, ∀i ∈ Ub (5.4)
In addition, let Ug denote the set of buses with uncompromised PMUs, and Ud denote
the set of buses with uncompromised and disconnected PMUs. As the remaining connected
and uncompromised PMUs (denoted by set Ug \ Ud) will remain unchanged, we have the
following constraints:
xi = 1, ∀i ∈ Ug \ Ud (5.5)
The PMUs in set Ud can be reconnected by the self-healing scheme as the actual decision
variables; thus, the following constraints apply:
xi = {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ Ud (5.6)
5.4.2.2 Power System Observability Constraints (PSOC)
The constraints in equations 5.1–5.3 specify the observability function Oi at bus i as a
function of the topology of the power system’s transmission network and PMU locations.
The considered power system is observable when Oi ≥ 1 for all buses.
If there are zero injection buses, i.e., no generation or load units are connected to them, the
voltage phasor at certain buses (e.g., those zero injection buses or their neighbors in trans-
mission networks) can be calculated indirectly by applying Kirchoff’s current law (KCL).
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Consequently, the number of PMUs needed to make sure that the system is observable can
be reduced. We apply the formulation used in [135] that considers zero injection buses. For
each zero injection bus k, a linear relation between its voltage phasor and the phasor of its
neighbor can be obtained based on KCL as:
∑
j∈V
Yk,jV̄j = 0 (5.7)
where V̄j is the voltage phasor at bus j, and Yk,j is the k − jth entry of the admittance
matrix of the power system. A group of equations handling zero injection buses forms a
system of linear equations, from which some voltage phasors can be calculated to make the
corresponding buses observable. As shown in [135], the observability function Oi with zero







ai,kvi,k, ∀i ∈ V (5.8)
∑
i∈V
ai,kvi,k = 1, ∀k ∈ Vz (5.9)∑
k∈Vz
ai,kvi,k ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ V (5.10)
where Vz denotes the set of zero injection buses, and the auxiliary binary variable vi,k is
defined so that vi,k = 1 implies that calculation of the voltage phasor at bus i is assigned to
the equation associated with zero injection bus k. The constraints specified in equations 5.9
and 5.10 guarantee the solvability of the group of equations corresponding to zero injection
buses. The detailed derivation of equations 5.8–5.10 can be found in [135]. The power system
observability constraints can be modeled as equations 5.2–5.3 and equations 5.8–5.10.
5.4.2.3 PDC Connection Space Constraints (PSC)
The disconnected PMUs can be reconnected only to PDCs with sufficient connection spaces.
The connection space of a PDC is defined as the maximum number of PMUs it can concen-
trate. This parameter can be found in the specification of the PDC, e.g., SEL-3373 PDC
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xi) ≤ Cd, ∀d ∈ Dg (5.11)
where Cd denotes the additional PMUs that PDC d can connect. In the constraint, we use
set Up to include all disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs that can be reconnected by
path p; this set is constructed by including all PMUs that are connected by the edge switch
at the ending node of path p. Furthermore, we use set Pd to specify all paths that are
connected to the remaining PDC d ∈ Dg.
If path p is selected for the reconnection, yp is set to 1. The innermost summation on
the left side of constraint 5.11 is used to calculate the number of PMUs that path p can
reconnect. Note that in the IP-based communication network, the routing path is uniquely
decided by its destination address. A PDC can be used by different paths to connect different
PMUs. When multiple paths connected to PDC d are selected, the outermost summation
calculates all PMUs that can be reconnected by those paths. We use constraint 5.11 to
ensure that the remaining connection spaces of PDC d can satisfy all those disconnected
PMUs.
Obviously, constraint 5.11 is a nonlinear constraint. To lower the computational complex-
ity, we reformulate the constraint 5.11 to linear forms in 5.12–5.14 using the big-M method
with an auxiliary variable tp. We use tp to represent the number of PMUs that path p can
reconnect if the path is selected. When yp = 1, constraints 5.12–5.13 become an equality
constraint, i.e., tp =
∑
i∈Up xi. On the other hand, if yp = 0, the big number M ensures
that the left side of constraint 5.12 is a nonpositive number. Consequently, constraints 5.12–
5.13 are equivalent to another inequality, i.e., 0 ≤ tp ≤
∑
i∈Up xi. The optimization makes
tp equal to 0, to let the PDC’s connection spaces Cd accommodate more PMUs via other
paths. Consequently, we set the value of M as |Ud|, where | · | denotes the number of ele-
ments in a set. In other words, we set the value of M to the total number of disconnected
PMUs. Because
∑
i∈Up xi < |Ud|, setting M with that value ensures that the left side of
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constraint 5.12 is a nonpositive number.
− (1− yp) ·M +
∑
i∈Up




tp ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P (5.13)∑
p∈Pd
tp ≤ Cd, ∀d ∈ Dg (5.14)
5.4.2.4 PMU Reconnection Constraints (PRC)
When a PMU is selected for reconnection, at least one path must be selected to reconnect




yp, ∀i ∈ Ud (5.15)
In constraint 5.15, we use set P i to include any path that can be used to connect a discon-
nected PMU at bus i. When the PMU at bus i is reconnected, the constraint guarantees
that at least one path can connect this PMU to a PDC.
5.4.2.5 Switch Rule Space Capacity Constraints (SRCC)
There should be sufficient space for each network switch to add the rules of both endpoint






zps ≤ Rs, ∀s ∈ S (5.16)
wds ∈ {0, 1}, ∀s ∈ S, ∀d ∈ Dg (5.17)









s is the total number of rules added to switch s.
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5.4.2.6 Routing Policy Constraints (RPC)
When a PDC is used to reconnect PMUs, a routing rule should be added to each network
switch in the path that connects the PMUs to the PDC, i.e.,
wds ≥ yp, ∀p ∈ P , ∀d ∈ Dp,∀s ∈ Sp (5.19)
yp ∈ {0, 1}, ∀p ∈ P (5.20)
We specify the constraint 5.19 for each network switch in the path p, i.e., s ∈ Sp, where
Sp denotes the set of network switches in path p. The set Dp includes PDCs that can be
connected through path p. If path p is selected to connect PMUs, we add a forwarding rule
in each switch in p that is used to transmit network packets destined for the corresponding
PDCs. If the path is not selected, constraint 5.19 becomes equivalent to constraint 5.17.
5.4.2.7 Endpoint Policy Constraints (EPC)
The total number of rules for the endpoint policy should be equal to the total number of









Constraint 5.21 specifies that if we choose to reconnect a PMU, we need to add one rule in the
endpoint policy to specify this connection. In practice, however, it is possible to combine
several rules into a single one by using techniques such as wildcards to specify multiple
“PMU-PDC” connections [134][137]. Designing algorithms to combine rules of endpoint
policy is an active research area, but is outside the scope of this dissertation. Therefore,
we do not apply any algorithm to combine the rules of the endpoint policy. As a result,
constraint 5.21 is observed in the ILP model.
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5.4.2.8 Optimization for Self-healing Mechanism
After certain PMUs and PDCs are disconnected in response to cyber-attacks, the self-healing
mechanism first checks the system observability by calculating the observability function Oi
at each bus, according to constraints 5.1–5.2 for a system without zero injection buses, or
according to constraints 5.8–5.10 and constraint 5.2 for a system with zero injection buses.
Depending on the system observability status, we divide the self-healing mechanism into
two stages. In the first stage, we try to recover the observability of the power system by
a PMU network as quickly as possible. In the second stage, we recover the remaining dis-
connected PMUs to increase redundancies of PMU measurements and thus more accurately
estimate system states.
Stage 1: Recover system observability
If the remaining connected PMUs (denoted by set Ug \ Ud) cannot make the system ob-
servable, i.e., Oi ≥ 1,∀i ∈ V is not satisfied, but the disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs
(denoted by set Ud) would make the system observable, then the self-healing mechanism will
enter Stage 1.
At this stage, we want to minimize the time it will take to recover system observability.
We use the total number of rules that all network switches need to modify to estimate the
time to reconfigure network switches in order to reconnect PMUs. The number of rules in
network switches plays an important role in the performance of both traditional and SDN-
enabled networks. Ways to reduce or compress the size of network rules have been an active
research area for almost a decade. The authors of [137][138] propose algorithms to reduce
and compress the number of rules stored in a single switch. In later work, [134][139][140]
focus on how to distribute rules further in optimal locations in order to save storage space
in an SDN-enabled network.
In the scenario that recovers the observability of power systems, the number of rules to
add can impact the performance of PMU networks as well. In a traditional communication
network or a more advanced network environment that uses SDN technology [123], modifying
a rule in a network switch requires the system operator to interact with the switch and make
the corresponding configuration. The round-trip time of this communication in a wide area
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network can take up to hundreds of milliseconds [141]. In PMU networks that perform
real-time monitoring on system states, optimizing the configuration time by reducing the
number of switch rules can help improve performance.















s.t. PCSC : (5.4)− (5.6)
PSOC : (5.2)− (5.3), (5.8)− (5.10)
PSC : (5.12)− (5.14)
PRC : (5.15)
SRCC : (5.16)− (5.18)
RPC : (5.19)− (5.20)
EPC : (5.21)
which is an ILP problem. The objective of the self-healing mechanism at this stage is
to minimize the number of rules for both the routing and the endpoint policies, in order
to restore the disconnected yet uncompromised PMUs to the uncompromised PDCs. The
details of all constraints of the ILP formulation are discussed in previous sections, i.e., from
Section 5.4.2.1 to Section 5.4.2.7.
Stage 2: Maximize system observability
If the power system becomes observable after Stage 1, the self-healing mechanism will
enter Stage 2 to continue recovering the remaining disconnected PMUs. Note that at the
beginning of the self-healing process, if the power system is already observable with the
remaining connected PMUs (denoted by set Ug \ Ud), or if reconnection of all disconnected
yet uncompromised PMUs fails to make the system observable, the self-healing mechanism
will omit the optimization at Stage 1 and directly enter Stage 2.
At this stage, the aim is to improve the observability of the power system. We use the
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minimum observability function of all buses, i.e., mini∈V Oi, to quantify the observability








where all constraints except constraint 5.3 in optimization 5.22 are still applied; constraint 5.3
is removed because the system observability either cannot be satisfied or has already been
satisfied. The set defined in Table 5.1 needs to be updated according to the decisions made
at Stage 1. Through introduction of an auxiliary variable O, the max-min optimization






s.t. O ≤ Oi,∀i ∈ V ,
all constraints in (5.22) except (5.3)
which is also an ILP problem.
5.4.3 Greedy Heuristic Algorithm
In the proposed ILP model, the number of variables is on the scale of O(|Ud|+|Dg|+|P|×|S|).
Consequently, ILP solvers suffer from dimensionality, especially when a power system and
underlying communication network increase in size. In that case, solving the problem can
introduce a long delay; the slow response to the attacks can result in the damage to PMU
networks.
In Algorithm 1, we propose a greedy heuristic algorithm to find reroutes for disconnected
PMUs one by one instead of finding a global optimal reroute for all PMUs. As shown in Step
3 in Algorithm 1, the heuristic algorithm always selects the PMU on the bus with the largest
degree in power systems’ transmission networks (i.e., the bus that has the largest number
of neighbors in the transmission networks), to make the system observable by reconnecting
a small number of PMUs. In Steps 4–28, among paths with sufficient hardware resources
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Algorithm 1 Greedy heuristic algorithm
1: while Ud is not empty do
2: CandidatePDCs = {}, CandidatePaths={}, Routes={}
3: Select i ∈ Ud with the largest degree in transmission networks
4: for all d ∈ Dg do
5: if d has connection spaces then
6: Put d in CandidatePDCs
7: end if
8: end for
9: for all d ∈ CandidatePDCs do
10: Find the communication path p between d and i with the smallest latency, calculated by
latency(p)
11: if latency(p) is shorter than the latency requirement of delivering PMU measurements
then
12: Put p in CandidatePaths
13: else
14: Remove d from CandidatePDCs
15: end if
16: end for
17: while CandidatePaths is not empty do
18: Select p of smallest latency(p) from CandidatePaths
19: if p has no rule space then
20: Remove p from CandidatePaths
21: else




25: Remove i from Ud
26: Connect i through p
27: Set routing policy in each switch in p
28: Set endpoint policy in the first switch in p that has available space
29: if power grid becomes observable then




(e.g., rule spaces in network switches and connection spaces in PDCs), the heuristic selects
the path with the smallest latency, as specified by latency(p) in Algorithm 1, to deliver
measurements. In practice, the latency of delivering measurements can be measured by
different metrics, such as the number of switches in a path or round-trip times.
Unlike the ILP model, Algorithm 1 considers the different optimization objectives at Stages
1 and 2 together. In the heuristic, Steps 29–31 mark the end of Stage 1 (i.e., observability
recovery), and the heuristic continues to select disconnected PMUs until all of them have
been reconnected.
5.5 Evaluations
In this section, we first present a simple case study on the small scale IEEE 30-bus system,
to demonstrate how the proposed ILP model and the greedy heuristic algorithm reconnect
PMUs. Then, in Section 5.5.2, we evaluate how the proposed methods perform in both IEEE
30-bus and 118-bus systems.
5.5.1 Case Study
We use the IEEE 30-bus system to demonstrate how the self-healing mechanism reconnects
compromised and disconnected PDCs and PMUs.
Based on the topology of transmission networks, we construct the topology of the com-
munication network of a power system through the following procedure. First, we employ
the minimum set cover problem to find a set of substations that cover all transmission
lines [142][143]. The consequence is that we classify substations into different sets. We
assign a network switch for each set as an edge switch, which connects PMUs deployed
among all substations in each set. To each edge switch, we add enough PDCs to combine
all measurements of the PMUs that are connected to the same switch.
The communication network of the IEEE 30-bus system is shown in Figure 5.5. We use
white rectangles to represent edge switches. In each edge switch, we specify the index of
the PMU and PDC that the switch connects in a format of (PDC#: PMU#, . . . ). In this
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network, there are 16 edge switches that connect PMUs in substations and 4 core switches
that form a mesh backbone network; the edge switches are evenly distributed among the
core switches.
(a) Result based on the ILP model
(b) Results based on the greedy heuristic algorithm
Figure 5.5: Reconnection of PMUs in a communication network for the IEEE 30-bus
system with (a) the ILP model and (b) the greedy heuristic algorithms.
In Figure 5.5(a), we also demonstrate how the proposed self-healing mechanism (imple-
mented in the ILP model) and the greedy heuristic algorithm are working. We consider a
case in which PDCs 1, 6, and 13 are compromised by attackers. Consequently, measurements
from PMUs 1, 2, 4, 10, 17, 20, 21, 25, and 26 cannot be delivered to the control center, even
though none of them is compromised. We formulate the ILP problem in the OPTI toolbox,
120
which can give us a solution that reconnects PMUs 1 and 10 to PDC 8 (shown by dotted
arrows in Figure 5.5(a)). Such reconnections need two rules to specify the endpoint policy
that grants their access to the PDC 8. Meanwhile, a forwarding rule destined for the PDC
8 is added to switches 1, 6, 7, 18, and 8. As a result, there are a total of seven rules to
configure.
In Figure 5.5(b), we show that the greedy heuristic algorithm can introduce a different and
nonoptimal result for the same case. Also, we use this case to demonstrate the procedure of
the greedy heuristic algorithm shown in Algorithm 1.
• Step 3 : We rank all disconnected PMUs based on their degrees in transmission net-
works (i.e., the number of neighbor substations that each PMU has); the proposed
heuristic tries to reconnect PMUs one by one based on this order. Because a PMU can
measure a voltage phasor not only at the substation where it is deployed, but also at
its neighbor substations, we select PMUs in an order that will restore the observability
of the power system as quickly as possible. Specifically in the attack case considered in
Figure 5.5, we select PMUs in the following order: PMUs 4, 10, 2, 5, 1, 17, 20, 21, and
26. When we select a PMU, we find it a PDC (Steps 4–8) and a path (Steps 9–16).
Without loss of generality, we describe the following steps to reconnect PMU 4, which
is the first PMU to reconnect in this case.
• Steps 4–8 : When we select PMU 4 for reconnection, we find all remaining PDCs (i.e.,
all PDCs except for PDCs 1, 6, and 13) that have sufficient connection space for this
PMU. We regard all those PDCs as candidate PDCs that can reconnect the PMU
(stored in a set CandidatePDC in Algorithm 1).
• Steps 9–16 : For each PDC in CandidatePDC, we find the shortest path (i.e., with the
shortest round trip time) between the PDC and PMU 4. If the round trip time of this
path meets the requirement of being able to deliver PMU measurements, we regard
this path as a candidate path. We put all candidate paths in a set, i.e., CandidatePaths
in Algorithm 1. To simplify discussions, we assume that the round trip times on all
network links are the same; the round trip time of a path can be quantified by the
number of links or the number of switches in a path.
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• Steps 17–24 : If set CandidatePaths is not empty, we select a path from the set that
has the shortest round trip time to reconnect PMU 4. For example, we can select PDC
2 to reconnect PMU 4; the path contains only three switches, i.e., Switch 1, Switch
17, and Switch 2.
• Steps 29–31 : After reconnecting a PMU, we check whether the power system has
become observable or not. If the system has become observable, we continue to Stage
2 of the optimization to achieve more redundancy of PMU measurements.
To show the effectiveness and optimality of our proposed methods, including both the
ILP model and the greedy heuristic algorithm, we compare them against a baseline method,
which is based on self-healing mechanisms proposed for traditional communication networks.
Note that the traditional self-healing mechanism intends to recover as many disconnected
hosts or links as possible, which is different from the recovery of observability of a power
system. In this baseline method, we randomly reconnect PMUs with the shortest paths to
any PDCs that have sufficient connection space.
In addition, we implement the self-healing mechanism in Mininet [144], a software platform
to simulate SDN-enabled communication networks, to demonstrate the procedures for self-
healing PMU networks against the attack case considered in Figure 5.5.
5.5.2 Performance Evaluation of Stage 1
We present the performance evaluation of the proposed ILP model and the greedy heuristic
algorithm, and compare them against the baseline method, on both IEEE 30-bus and IEEE
118-bus test systems. Specifically, we compare the optimization results and execution times
of these two methods when the hardware resources, such as rule spaces of network switches
and connection spaces of PDCs, become limited. We use the solver in the OPTI Toolbox to
solve the ILP problem formulated in Section 5.4.2 [145]. The heuristic algorithm presented
in Section 5.4.3 is implemented in MATLAB. All of our experiments were performed on a
64-bit desktop with two Intel Core I7 3.6 G processors and 16 GB of RAM.
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5.5.2.1 Impact of Attack Scales
We assume that each PDC can combine measurements from up to 40 PMUs, which is
the connection space of the SEL 3373 [136]. Each network switch can contain up to 1000
forwarding or routing rules, which is in line with the experiment settings in [134].
Figure 5.6 shows the impact of an attacks’ scale on the number of rules added to recover the
observability of power systems. The horizontal axis specifies the number of compromised
PDCs. In each case, we randomly selected the compromised PDCs and performed the
experiments 500 times. The vertical axis specifies the average number of network rules that
are added to reconnect PMUs. We use bars of different shades of gray to represent the results
obtained by the ILP problem, the greedy heuristic algorithm, and the baseline method with
a 95% confidence interval. Obviously, if attackers compromise more PDCs, we need to add
more rules in network switches to reconnect PMUs.
(a) 30-bus system (b) 118-bus system
Figure 5.6: Comparison of the number of network rules to add for (a) the IEEE 30-bus
system and (b) the IEEE 118-bus system.
Based on the result, we can see that the greedy heuristic algorithm performs better when
a small number of PDCs are compromised in both 30-bus and 118-bus systems. The worst
case happens when 8 PDCs are compromised in the 30-bus system; the greedy heuristic
algorithm needs to add 5 to 6 more rules, on average, to recover the observability of the
power system. The baseline method performs much worse than the greedy heuristic, as it
can take a long time to reconnect enough PMUs to recover the observability.
Figure 5.7 compares the execution times of the ILP model, the greedy heuristic algorithm,
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and the baseline method. The execution time of the ILP model is specified by the major
vertical axis, while the execution times of the other two algorithms are specified by the
secondary vertical axis. Because the execution times vary significantly for the compromise
of different PDCs, we selected the 50 largest execution times for those three methods and
include their average in Figure 5.7. Because the number of compromised PDCs impacts
the size of the search space in the ILP model, the execution time to solve the ILP model
(represented by the light grey line in both sub-figures) increases slightly with the number of
compromised PDCs. On average, the greedy heuristic algorithm can reduce the execution
time by approximately two orders of magnitude. In the greedy heuristic algorithm, however,
we reconnect PMUs one by one, starting from the one on the bus with most neighbors in
transmission networks. The number of reconnected PMUs is not directly related to the
number of compromised PDCs, and the execution time does not change significantly. The
baseline method randomly selects PMUs for reconnection; the method can take a long time
to restore the observability of power systems.
(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.7: Comparison of the execution times for (a) the IEEE 30-bus system and (b) the
IEEE 118-bus system.
The execution times of these methods scale differently with the size of the power system.
Because there are more paths to reconnect PMUs in the 118-bus system, the search space
in the ILP models increases dramatically, which can increase the execution time of the ILP
model by more than ten times. The execution times of the greedy heuristic algorithm and
the baseline method do not change significantly as these algorithms select PDCs that can
connect PMUs with the shortest distance. For communication networks of the 30-bus and
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118-bus systems, disconnected PMUs are often reconnected to PDCs in their neighbors based
on the greedy heuristic algorithm and the baseline method.
5.5.2.2 Impact of Hardware Resources
In this section, we evaluate the impact of hardware resources, i.e., rule spaces in communica-
tion networks and connection spaces (the number of PMUs to which a PDC can connect), on
the performance of the self-healing mechanisms. In practice, these resources can be shared
with other devices in addition to being assigned to PMUs and PDCs. For the simulated
communication network, we set the size of the rule space of each switch to be between 5
and 10 and the number of PMUs to which each PDC can connect to be between 3 and 8.
For each value set of those two parameters, we randomly selected 8 compromised PDCs and
performed the experiments 500 times.
(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.8: Comparison of the numbers of added network rules with impact of limited
network resources.
In Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, we show how solutions obtained by the ILP model and the
greedy heuristic are affected. In the experiment, we ignored the solution that did converge in
the ILP model. In both cases, because there were insufficient resources, some disconnected
PMUs needed to be rerouted to PDCs distributed at different substations; that increased the
number of forwarding rules added to switches. Compared to the results shown in Figure 5.6
(when 8 PDCs were compromised), the solutions obtained from the ILP model at Stage 1
can increase by more than three times due to the increased number of forwarding rules in
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(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.9: Comparison of the numbers of added network rules with impact of limited
PDC connection space.
switches. The heuristic algorithm and the baseline method perform worse and give solutions
which increase by more than six times.
As shown in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, when hardware resources, i.e., rule spaces in
switches or connection spaces in PDCs, become limited, the greedy heuristic algorithm
performs better in the 118-bus system than in the 30-bus system. In the experiments, we
limited the rule spaces in each switch or the connection spaces in each PDC. Because the
118-bus system includes more switches and PDCs, it can provide more hardware resources
for the greedy heuristic algorithm to use.
As shown in Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11, the limited resources in network switches and
PDCs have two impacts on the execution time. On the one hand, they reduce the search
space. In the ILP problem, the search space specified by constraints 5.12–5.14, and con-
straints 5.16–5.18 is reduced. The greedy heuristic algorithm stops adding rules into the
switches at Steps 17–24, if there is insufficient rule space in a path. On the other hand,
because of limited resources, it can take more time to find a solution in both methods.
When they are impacted by these two factors simultaneously, the execution times of the ILP
model, the greedy heuristic algorithm, and the baseline method fluctuate without increasing
or decreasing dramatically.
An interesting phenomenon happens in the 118-bus system when PDCs are short of con-
nection spaces (shown in Figure 5.11(b)); the greedy heuristic algorithm spends more time
than the baseline method to obtain the result. The reason is that even though the heuristic
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algorithm reconnects PMUs in the order of their degrees in the power system’s transmission
networks, the limited connection space in PDCs means that the algorithm must spend a lot
of time searching possible paths for reconnection before it tries the next disconnected PMU.
(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.10: Comparison of the execution times with impact of limited network resources.
(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.11: Comparison of the execution times with impact of limited PDC connection
space.
5.5.3 Performance Evaluation of Stage 2
We further evaluate the second stage of the optimization, which reconnects PMUs to max-
imize the redundancy of measurements. In this evaluation, we consider the case when the
power grid is still observable with the disconnected PMUs. When there are sufficient hard-
ware resources, the ILP model, the greedy heuristic algorithm, and the baseline algorithm
always reach the same result, i.e., all remaining uncompromised PMUs are reconnected.
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Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13 show how the limited rule space of network switches and
the connection spaces of PDCs can impact the result of the self-healing mechanism. As
shown in Figure 5.12, the greedy heuristic algorithm and the baseline method are affected
if there are a limited number of rule spaces in switches. Both the greedy heuristic and the
baseline algorithm reconnect PMUs one by one. The algorithm can use up the rule space
of a small number of switches; those switches can become bottlenecks that prevent other
PMUs from reaching unused PDCs. The ILP model tries to optimize global reconnection of
PMUs among all paths; it can avoid selecting paths that tend to use up the rule space of a
few switches. As seen in Figure 5.13, the ILP model, the greedy heuristic, and the baseline
method usually give the same results, i.e., reconnect PMUs based on the existing connection
spaces from all PDCs.
(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.12: Comparison of power system observability with the impact of limited network
resources.
Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15 show the execution times of the ILP model, the greedy heuris-
tic algorithm, and the baseline method. Like Figure 5.7, Figure 5.10, and Figure 5.11, Figure
5.14 and Figure 5.15 include the average of the 50 largest execution times spent by these
three methods. By comparing Figure 5.10 and Figure 5.11 with Figure 5.14 and Figure 5.15,
we can see that the execution times of the ILP model spent at Stage 2 are one order of
magnitude smaller than the time spent at Stage 1. In other words, the ILP model uses
a large amount of computation to satisfy constraints (5.3). However, the execution times
spent by the greedy and baseline algorithms at Stage 2 are one magnitude larger than their
times spent at Stage 1, as they often end up attempting to reconnect many PMUs.
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(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.13: Comparison of power system observability with the impact of limited PDC
connection space.
The execution time of the ILP model does not change dramatically when the rule space
of the network switches or the connection space of PDCs becomes limited. However, the
greedy algorithm and the baseline method select PMUs in sequence. They can reconnect
more PMUs if more hardware resources are available, and thus need more execution time
to finish. Also, the greedy algorithm and the baseline method expect more variation in
execution time, because in both approaches the search space of a PMU can be varied with
the location of the disconnected PMUs when hardware resources become limited.
(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.14: Comparison of the execution times with the impact of limited network
resources.
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(a) IEEE 30-bus system (b) IEEE 118-bus system
Figure 5.15: Comparison of the execution times with the impact of limited PDC
connection space.
5.6 Related Work
Although the deployment and use of PMUs in the power system is still at an early stage,
the cybersecurity issues have already been studied in the literature. In the National Elec-
tric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource (NESCOR) report [146], attack scenarios,
impact, and potential mitigation actions are discussed for wide area monitoring, protection,
and control (WAMPAC), including those for PMUs [120][121]. In [122], the authors di-
rectly apply existing security mechanisms used in the general computing environment (e.g.,
firewalls, VPNs, access control mechanism) to a PMU network, to reduce the risk of cyber-
attacks. The authors in [9] propose an attack mitigation scheme for a PMU network to
prevent propagation of attacks. Those projects were pilot efforts to analyze and enhance
the cybersecurity of PMU networks; however, they did not consider how to design miti-
gation mechanisms that self-heal the PMU network (e.g., reconnecting PMUs/PDCs) by
considering the constraints exclusive to PMU networks. In [147], the SDN-enabled network
is exploited to design the PMU network to save network bandwidth. Our scheme further
utilizes the potential reconfiguration features enabled by SDN to achieve the self-healing
PMU network.
The concept of self-healing has previously been proposed for virtual circuit switching
networks, such as the asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) network [131][132]. When a link
or node failure happens, the self-healing algorithms try to recover as many lost services as
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possible under the resource constraint of network switches. In this network environment,
the self-healing is performed on predetermined backup or protection paths [133]. The self-
healing mechanism proposed for PMU networks in this chapter is quite different from the
conventional algorithm. First, the optimization objective in reconnecting PMUs and PDCs
is to achieve quick restoration of power systems’ observability. This objective is different
from the one that is used to restore failed links or nodes in conventional ATM networks, e.g.,
minimizing the cost of assigning spare links [131], maximizing the amount of traffic restored
[148][149], and maximizing the volume of remaining capacity in routing paths [133][150].
Because PMUs and PDCs are expensive, deploying spare PMUs or PDCs can be costly, and
thus we need to reuse existing uncompromised PMUs and PDCs. Second, the self-healing
mechanisms for conventional networks consider the failure of a small range of components,
e.g., single link or node failures caused by accidental events, while we assume that attackers
can compromise multiple PDCs and PMUs.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have presented an innovative, self-healing mechanism for mitigation of
cyber-attacks and recovery of power system observability on a PMU network. After a cyber-
attack, the mechanism works by changing the configuration of the network switches enabled
by SDN technology, so that the compromised PMUs/PDCs are isolated to prevent further
propagation of the attack while the uncompromised PMUs are reconnected to the network
to “self-heal” and therefore restore the observability of the power system. Specifically, ILP
models are formulated to minimize the overhead of the self-healing process while considering
the constraints of power system observability, hardware resources, and network topology.
The proposed greedy heuristic algorithm reduces computational complexity. Experiments
conducted on a PMU network over IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems validate the
effectiveness of the proposed methods.
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CHAPTER 6
RAINCOAT - RANDOMIZATION OF NETWORK
COMMUNICATION IN POWER GRID CYBER
INFRASTRUCTURE TO MISLEAD ATTACKERS
6.1 Preamble
The detection mechanism presented in Chapter 3 and response mechanism presented in
Chapter 5 can be regarded as “passive” approaches, which are performed after attacks occur.
In this chapter, we present a preemptive approach, which is performed during attacks’
preparations and before they execute the designed strategies (as shown in Figure 6.1). In
this approach, we use SDN (software-defined networking) technology to implement a mov-
ing target defense (MTD) mechanism that achieves two objectives: (1) randomize network
connectivity of substation devices such that attackers lack sufficient understanding of power
systems physical state and (2) spoof decoy measurements to further mislead attackers into
designing ineffective strategies.
Figure 6.1: Chapter 6 overview.
6.2 Introduction
Cyber-attacks on SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems used by in-
dustrial control systems (ICSs), e.g., power grids, can cause severe damage. Mitigating
physical damage from those cyber attackers can be very challenging because attackers can
penetrate internal SCADA communication networks and use syntactically correct network
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messages to deliver compromised measurements or commands that can cause destructive
physical perturbations.
To detect attacks in SCADA systems, previous work, including the approaches presented
in Chapters 3 and 5, has focused on in-depth analysis of network and system activities
when or after attackers execute their strategies. These efforts include using (i) anomalies in
communication patterns, (ii) the physical impact predicted by state estimation algorithms
(e.g., whether execution of a given command could cause overload of a transmission line),
and (iii) inconsistencies in compromised measurements [24][34][79]. These approaches are
effective against specific malicious activities. However, once attacks evolve and use different
execution channels based on new vulnerabilities, the detection methods can become less
effective. In addition, detecting attacks during their execution can leave system administra-
tors little time to prevent damage from happening (by either delaying or reversing malicious
activities) [79].
Instead of focusing on the execution stage, we can detect attacks in their “preparation”
stage. Towards this goal, we obfuscate SCADA data acquisitions based on which attackers
develop their strategies to cause physical damage. Detecting attacks during their prepara-
tions brings two major benefits that are difficult to achieve at attack execution stage (i.e.,
when the attack payload is delivered). First, we can cover a wide spectrum of attacks in-
cluding unknown ones. Though attackers may adopt diverse execution activities to cause
different types of physical damage, they need to rely on measurement data to estimate the
current physical state of the target system and prepare an effective attack strategy. Sec-
ond, we can detect and mislead attacks before adversaries execute their strategies and inflict
damage; detecting attacks at this early stage makes it possible to remove potential threats
and prevent damage.
To obfuscate attackers’ knowledge, we propose Raincoat, a technique that randomizes
data acquisitions in power systems. Raincoat aims to expose and mislead attackers while
they are preparing attack strategies. At runtime, a single data acquisition operation issued
by the control center to all substation devices is transformed into multiple rounds of data
delivery. In each round, we enable network connectivity to a subset of randomly selected
devices, i.e., online devices. We allow the network traffic to reach online devices, which send
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real measurements upon receiving data acquisition requests. Meanwhile, we disallow traffic
to offline devices (i.e., a subset of devices for which we disable network connectivity) but
intelligently spoof the measurements for these devices. While the control center continu-
ously collects the complete set of real measurements, the attackers’ observations are limited
because of their inability to distinguish between the real and spoofed measurements.
So that Raincoat can further deter attackers’ ability to compromise systems, we design an
algorithm that includes decoy values in the spoofed measurements of offline devices. Conse-
quently, when mixed with real measurements, the spoofed measurements present attackers
with a valid power system state that is different from the real state. Using this crafted state
information, attackers will always end up with ineffective attack strategies that expose the
malicious activities but cause little or no harm to the real power system.
Raincoat significantly raises a bar that attackers must overcome to launch a successful
attack and cause physical damage to the target system. In practice, Raincoat can take ad-
vantage of network management and programming paradigm by implementing and deploying
SDN in switches at the edge of power systems’ communication infrastructure [151]. SDN
can manipulate network flows related to data acquisition in SCADA systems while making
little change to data acquisition procedure or the configurations of substation devices.
Specifically, Raincoat makes the following contributions:
1) Disrupts attacks at the preparation stage. To the best of our knowledge, Rain-
coat is the first technique to disrupt and mislead attackers as they prepare malicious
activities in power systems. The randomized data acquisition exposes the attackers
when they attempt to access offline devices, even before they carry out any destructive
activities.
2) Mitigates damage by misleading attackers. We include in Raincoat an algo-
rithm based on state estimation to generate decoy measurements for offline devices.
The decoy measurements mislead attackers into designing ineffective attack strategies
against power systems, as follows:
• False data injection attacks. Attacks designed based on the decoy measurements
generate large measurement errors (e.g., at least 50 times larger than the threshold
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used by state estimation to identify bad data) and hence reveal the existence of
maliciously injected data.
• Control-related attacks. The probability of successful “target attacks” (wherein
attackers with complete system knowledge target critical devices) can be more
than 70% when attackers make small perturbations, e.g., disconnecting 8 strate-
gically selected transmission lines (out of a total of 1415) in a 1153-bus real-world
power system. Using decoy measurements, Raincoat misleads attackers such that
the probability of successful attacks is reduced to less than 5%, which is even
less than the probability observed in random attacks (wherein attackers have no
system knowledge).
3) Has a small impact on normal state estimation. Using measurements collected
by the randomized data acquisition, the state estimation in the control center still
provides accurate results in highly dynamic power systems, in which measurements
change frequently. In our experiments, we used real operational data from our campus,
3 small-scale IEEE power system cases, and 3 large-scale real-world cases (based on
Polish national power systems). The accuracy of the state estimation is within ±2%
of the result when Raincoat is not used.
4) Has a small overhead on control networks. To mimic SCADA communication
networks, we used the GENI testbed to construct six real wide area networks (WAN),
including one consisting of up to 40 hardware switches and 80 end hosts distributed
at different geographical locations [20]. We implemented SDN controllers in ONOS,
an open-source network operating system, so that Raincoat could manipulate network
flows to online and offline devices [152]. Compared to the default ONOS controller,
Raincoat introduces on average less than 6% additional latency in data acquisition.
6.3 Background
In this section, we first describe the threat model based on the SCADA communication
architecture. Then, we use a physical model of a power system to demonstrate attackers’
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preparations for introducing physical damage.
6.3.1 Threat Model in Attacks’ Preparation Stage
In Figure 6.2, we show a hierarchical communication architecture used by SCADA systems in
the context of an electric power grid, where IP-based networks provide connectivity between
a control center and devices deployed at substations. To facilitate descriptions, we use the
following terms in this chapter:
Definition 1 (End device). Intelligent electronic devices (IED) located at the edge of
the communication path connecting the control center and substations.
By definition 1, in their downstream communication, end devices connect to sensors or
circuit breakers through hardwired connections. In their upstream communication, multiple
end devices connect to an up-level IED, e.g., RTU (remote terminal unit), which forwards
information (e.g., aggregate measurements or commands) to/from the control center.
Definition 2 (Edge switch). Switches located as the first or the last hop of communi-
cation paths that connect the control center and end devices.
Figure 6.2: Control network setup in power systems.
In this dissertation, we consider the remote insider threat model. In other words, we
assume that the attackers can bypass the barrier (or perimeter protection) between corporate
networks and control networks and establish footholds in the control network connecting
control center and end devices.
By using Figure 6.2, we present the assumptions of the threat model used in this chapter.
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• In control networks, we assume that attackers can penetrate computing devices on any
communication path that connects the control center and end devices. Those comput-
ing devices, such as human machine interfaces (HMIs) or RTUs, are often installed at
substations that are distributed over a large geographical area. Because it is challenging
to maintain computing devices in a wide area, we often find unpatched vulnerabilities
in those devices, e.g., an old TCP vulnerability found in substation devices [153]. In
most well-known attacks targeting industrial control systems, e.g., Stuxnet and at-
tacks against Ukrainian power system [6][8], attackers targeted vulnerable computing
devices and used them as footholds to prepare and execute attacks.
In substations, we assume that attackers do not have physical access to the devices
on the downstream of end devices. Under this assumption, attackers need to use
computing devices on the upstream of end devices, including control networks and the
control center, to monitor system state and launch malicious operations. We argue that
this is a reasonable assumption as substations are usually located in large geographical
areas and simultaneous physical breaking into those substations is not practical.
• In the control center, we trust the integrity of the state estimation software used in the
control center. Under this assumption, attackers are not able to observe measurements
by compromising the state estimation software; they need to penetrate into the control
networks or other devices in the control center to learn the system state. We argue that
this is a reasonable assumption, as it is practical to protect the state estimation software
by running it in a dedicated or a separate virtual machine or by using attestation
mechanisms, e.g., TPM (trusted platform module), to verify its integrity periodically.
Also, the integrity of state estimation software is ensured by much existing research
work that protects power systems against false data injection attacks [34].
Even when state estimation software is protected, attackers can still monitor system
state and launch malicious commands. In addition to penetrating the control network,
we assume that attackers can remotely penetrate the local area network environment
of the control center. By exploiting the vulnerabilities in workstations and employee’s
personal devices, e.g., laptops, smart phones, or USB drives, that are connected to con-
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trol centers [6], attackers can further obtain the privileges necessary to install malware,
sniff, inject, and even modify measurements delivered to state estimation software and
commands issued to substations.
• We trust the functionality of Raincoat. Raincoat uses edge switches and SDN con-
trollers to randomize data acquisitions in SCADA systems; we trust SDN controllers
and the edge switches. This is a reasonable assumption for two reasons. First, main-
taining the integrity of SDN controllers and edge switches (e.g., being patched or
upgraded) can be more practical to achieve compared to legacy devices in substations
and control networks. Second, trusting edge switches can reduce the range of trusted
computing base, as compared to trusting all computing devices in the control networks.
Also, SDN controllers connect to switches through ports different from the data ports
that are used to exchange information. Consequently, it is not practical for attackers to
penetrate SDN controllers and thus to monitor network traffic between the controllers
and the edge switches. Even if edge switches and SDN controllers were compromised,
attackers would obtain the same privilege as if they penetrated substation devices (e.g.,
RTUs or HMIs).
Under that assumption, attackers can perform both active and passive monitoring from
the compromised devices to collect system information needed to develop attack strategies.
The active monitoring relies on attackers’ ability to issue a valid and even authenticated
request to end devices to retrieve measurements. To be stealthy (i.e., hide their presence),
attackers can passively monitor the measurements when they go through the compromised
devices, even if the measurements are transmitted between devices in encrypted traffic. We
assume that with information gained via passive and active monitoring, attackers can com-
promise measurement data, i.e., perform false data injection attacks, and compromise com-
mands, i.e., perform control-related attacks, when measurements or commands go through
the compromised devices.
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6.3.2 Learning the Physical State
In this section, we discuss the physical measurements and system state information that
attackers need in order to launch two types of attacks against power systems: (i) false data
injection attacks (FDIA), whereby attackers compromise measurements sent to the control
center, and (ii) control-related attacks (CRA), whereby attackers compromise commands
sent to end devices at substations to change the system state and cause physical damage.
Recent high-profile attacks against power grid infrastructures fall into these two broad cat-
egories [8][11][24][154].
A power system is composed of buses (representing substations) that are connected through
transmission lines. The state of the system is specified by the voltage magnitude and the
angle for each bus, i.e., (Vj,θj) in equations 6.1–6.4; to facilitate the understanding, we
rewrite the power flow equations presented in Chapter 2 in this section. For each bus j, two
power flow equations, i.e., equations 6.1 and 6.2, are formulated based on the fact that the
generated power (PGj and Q
G




j ), and the power delivered
to other buses (indexed by k) are balanced at each timestamp [30]. In addition, we can for-
mulate equations 6.3 and 6.4 to describe the power flow corresponding to each transmission
line.
PGj − PLj =
∑
k




(VjVk(Gjksin(θj − θk)−Bjkcos(θj − θk)) (6.2)
Pjk = −V 2j Gjk + VjVkGjkcos(θj − θk) + VjVkBjksin(θj − θk) (6.3)
Qjk = V
2
j Bjk + VjVkGjksin(θj − θk)− VjVkBjkcos(θj − θk) (6.4)
Table 6.1 summarizes the notations used in equations 6.1–6.4. The first two rows include
the measurements related to each bus, while the last two rows include the measurements
related to each transmission line.
In Table 6.2, we list the targets of the two attack types (FDIAs and CRAs) along with
the measurements that attackers need in order to design effective attack strategies, which
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j Active/reactive power generated at bus j
PGj , Q
G
j Active/reactive power consumed at bus j
Pjk, Qjk
Active/reactive power flowing from bus j to bus k along the transmission
line
Y = G+ i ·B
Nodal admittance matrix Y can be decomposed into two real-valued ma-
trices: Y = G+ iB. The elements Gjk and Bjk of the matrices denote the
conductance and the susceptance of the transmission line connecting bus j
and bus k
are listed as preconditions. Attackers use existing state estimation algorithms to analyze
the collected measurements (e.g., the “preconditions” in Table 6.2) and decide on the attack
strategy, e.g., to change the measurements seen by the control center or to issue a command to
open a transmission line [30]. Note that there are two classes of state estimation approaches
for solving equations 6.1–6.4: AC state estimation, which employs iterative algorithms; DC
state estimation, which solves the linear approximations of the equations.
Table 6.2: Target and preconditions for FDIAs and CRAs.
Type Preconditions Target
FDIA













j of all substations;
Pjk, Qjk of all transmission lines
Control commands that can disconnect transmis-
sion lines or substations in a power grid
The objective of Raincoat is to obfuscate the cyber-physical infrastructure to prevent
attackers from obtaining correct measurements of the system state, i.e., the measurements
specified as “preconditions” in Table 6.2, by (i) randomizing the data acquisition procedure
and (ii) spoofing measurements.
6.4 Raincoat Approach
High-level procedure. Traditional SCADA systems perform data acquisitions by issuing
requests from the control center to all end devices in substations periodically. According to
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IEEE standard 1646 [63], the period, represented by T, ranges from 1 to 10 seconds.
The Raincoat approach is illustrated in Figure 6.3, which consists of the following steps:
• Step ¬: Raincoat does not change the procedure that SCADA systems use to issue
data acquisition requests; the requests are still issued to all devices as in the case that
Raincoat is not used. In the example shown in the figure, we assume that there are 6
end devices, whose measurements are collected; the requests are represented by square
boxes of 6 different colors.
• Step ­: When data acquisition requests reach the edge switch at the control center,
they are divided into multiple rounds of data acquisition requests. In each round, we
randomly select a subset of end devices and only the requests to these devices are
issued to substations. In the example shown in Figure 6.3, we divide data acquisition
requests into three rounds. In each round, we send requests to 4 randomly selected
devices, out of the total of 6 end devices.
• Step ®: When each round of data acquisition requests reach the edge switch at sub-
stations, we again randomly specify two sets of devices. The first set consists of online
devices, whose network connectivity is enabled and which are allowed to respond with
real measurements. All devices not included in this set are offline devices, whose net-
work connectivity is disabled. In the example shown in Figure 6.3, we randomly select
2 online devices in each round of data acquisition.
• Step ¯: Raincoat does not change the physical configurations of end devices; each
online device responds with the collected measurement as in the case that Raincoat is
not used (represented by colored circles).
• Step °: We use the edge switch at substations to forward the responses of real mea-
surement data from online devices. Meanwhile, we spoof the responses on behalf of
offline devices and use the edge switch to send them to the control center (represented
by grey circles in the figure). Under our threat model, attackers, who can compro-
mise any device in the control networks, are not able to distinguish online and offline
devices.
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• Step ±: We use the edge switch at the control center to combine responses from
multiple rounds of data acquisitions. Consequently, the state estimation software in
the SCADA systems receive both real and spoofed measurements. With the knowledge
of randomized device connectivity, the state estimation software can still collect real
measurements from all devices with the same period as in the case that Raincoat is
not used.
Figure 6.3: Control network setup in power systems.
By using Raincoat, we can disrupt both active and passive monitoring performed by at-
tackers. Under our threat model, any attempt by attackers to access offline devices while
they monitor the target system, e.g., by scanning of end devices, exposes the attackers’
presence and results in raising an alert to the system operator. Because of the spoofed mea-
surements for offline devices, the passive monitoring is also disrupted as attackers cannot
distinguish between online and offline devices. Furthermore, under our threat model, attack-
ers cannot compromise edge switches. As a result, they are unable to distinguish between
real and spoofed measurements by passively monitoring (i) network packets between the edge
switches in substations and end devices and (ii) network packets between the edge switches
and the corresponding SDN controllers. Additionally, we present in Section 6.5 a method
to include decoy measurements into the spoofed responses to further prevent attackers from
designing strategies that can cause physical damage.
Implementation. Raincoat achieves randomized data acquisition by manipulating the
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network flow on edge switches, which, again, are the switches located at either the first
hop or the last hop of a network path connecting the control center and an end device. To
manipulate the network flows in edge switches, we can use SDN technology. Note that SDN-
enabled switches are being designed and deployed for power system substations, making it
practical to deploy Raincoat [151].
When the control center issues data acquisition requests, the edge switches in the sub-
stations are at the last-hop of the communication; they filter in requests destined for online
devices and redirect the requests destined for offline devices to SDN controllers (Step ­ in
Figure 6.3). In responding to data acquisitions, the edge switches in the substations are
at the first-hop of the communications. We use SDN controllers to forward responses from
online devices and craft spoofed responses and send them through these edge switches.
In using SDN controllers to randomize data acquisition, Raincoat does not make any
changes to: (i) data acquisition procedure in the SCADA systems, (ii) physical configurations
of end devices in substations, and (iii) existing network routing/forwarding configurations
in the control networks.
The values of spoofed measurements should not be set randomly; they must follow power
flow equations 6.1–6.4. Otherwise, attackers might become suspicious of the observed mea-
surements. We have designed a method to produce spoofed offline device measurements that
follow the power flow equations. Details are given in Section 6.5.
6.4.1 Procedure to Randomize Device Connectivity
We use the procedure shown in Algorithm 2 to generate a random binary sequence of length
nr to encode the device connectivity. Here, we use nr to represent the number of end devices
from which the control center collects measurements. We use the value of each bit in this
binary sequence to indicate the online/offline status of a device. Data from all nr devices
are acquired in k rounds. As a result, there are approximately ⌈nr/k⌉ online devices on each
data acquisition round, where ⌈·⌉ represents the ceiling function. We refer to this number
as the connectivity threshold, conThld = ⌈nr/k⌉.
As shown in Algorithm 2, we start with the set remId, which includes the indices of all
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Algorithm 2 Randomization procedure
Input. nr: number of end devices in a power grid.
Output. B: k sets of device indices.
Procedure:
1: Assign remId = (1, . . . , nr), conThld = ⌈nr/k⌉, B = () {⌈·⌉ is the ceiling function}
2: while |remId| > 0 do
3: if conThld < |remId| then
4: randomly select conThld indices from remId and include them in B
5: remove the selected indices in remId
6: else
7: put remId in B
8: empty remId
9: randomize the order of k sets in B
10: end if
11: end while
end devices. We first randomly select conThld end devices from all devices. Then, in the
following steps (Steps 3–5), we randomly select conThld devices among the ones that have
not been selected in previous rounds. In the last round (Steps 6–8), we can have less than
or equal to conThld devices that have not been selected yet. In that case, we connect all
remaining devices. In the last step (Step 9), we randomize the order of these k sets, which
ensures that the devices selected in the last round cannot be predicted based on the device
connectivity from previous rounds.
The randomization procedure ensures that the measurements from all devices are delivered
to the requestor (the control center in our case) within a predefined time T . For SCADA
systems, the value of T for normal (i.e., no randomization procedure is applied) data acqui-
sition ranges from 1 to 10 seconds [63]. When using Raincoat, we acquire the measurements
in k rounds so that the overall time interval T is divided into k subintervals, each of which
has a duration p, where k · p ≤ T . Doing so, we can collect all the measurements with the
same accuracy and within a predefined time T , as in the case when Raincoat is not used.
6.4.2 Implementation of SDN Controller: Central or Distributed
In Raincoat’s design, the spoofed measurements are delivered from the SDN controller in-
stead of from the offline devices. There are two options for implementing SDN controllers,
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i.e., a single central controller or multiple distributed controllers. We offer these two imple-
mentations to support trade-offs between implementation complexity and scalability.
When using a central SDN controller, we can use true random number generators to imple-
ment the procedure of randomizing device connectivity. However, when we deploy Raincoat
in a large-scale communication network, the increased amount of spoofed measurements can
congest the SDN controller.
Instead of using a single SDN controller, we can distribute multiple SDN controllers in
different physical sites. Each SDN controller is collocated at the same site as the edge
switches. This distributed configuration allows us to reduce: (i) the amount of spoofed
measurements that each SDN controller handles to make Raincoat scalable to large networks,
and (ii) the network latency of communications between switches and the controller (see
Section 6.6.2 for evaluation).
However, using distributed SDN controllers can increase the implementation complexity,
e.g., of maintaining a consistent view of device connectivity. To overcome this challenge,
we use strong pseudorandom number generators (PRNGs) to implement the procedure for
randomizing device connectivity. With a synchronized clock, each SDN controller generates
the same device connectivity. However, it is computationally expensive, if not impossible, to
guess the subsequent device connectivity based on the current connectivity. In today’s power
systems, substations are using GPS to synchronize measurements that can be sampled 200
times per second. We can use the same GPS to synchronize the device connectivity. Note
that in our approach, the device connectivity is changed with a frequency on the order of
seconds (as estimated by p = T/k).
6.5 Craft Decoy Measurements to Mislead Attackers
For Raincoat, we can have multiple options on what to include in spoofed measurements.
One option is to include random values in the spoofed measurements. Attackers, without
the knowledge of device connectivity, cannot distinguish between real and spoofed random
measurements. However, while the random measurements can hide the real measurements,
they do not directly follow the physical model of power systems. As a result, they can easily
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attract attackers’ suspicion.
In addition to hiding real measurements, we propose a method to include decoy values
in the spoofed measurements, which further misleads attackers into designing ineffective
strategies. To craft decoy measurements, we simulate a power system that has the same
topology as the transmission network of the real power system under protection. The sim-
ulated power system can be implemented in any simulation tool, e.g., MATPOWER which
is what we use [19], and run at the SDN controller, which is responsible for sending spoofed
measurements on behalf of offline devices.
Figure 6.4: Procedure to craft decoy measurements.
As shown in Figure 6.4, we craft decoy measurements in two steps to achieve two corre-
sponding objectives: (i) we set initial values for decoy measurements to mislead attackers into
designing ineffective strategies, and (ii) we refine the values such that decoy measurements
ultimately follow the power system’s physical models as specified in equations 6.1–6.4.
In Step 1, we can set different initial values based on the attacks that we want to mislead.
In this chapter, we mislead FDIAs and CRAs, by crafting the “precondition” measurements
listed in Table 6.2 such that the compromised “target” measurements fail to introduce physi-
cal damage. Specifically, we determine the susceptance of transmission lines in the simulated
power systems, based on which the designed FDIAs become detectable in real power systems
(in Step 1.a). We determine the power flows of the transmission lines in simulated power
systems to mislead CRAs (in Step 1.b) into targeting non-critical devices in real power
systems.
In Step 2, we further refine the values such that the decoy measurements follow physical
models. Specifically, we iteratively put decoy measurements in the state estimation algorithm
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and use the obtained calculation results to adjust the measurements determined in Step 1,
until the decoy measurements can observe the bad-data detection criteria used in the state
estimation.
6.5.1 Step 1.a: Mislead FDIAs
Background. We use the DC power flow model to discuss misleading FDIAs. In this
model, we relate state variables, i.e., θj in equations 6.1–6.4, and power measurements at
substations and transmission lines, i.e., PGj , P
L
j , and Pjk, by using linear approximations of
equations 6.1 and 6.3:
z = Hx+ e (6.5)
where z = (z1, z2, . . . , zq) represents q measurements. For measurements of power flow
along transmission lines, we have zl = −Pjk; for measurements on substation j, we have
zl = P
G
j −PLj ; x = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θp), which represents p physical state or p phasor angles at all
buses; and e = (e1, e2, . . . , eq) is the collection of q measurement errors. H = (hik)q×p is a
q-by-p Jacobian matrix; all entries in H are determined based on entries Bjk, the susceptance
of transmission lines connecting bus j and bus k (the detailed derivation of H can be found
in [11]).
When measurement errors follow a normal distribution with zero mean, the estimation of
state variable x̂ can be obtained through statistical criteria, e.g., the weighted least-square
criterion. When estimating x̂, the state estimation further detects and removes bad data or
measurements to ensure that the estimated state variable comes “closer” to that of the actual
state. The state estimation uses an L2-norm of the measurement residual, i.e., ∥z − Hx̂∥,
to detect the presence of bad measurements. If the residual is larger than a threshold, i.e.,
∥z −Hx̂∥ > τ , we declare the presence of bad measurements.
In false data injection attacks, attackers maliciously compromise the measurements so
that the estimated state variable x̂ differs from the actual state without triggering alerts
from bad-data detectors [11][12]. If attackers intend to make the state estimation describe
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a system state that is different from the real one, i.e., x̂a = x̂+ c, they can inject an attack
vector a into the original measurement z. With the full knowledge of H, attackers can
construct a such that a = Hc and make the corresponding compromised measurements, i.e.,
za = z + a. In that case, the L2-norm of the measurement residual becomes:
∥za −Hx̂a∥ = ∥z + a−H(x̂+ c)∥ = ∥z −Hx̂∥ ≤ τ (6.6)
Consequently, based on the L2-norm of the measurement residual of za, the state estima-
tion cannot detect that the measurements are compromised.
Prerequisites. As illustrated by [11][12], to achieve FDIAs, attackers must (i) obtain
the measurement matrix H of a power grid, and (ii) modify enough measurements that
ka ≥ q − p+ 1, where ka represents the number of compromised entries in vector z.
Protection. Raincoat can use device connectivity to limit the number of measurements
that attackers can compromise and mislead attackers into using Jacobian matrix H ′. Specif-
ically, we determine the decoy values of the susceptance of the transmission lines in H ′
such that it becomes challenging for the attack strategy based on H ′ to bypass the state
estimation based on H.
We represent the decoy Jacobian matrix H ′ as H ′ = H+∆H. Based on their knowledge of
H ′, attackers choose injected measurements a = H ′c = (H+∆H)c, where c is decided by the
attackers and is unknown to us. For attackers to bypass the state estimation of the protected
power system, the following condition needs to be satisfied: a = H ′c = (H +∆H)c = Hc′,
where c′ is a nonzero p-by-1 vector. Here, we analyze two cases, i.e., c = c′ or c ̸= c′. In each
case, we determine the condition of H ′ that makes FDIAs challenging to be successful and
to bypass state estimation.
Case 1: c = c′. To make (H + ∆H)c ̸= Hc is equivalent to making ∆Hc ̸= 0 for all
nonzero vectors c. Consequently, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1. To disrupt the attack strategy for FDIAs (reflected in c), we determine ∆H
such that equation ∆Hy = 0 has a unique solution y = 0.
Proof. Because ∆Hy = 0 has a unique solution, y = 0, then when y ̸= 0, ∆Hy ̸= 0.
When p > q, ∆Hy always has more than one nontrivial solution. In this case, there are
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actually more state variables than measurements. As a result, it is not possible to estimate
system states, even without any attack.
When p ≤ q, ∆y = 0 has a unique solution if and only if rank(∆H) = n − 1, where n
is the number of buses. When attackers target a different state, i.e., x̂a = x̂ + c and c ̸= 0,
then because a = H ′c = (H +∆H)c = 0 and ∆Hc ̸= 0, we always have a ̸= Hc. 
Case 2: c ̸= c′. By satisfying Lemma 1, we guarantee that attackers’ original strategy
does not succeed. However, this does not ensure that attackers’ activities are always detected.
If a = Hc′ with c ̸= c′, the corrupted measurements can still bypass the bad data detector
in the state estimation. However, in this case, the state estimation estimates the state as
x+ c′, not x+ c, which is the malicious state that attackers intended to achieve.
In Lemma 2, we present the condition when the compromised measurements based on the
decoy Jacobian matrix can bypass the bad-data detectors used in the real power system.
Lemma 2. An attack strategy based on the decoy Jacobian matrix, i.e., a = H ′c, can
bypass the bad-data detection if it satisfies the condition rank(H) = rank([HH ′c]).
Proof. If rank(H) = rank([HH ′c]) and a = H ′c, the linear equation Hy = a is consistent
(i.e., the equation has at least one solution). The solution of this equation is the change of
system state c′ that can bypass the state estimation. 
If attackers use the decoy Jacobian matrix, they need to ensure that compromised mea-
surements fall into the column space of H, to avoid detection. Even though we cannot find
a sound proof to ensure that the condition rank(H) = rank([HH ′c]) always fails, this con-
dition can be challenging to satisfy in practice. In our experiments, we have not found any
FDIAs that can bypass the bad-data detectors (see Section 6.6.1 for details).
Combining the analyses from those two cases, we formulate the following procedure for
Step 1.a, which aims to satisfy Lemma 1.
Procedure of Step 1.a. We determine the decoy values of the susceptance of the
transmission lines by randomly changing the corresponding line susceptance of the protected
power systems, such that rank(∆H) = n− 1, where n is the number of buses.
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6.5.2 Step 1.b: Mislead CRAs
Background. In CRAs, attackers compromise commands delivered to end devices to change
the physical states of power systems. In this chapter, we focus on control-related attacks that
seek to disconnect transmission lines. These operations are also used in real attacks [8]. Note
that attackers can also use the commands to disconnect a substation, which is equivalent to
disconnecting all the transmission lines that connect to that substation.
Prerequisites. To cause physical disturbance of power systems, attackers can target
transmission lines that carry heavy power flows. Disconnecting those lines can cause over-
loading of other remaining transmission lines. To identify those critical transmission lines, at-
tackers need to collect measurements of power flows of transmission lines and the power gen-
erations and consumptions of substations (the “precondition” measurements in Table 6.2).
Protection. To protect a power grid from CRAs, we craft decoy measurements such
that the transmission lines with heavy loads correspond to the lines that carry light power
flow in real power systems. Consequently, attack strategies that rely on decoy measurements
ultimate target lightly loaded transmission lines and have little impact on the real power
grid, even if the attack strategies are successfully executed.
Procedure of Step 1.b. We first list, in descending order, the active power of transmis-
sion lines that are controlled by offline devices in the real power system: PI1 ≥ PI2 ≥ · · · ≥
PIt , where I1, . . . , It represents the indices of transmission lines. We assign the initial decoy








6.5.3 Step 2: Refine Measurement
In Step 2, we decide on the remaining decoy measurements, e.g., active and reactive power
generations and consumptions in substations, and adjust the existing decoy measurements
such that the decoy measurements become “legitimate.” We regard the measurements as
legitimate if they can pass bad-data detection in AC state estimations. In other words, when
attackers use state estimation, they will not obtain results that indicate the existence of bad
data.
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Procedure of Step 2. We iteratively use AC state estimation on decoy measurements. In
each iteration, we update the decoy measurement from offline devices with the results from
the AC state estimation while keeping the measurements from online devices unchanged.
Using the results of state estimation can bring the decoy measurements “closer” to being
legitimate.
To reduce the duration of Step 2, we use a “cut-short” version of AC state estimation,
similar to the method in [24]. Specifically, we reduce the number of iterations spent in each
state estimation. Consequently, we make decoy measurements move “faster” towards being
legitimate.
6.5.4 Case Study
We illustrate the procedure for crafting the decoy measurements in a case study of a 5-bus
system that contains 5 transmission lines, 3 generators, and 3 load units.
Figure 6.5: Procedure to craft decoy measurements to mislead control-related attacks.
Figure 6.5 illustrates the procedure, including Step 1.b and Step 2. Figure 6.5.(a) depicts
the state of the real/original system. To simplify the discussion, we attach to each transmis-
sion line a end device (denoted by a pie chart in the figure) that measures the active power
flow of the transmission line. We assume that the measurement of P12 is collected from
an online device (shown in blue), while all other measurements are collected from offline
ones (shown in red). In Step 1.b, we assign initial values of the decoy measurements in the
reverse order of the real measurements: (P decoy34 = P45) < (P
decoy
32 = P15) < (P
decoy
15 = P32) <
(P decoy45 = P34), as shown in Figure 6.5.(b).
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In Step 2, we perform state estimation iteratively. The ultimate result is shown in Fig-
ure 6.5.(c). After Step 2, measurement P12 remains unchanged. The decoy measurements,




15 , and P
decoy
45 , change slightly compared with their initial values
shown in Figure 6.5.(b). However, the final decoy measurements can still map transmission
lines with heavy power flows to the lines that carry light power flow in the real grid.
To assess the impact of attack strategies based on decoy measurements, we show an
example attack on the 5-bus system. Figure 6.6.(a) shows the consequences of an attack done
with knowledge of all the real measurements, which are shown in Figure 6.5.(a). Attackers
determine that the line connecting buses 3 and 4 carries the most power flows. After that
line is disconnected, a transmission line connecting buses 2 and 3 is overloaded (indicated by
the red pie chart) and can be disconnected automatically. This can have a cascading effect
on the whole power grid. Figure 6.6.(b) shows that if attackers designed an attack strategy
based on decoy measurements, as shown in Figure 6.5.(c), they would target the transmission
line connecting buses 1 and 5, which carries the most power flow (as determined using the
decoy measurements). Attackers would disconnect that line with the goal of overloading
two transmission lines. However, Figure 6.6.(c) shows that the attackers would actually be
disconnecting a transmission line that carries light power flow in the real power grid. Even if
the attackers successfully disconnected this transmission line, they would not cause overload
of any transmission lines.
Figure 6.6: Decoy measurements misleading attackers.
6.6 Evaluation
In order to evaluate Raincoat, we use the testbed shown in Figure 6.7 to simulate both the
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physical and cyber infrastructures of power systems.
• Power Grid Simulation. We use Matpower to simulate power systems’ physical
infrastructures [19]. For the example in Figure 6.7, we show the topology of transmis-
sion network of a 5-bus system. When a command is issued from the control center
to end devices (simulated in the corresponding communication networks), we estimate
the impact of the command and provide measurements to build network traffic.
Figure 6.7: Cyber-Physical Testbed to Evaluate Raincoat.
In our experiment, we simulated IEEE 24-bus, IEEE 30-bus, and IEEE RTS-96
(which includes 73 buses) systems, and three power systems representing three areas
of Polish 400-, 220-, and 110-kV networks, which include a 286-bus, a 406-bus, and a
1153-bus system. The baseline configurations of the latter three systems are included
in Matpower as examples of large-scale power systems.
To simulate the normal variability of operations in the simulated power grids, we
created a benchmark profile based on one month of real data on power generation at
our campus. In Figure 6.8, we show the power generation on the month’s 12th day,
which was the day power generation experienced the biggest variations. On the y-axis,
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Figure 6.8: Recording of power generation on local campus.
we show the normalized power generation, where each data point corresponds to a
ratio between the actual power generated at the time specified on the x -axis and the
peak value for this month. For each simulated system, we randomly selected power
generators and load units and adjusted baseline measurements for each unit by scaling
down with the ratio selected from the benchmark data.
• Communication Networks. We used the GENI testbed, a nationwide network ex-
periment platform, to construct communication networks of the kinds used by SCADA
systems to deliver commands and measurements. We used real SDN-enabled hardware
switches distributed in different physical locations to build control networks, which sup-
ports communications among the control center and substations. A control center and
end devices were simulated as virtual machines.
To build a control network, we follow two steps. The first step is to construct a
backbone network. To do this, we used one of three topologies of communication
networks: a dumbbell topology and two topologies from the TopologyZoo dataset,
namely ARPANET and NSF, which are the names of two WANs used in the U.S. [155].
The second step is to connect different numbers of edge switches to the switches in the
backbone network. Following these two steps, we built six different control networks in
our experiment. When indicating a network in the following paragraphs, we include the
name of the backbone network and the number of nodes (including switches and end
devices) in parentheses. For example, Figure 6.7 includes the (Dumbbell, 21) network,
which is a 21-node network whose backbone network uses the dumbbell topology.
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We used the open DNP3 library (DNP3 is an IP-based communication protocol
widely used in power grids) to implement a DNP3 master in the simulated control
center and DNP3 slaves in all simulated end devices [68]. All measurements produced
by substation devices were transmitted to the control center using the DNP3 protocol.
• Raincoat Implementation. We implemented in MATLAB the randomization pro-
cedure and the method that crafts decoy measurements, as shown in Algorithm 2 and
Figure 6.4. When attackers collect decoy measurements, they can use the state estima-
tion to determine the system state, which is then used to prepare attacks. We regard
the decoy measurements as valid if they can pass the bad-data detections in the state
estimation. In our experiments, we collected over 13,000 sets of decoy measurements
for all simulated power systems. Over 88% of the decoy measurements are valid. For
invalid decoy measurements, attackers can find bad measurements in them based on
the results of the state estimation, which can raise suspicions. However, because at-
tackers cannot obtain the real system state and design effective strategies, they may
abandon their attacks or randomly select target devices to compromise, which can be
detected by the randomized device connectivity.
We implemented SDN controllers in a distributed manner by using ONOS, an open-
source network operating system [152]. Because we used DNP3 as the protocol to
deliver measurements, we included in ONOS an encoder to encapsulate decoy mea-
surements in DNP3 packets. As shown in Figure 6.7, we deployed a single instance of
the implemented controller in each simulated substations (i.e., location), where each
controller was run on a virtual machine with a dual-core processor (2.10 GHz) and
2 GB memory. We relied on the clock in virtual machines to synchronize the device
connectivity; the synchronization was implemented by a cluster coordination mecha-
nism in ONOS. In our experiments, we did not find any inconsistencies, even when we
changed device connectivity every second.
In the following sections, we perform the following evaluations of Raincoat:
• Security evaluation: We used power grid simulations to evaluate how Raincoat
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disrupts and misleads FDIAs and CRAs by using randomly selected online/offline
devices and decoy measurements.
• Performance evaluation: We use constructed communication networks to evaluate
how Raincoat impacts the performance of data acquisitions, including: (i) the accuracy
of normal state estimation performed at the control center and (ii) the performance of
the communication network by which the measurement data are transmitted.
6.6.1 Security Evaluation
Mislead FDIAs. For each simulated power system, we implemented the false data injec-
tion attacks by changing the target measurements listed in Table 6.2 based on the procedure
in [12]. We regard a FDIA as successful if the compromised measurements based on the decoy
Jacobian matrix pass the bad-data detections based on the real Jacobian matrix. In other
words, the L2-norm of the measurement residual satisfies the condition ∥za−Hx̂a∥ ≤ τ . Be-
cause bad-data detection relies on a chi-square test, we determine τ =
√
chi2inv(0.1, F ) · σ2,
where chi2inv(0.1, F ) computes the inverse of the chi-square cumulative distribution func-
tion for a probability of 10% (i.e., 90% accuracy) with degree of freedom F = |z| − |x| (i.e.,
the differences between the dimensions of measurements and state variables) [156]. Also,
we set the measurement error (at a device) σ = 0.01 based on the specification of SEL 421
relays [67].
In our experiment, the state estimation of all simulated power systems was able to detect
all compromised measurements that had been determined based on decoy Jacobian matrix
H ′. The experiment results show that the L2-norm of the measurement residual can be at
least 50 times larger than the bad-data detection threshold, i.e., ∥za −Hx̂a∥ > 50 · τ .
Mislead CRAs. We simulated control-related attacks as disconnections of multiple
transmission lines in the power system. For each attack, we analyzed its physical conse-
quence. If the attack caused an overload on at least one transmission line, we regarded the
power system to be in an insecure state, and thus the attack was deemed successful.
To demonstrate how Raincoat disrupts and misleads CRAs, we considered three scenarios:
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Scenario 1: Random attacks (baseline), in which attackers randomly disconnect transmis-
sion lines to cause physical perturbations. In this scenario, we simulated attackers who had
little or no knowledge of the power flows on the transmission lines. Note that we use the
result of Random attacks to demonstrate the effectiveness of Raincoat. Random attacks can
also be detected and mitigated by the randomized device connectivity.
Scenario 2: Targeted attacks, in which attackers identify the top 15 heavily loaded trans-
mission lines that carry most power flows and randomly disconnect some of them.
Scenario 3: Raincoat, in which attackers use decoy measurements to identify the top 15
transmission lines that carry heavy power flows and randomly disconnect some of them.
In each scenario, we made 2000 attack attempts and calculated the probability of suc-
cessful attacks, denoted by pa. We show in Figure 6.9 how pa changes with the number of
disconnected transmission lines. We present the result for each simulated power system in
a separate plot. The three scenarios are indicated by different line patterns.
One can observe that attackers with full knowledge of the target power systems can easily
put the system into an insecure state. For example, in the mid-scale IEEE RTS-96 system,
disconnecting 7 strategically selected transmission lines (out of a total of 120) can be sufficient
to put the system into an insecure state (i.e., overloading at least one transmission line).
If the attackers have little knowledge, the probability of a successful attack (shown as the
“Random attacks” scenario) is significantly smaller.
Comparison of the pa of Scenario 3 (Raincoat) with that of Scenario 2 (Targeted attacks)
indicates that the proposed algorithm for crafting decoy measurements can mislead attackers
into targeting lightly loaded transmission lines and significantly reduces the probability of
successful attacks. For example, for the Polish 1153-bus system (the largest system simu-
lated), the value of pa dropped from 60% (for Scenario 2, the Targeted attack) to less than
5% (for Scenario 3, Raincoat) when 7 lines were disconnected.
More importantly, the pa observed in Scenario 3 (Raincoat) was of the same magnitude
as, or less than, the probability observed in Scenario 1 (Random attacks). Consequently,
Raincoat can successfully hide the real system state and obfuscate device connectivity to
mislead attackers into designing ineffective strategies.
Note that the value of pa is calculated under the condition that the attackers succeed in
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making correct guesses about online devices. Using a good random number generator to
determine device connectivity can make the correct guessing computationally expensive. In
practice, if Raincoat detects an attempt to access an offline device, it can prevent attackers
from causing physical damage.
(a) IEEE 24-bus (b) IEEE 30-bus
(c) IEEE RTS-96 (d) Poland 208-bus
(e) Poland 406-bus (f) Poland 1153-bus
Figure 6.9: Comparing the probabilities of successful attacks in different evaluation
scenarios.
6.6.2 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the impact of Raincoat on (i) the accuracy of the state estimation
performed at the control center, and (ii) the performance of the control networks by which
measurement data are collected.
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6.6.2.1 Impact on the State Estimation
Raincoat randomly selects the set of online/offline devices. As stated earlier, the collection
of measurements from all end devices is divided into k rounds of data delivery. In each
round, only the measurements from the online devices are used by the control center, and
the decoy measurements from offline devices are discarded.
Table 6.3: Execution time to craft decoy measurements.
Case Execution Time (s) Case Execution Time (s)
24-bus 0.06± 0.001 Poland 208-bus 2.2± 0.01(8.3)
30-bus 0.02± 0.001 Poland 406-bus 5.2± 0.01(22.1)
RTS-96 0.36± 0.008 Poland 1153-bus 70.1± 0.04(363.6)
In Table 6.3, we show the average times to generate decoy measurements (with 99%
confidence interval). The experiments were performed by MATLAB running on a computer
with an Intel(R) i7 (3.6 GHz) 8-core processor and 16 GB memory. For small-scale power
systems, generating decoy measurements usually took less than 0.4 second. For large-scale
systems, we spent more time computing decoy measurements, e.g., up to 70 seconds for the
1153-bus system. The reason is that the algorithm for crafting decoy measurements is based
on state estimation, which scales badly with the size of power systems.
In practice, we can reduce the time to calculate decoy measurements by using methods
that can perform state estimation in parallel or hierarchically [157][158]. In Table 6.3, we
give (in parentheses) the average times to perform normal state estimation for the same
large-scale power systems. We can see that constructing decoy measurements takes less
than 27% of the time needed to perform normal state estimation. As shown in [157], using
GPU (graphical processing units), one can perform the state estimation of a power system
that has over 1200 buses within approximately 4.3 seconds. By applying such techniques, it
is possible to generate decoy measurements within 1 second, even for such large-scale power
systems.
If we generate decoy measurements quickly, the duration of each round in collecting sub-
station measurements can be set small enough to satisfy the condition k · p ≤ T (see Section
6.4.2 for details). In these cases, the control center collects measurements from all devices
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within the period T predefined in SCADA systems; the accuracy of state estimation is not
affected by Raincoat. However, in situations where we cannot generate decoy measurements
quickly enough to satisfy the condition k · p ≤ T , the control center uses past measure-
ments, i.e., the measurements collected k · p time slots before, to compensate for the missing
measurements when it performs state estimation.
Table 6.4: Impact on accuracy of state estimation.
Case Accuracy Case Accuracy
24-bus ±0.68%(0.16%) Poland 208-bus ±0.15%(0.09%)
30-bus ±0.80%(0.17%) Poland 406-bus ±0.19%(0.09%)
RTS-96 ±1.05%(0.17%) Poland 1153-bus ±0.81%(0.2%)
In Table 6.4, we can see the accuracy of the state estimations when past measurements
were used for the six simulated power systems (with 99% confidence interval being in-
cluded in parenthesis). The accuracies were calculated by: (seraincoat − sebase)/sebase, where
se[·] = ∥z −Hx̂∥ represents the L2-norm of the measurement residual (see Section 6.5.1 for
definitions). While sebase represents the residual for the case when Raincoat is not used,
seraincoat represents the case when past measurements are used (i.e., when Raincoat does not
generate decoy measurements quickly enough). If measurements experienced quick changes,
e.g., collected from dynamic power systems, then use of past measurements could generate
large errors. In our experiments, we varied the outputs of power generation and load units
of simulated power systems every second by scaling their baseline values with the ratio col-
lected in the benchmark data shown in Figure 6.8. Note that the benchmark data recorded
the power generations every minute. In other words, in our experiments, we sped up the
variations of power generation by 60 times, compared to the variations observed on our
campus. In Table 6.4, we present the average over the 100 largest errors for each simulated
system. We can see that all errors were within 2% of case when Raincoat is not used, even
in the presence of high variability of load and generation.
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6.6.2.2 Impact on the Network Performance
Impact on round-trip time (RTT). In Figure 6.10, we show the average RTTs (with
99% confidence interval) taken by the control center to perform data acquisition in the
simulated networks when Raincoat and the default ONOS Forwarding controllers were used.
We normalized the results with respect to the RTT of the Base flow manipulation method.
Figure 6.10: Comparing RTTs under three flow control mechanisms.
As shown in Figure 6.10, compared to the Forwarding controllers, the Raincoat controllers
add a small latency, which is less than 6% on average, to encode decoy measurements in
the form of DNP3 packets. Figure 6.10 also shows that use of Forwarding controller can
add communications between an edge switch and an SDN controller. The resulting latency
causes a 30% increase in the RTTs relative to the Base case for the first five networks, and
an almost 100% increase for the last network (NSF, 111). The reason is that we were sharing
computing resources in the GENI testbed with other projects. As the scale of the networks
increased, we could not allocate sufficient computing resources for the SDN controllers to
handle more traffic from the edge switches, and thus additional latency was introduced in
the data acquisition. However, even with the limited computing resources, the RTTs of the
data acquisitions in the (NSF, 111) network were around 120 to 150 ms, which is less than
200 ms (the required maximum time from IEEE to deliver measurements from substations
to the control center [63]). To remedy the communication latency between controllers and
switches, we can increase the number of controllers or allocate more computing power to
run controllers when deploying Raincoat in real power systems. Based on the figures from
studies on networks in data centers, the latency between the controller and switches can
typically be maintained around 15 ms [159].
Moreover, we can observe the variations of RTTs when the ONOS Forwarding controller
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is used. Because there are only small differences between the RTTs when the Raincoat and
Forwarding controllers are used, it can be hard for attackers to distinguish between real and
spoofed measurements based on the observed variations in RTTs.
Impact on controller throughput. In Figure 6.11, we show the average throughputs for
all controllers (the 99% confidence interval is small and cannot be clearly shown). We use the
x -axis to separate the results for the six simulated networks. We can see that the throughput
of spoofing network packets (i.e., when we used Raincoat) varied between 2.8 Mbps and 3.5
Mbps. Compared to the throughputs found with the default ONOS Forwarding controller,
there is an approximately 30% decrease on average. For a DNP3 packet of 1 kilobyte (kB),
which can contain more than 200 32-bit measurements, the Raincoat controller can spoof
more than 300 packets per second, which is equivalent to handling 300 devices in a substation.
For a large-scale substation, we can deploy multiple controllers to enable Raincoat to spoof
more measurements.
Figure 6.11: Comparing the throughputs of Raincoat and Forwarding controllers.
6.7 Discussion
Integrating with power system applications. Because SDN controllers can manipu-
late network flows based on their application-layer payloads, we can create multiple views of
online/offline devices for different power system applications. For example, we can manipu-
late the network flows such that a device is offline for data acquisitions but online for other
power system applications, e.g., commands that operate end devices.
Integrating with real-time measurement collection. The ability to manipulate net-
work flows for different applications makes Raincoat suitable for data acquisition with short
periods. For example, smart grids can collect PMU measurements 200 times per second. Di-
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viding one such data acquisition into multiple rounds introduces challenges in synchronizing
device connectivity (if distributed SDN controllers are used) and crafting decoy measure-
ments. To overcome these challenges, we can adjust the randomization procedure in SDN
controllers by prioritizing the measurements that are changed significantly and randomiz-
ing only the remaining measurements. Note that many network protocols used in power
grids support unsolicited responses, which are used to deliver measurements that have big
changes. Raincoat can use SDN controllers to forward the unsolicited responses directly
while randomizing other responses.
The differences between real and spoofed measurements. Because spoofed mea-
surements are changed when Raincoat changes the set of online/offline devices, there can
be multiple spoofed measurements from each end device. Consequently, in the long term,
attackers can observe different measurements from the same end device, i.e., the real mea-
surement and different spoofed measurements generated at different times. The differences
between those measurements may make attackers suspicious, but the attackers will not be
able to distinguish real measurements from spoofed measurements. Consequently, attackers
may abandon the attacks or randomly select devices as targets, which can still reduce the
impact of the attacks.
Limitation. Raincoat can be vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks, which target
network links and switches [160][161]. In these attacks, SDN controllers can receive a large
amount of traffic and become unresponsive to measurements and control commands. Even
though DoS attacks can disrupt Raincoat, they can still reveal the existence of adversaries
during their preparations. These attacks can be remedied by increasing a number of SDN
controllers deployed in substations. By doing this, the amount of traffic handled by each con-
troller is reduced, making it more challenging for attackers to disable the proper operations
of all SDN controllers.
6.8 Related Work
Moving target defense (MTD) on cyber-physical systems. In the last two decades,
moving target defense mechanisms have been proposed to protect computing and network
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environments [162]. In [163][164], the authors assigned random IP addresses and port num-
bers to end hosts to disrupt attackers’ knowledge of target network infrastructure. As such
MTDs randomize only network infrastructure and still deliver the true measurement over
communication networks, attackers can still learn the physical state. Further, based on
the measurements, it is possible for attackers to identify devices identities [165]. In Rain-
coat, we obfuscate both network infrastructure and physical measurements; we can not only
hide the cyber-physical characteristics of power systems but also use intelligently crafted
measurements to mislead attackers into designing ineffective strategies.
Recent research has begun using MTDs to detect attackers in ICSs. Based on their
impacts on existing physical operations, we categorize these MTD approaches as either
passive or intrusive. The “passive” MTD approach, as shown in [166], uses randomly selected
measurements in state estimation to detect FDIAs. This approach can randomly remove
some compromised measurements and reduce the effectiveness of the FDIAs against state
estimation. However, because fewer measurements are used, the passive MTD approach
reduces the measurement redundancy, which can downgrade the accuracy of existing power
system applications, e.g., state estimation. In Raincoat, we randomize measurements only
for potential attackers; legitimate users, e.g., the control center, can still collect the complete
set of real measurements, which can maintain the accuracy of state estimation.
The “intrusive” MTD approach, as shown in [167][168][169], intentionally injects into ICSs
some perturbations, e.g., by changing the communication paths or adjusting the admittance
of transmission lines. System operators would use the deviations from the expected con-
sequences of the perturbations to detect attackers. Such approaches can expose attackers
when they perform malicious activities. However, the approaches themselves require changes
to physical operations and introduce some physical perturbations. Raincoat manipulates
network flows to obfuscate the data acquisitions without changing the existing physical op-
erations or the configuration of relay devices. In addition, the decoy measurements and
randomized device connectivity mislead attackers and prevent them from introducing any
unauthorized activities, even if the activities introduce little physical damage.
Dynamic scheduling of ICS operations. In recent work, SDN has been used to
adjust ICS operations, including both data acquisition and control commands, to meet
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different QoS requirements [26][91]. In [92][170], the authors proposed scheduling real-time
measurements that have different QoS requirements to maintain the performance of control
networks. In addition, SDN technology is used to increase the resilience of ICS networks
in the face of accidental events, e.g., a link or node failure [26]. In Raincoat, we use SDN
to manipulate network flows that deliver SCADA measurements. The difference is that
our objective is to randomize data acquisitions and thus disrupt and mislead attackers and
mitigate physical damage.
Honeypots for ICS. Several honeypot projects aim to build separate computing or net-
work environments for ICSs, to attract and trace attackers’ activities on ICS devices, e.g.,
PLCs (programmable logic controllers) [171][172]. Those ICS honeypots can mimic the cy-
ber infrastructure of an ICS (including the network protocols and response time). However,
in their constructed network communications, the projects lack support for constructing
meaningful application-layer payloads, e.g., measurements exchanged between ICS devices.
Without careful design, randomly generated measurements included in communication net-
works can reveal the presence of a bogus environment to attackers.
Raincoat is not a honeypot for ICSs; it uses SDN to manipulate existing network flows of
power systems to disrupt attackers’ preparations. However, we include in Raincoat a method
to craft spoofed measurements that follow the physical model of power systems. This method
is based on general AC state estimation. It can be used independently in an ICS honeypot
to mimic valid yet deceptive physical measurements, to increase the honeypot’s authenticity.
6.9 Conclusions
In this chapter, we present the design of Raincoat, which randomizes data acquisitions per-
formed in SCADA systems in order to foil attackers in the attack-preparation stage. Raincoat
manipulates network flows to transform a single deterministic data acquisition request into
multiple rounds of data acquisitions of randomly selected online/offline devices. While on-
line devices respond with real measurements, Raincoat spoofs measurements on behalf of
offline devices. To spoof measurements that follow physical models of power systems, we
include in Raincoat an algorithm that generates decoy measurements. Decoy measurements
mislead attackers into designing (i) false data injection attacks that cannot pass the state
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estimation, and (ii) control-related attacks whose probability of generating physical damage
is less than 5% in a real-world power system. Evaluations done in both cyber and physical
domains in power systems show that Raincoat introduces a small overhead. The accuracy
of the state estimation using randomized data acquisitions is within ±2%, and the latency
of the data acquisitions increases by less than 6%.
In future work, we plan to integrate Raincoat with dynamic scheduling of control opera-




ANALYSIS, DETECTION, AND MITIGATION
7.1 Preamble
In previous chapters, we applied the domain-specific knowledge from power systems to detect
the control-related attacks and prevent the malicious physical damage. Can the proposed
methods be applied to other cyber-physical systems (CPSs)? In this chapter, we use research
work in two different cyber-physical systems, i.e., power systems and surgical robotic systems,
to demonstrate that the designs presented in this dissertation can have broad impacts on
other cyber-physical systems.
7.2 Introduction
In today’s cyber-physical systems (CPSs), control operations involve complex interactions
between cyber domain controls and physical domain processes. As shown in Figure 7.1,
measurements collected from the physical processes are used as an input to the control
algorithms to update the models of the physical processes in the cyber domain. Based on
the current model and estimation of the state of physical processes, the control algorithms
generate commands to adjust the state of the physical processes.
Figure 7.1 depicts a generic CPS control loop and the most likely entry points (marked as
A, B, and C in Figure 7.1) for attackers to penetrate the system. In attacks that compromise
measurements (often referred to as false or bad data-injection attacks, marked as type A
in Figure 7.1), the attackers try to mislead the control algorithm by corrupting the cyber
system states [11][12] and thus cause a wrong command to be issued to the physical pro-
cess. Examples of the impact of false data injection attacks, in terms of disrupting control
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Figure 7.1: The control loop in cyber-physical systems.
operations and potential economic losses, are studied in [45][173].
Type A attacks frequently aim at indirect changes of the commands issued to the physical
process. However, in today’s CPSs, commands are often transmitted over IP-based control
network on unprotected communication channels. If an attacker can gain access to the
control network or the communication link between the cyber and physical components, the
attacker can disrupt the system by directly compromising the control commands (type C
attack). This is not to say that the attacks on sensor measurements are not important.
Quite the opposite, compromised measurements can be used to hide the real (potentially
anomalous) state of the power grid in order to delay the detection of the attacks before
the actual damage to the system (as seen in the example of Stuxnet [6] and in the recent
study [8]).
To identify and rank the attacks that exploit the vulnerabilities in physical components
(marked as type B in Figure 7.1), many researchers proposed metrics, which can be used to
uncover different types of vulnerabilities [14][15]. For example, a power system’s electrical
characteristic, such as the load of substation or transmission lines, can be used to under-
stand how an overloading event, caused by cyber-attacks, could cause a safety violation.
Additionally, previous research studied the characteristics of the transmission network (e.g.,
connectivity or the length of the shortest path between substations) to specify how malicious
attacks can propagate through CPSs [48][50].
Instead of perturbing physical components simultaneously, previous research shows that,
in type B attacks, an adversary perturbs physical components in sequence. A brief discussion
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on the risk of the cascaded outage caused by accidents or attacks is presented in [52]. Zhu
et al. experimentally demonstrate that the cascaded attack can introduce more significant
damage than the attacks that perturb multiple physical components simultaneously [14].
Note that type B attacks often require physical access to the actual CPS device, which is
not easy, less practical, and has a higher risk of being detected.
Our research focuses on studying type C attacks, in which the control fields of commands
delivered over communication channels are maliciously modified, and assessing the impact
of the attacks on the resiliency of CPSs. Unlike type B attacks that consider attacks on all
combinations of physical components, we narrow down the search space to only include the
components that attackers can compromise through the cyber domain, to reduce the analysis
time and computation power. Unlike type A attacks that affect the process indirectly,
modifying control fields can directly affect the physical process and thus introduce safety
violations. To make things worse, it is difficult to detect this class of attacks by solely
monitoring in the cyber domain, because their modifications do not introduce any anomalies
in the control flow and communication protocols.
As shown in [24], the malicious modification of control commands can impact a power
system’s steady state and dynamic behavior. In [174], we demonstrated that malicious
modification of control commands in a surgical robot could cause abrupt jumps of a few mil-
limeters in the robotic arms. If the attacker mounts the attack during a surgical procedure,
it could cause catastrophic damage to the robot and harm the patient in the middle of a
surgery. Another example of this type of attack is the recent incident in Ukrainian power
grids, where attackers used the cyber domain to inject malicious commands, which resulted
in safety violation of the grid and caused the grid to be down for several hours [8][49].
To detect such attacks in a timely manner, our approach is to combine the information
from both cyber-domain simulations and physical domain process state in a smart way.
Contrary to previous work, which mainly focuses on analysis and monitoring of malicious
activities in the cyber domain, we believe that combining the modeling and simulation of
both cyber and physical infrastructures is the key to predict the potential safety violation and
can be beneficial to comprehensive study of attacks and their impacts.
In this dissertation, we have focused on a class of attacks that impact the physical pro-
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cesses without introducing anomalies in the cyber domain (type C attacks). We discuss the
common challenges in detecting this type of attack in the contexts of two very different CPSs,
namely, power grids and surgical robots. We discuss general principles for detecting such
cyber-physical attacks, which combine the knowledge of both cyber and physical domains
to estimate the adverse consequences of malicious activities in a timely manner.
7.3 Example of Target CPSs
In Figure 7.2, we show the control structures of two example CPSs (i.e., robotic surgical
systems and power grid infrastructures) side by side to demonstrate their similarities. Both
CPSs rely on a feedback control loop, in which human system operators rely on measurements
from the physical systems to decide the appropriate operations.
(a) (b)
Figure 7.2: Example control structures for (a) robotic surgical systems and (b) power grid
infrastructures.
In Figure 7.2.(a), which shows the typical control structure of a robotic system used in
minimally invasive surgery, the control software receives the user commands (e.g. the de-
sired position and orientation of the robot) through a teleoperation console and translates
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them into surgical movements by issuing motor commands. In Figure 7.2.(b), which shows
the common control structure used in a power grid, the control software receives the mea-
surements of current, voltage, and power usage, estimates the electronic state, and issues
commands which can adjust power system’s operational conditions.
Both robotic surgical systems and power grid infrastructures share similar feedback loops,
which allow us to propose a general detection principle on common CPSs (details in Section
7.5). However, the implementation of the control structure and algorithms can vary dra-
matically in different CPSs, which implements the detection principle into ad-hoc methods
for cyber-physical attacks in different systems.
7.3.1 Surgical Robotic System
Surgical robots are designed as human-operated robotically controlled systems, consisting of
a teleoperation console, a control system, and a patient-side cart (which hosts the robotic
arms, holding the surgical endoscope and instruments).
(a)
(b)
Figure 7.3: Example communication structures for (a) robotic surgical systems and (b)
power grid infrastructures.
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Figure 7.3.(a) shows the common configuration of the RAVEN II system, an open-source
surgical robot [175][176]. The desired position and orientation of robotic arms, foot pedal
status, and robot control mode are sent from the master console to the robotic control
software over the network using the Interoperable Teleoperation Protocol (ITP), a protocol
based on the UDP [177]. The control software receives the user packets, translates them into
motor commands, and sends them to the control hardware, which enables the movement of
robotic arms and surgical instruments.
The control software runs as a node (process) on the Robotic Operating System (ROS)
middleware [178] on top of a real-time (RT-Preempt) Linux kernel. It communicates with
the physical motor controllers and a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) through a hard-
ware interface (two custom USB interface boards). The interface boards include commodity
programmable devices, digital-to-analog converters, and encoder readers. The PLC controls
the fail-safe brakes on the robotic joints and monitors the system state by communicating
with the control software.
The RAVEN control system starts with an initialization phase before getting ready for the
operation. During the initialization phase, the mechanical and electronic components of the
system are tested to detect any faults or problems. After successful initialization, the robot
enters the “Pedal Up” state, in which the robot is ready for teleoperation but the brakes are
engaged. When the human operator presses the foot pedal on the master console, the robot
moves to the “Pedal Down” state. In this state the brakes are released from the motors,
allowing the teleoperation console to control the robot.
Control algorithm. In each control loop, the current state (position and orientation)
of the end effector on each robotic arm is estimated based on the encoder readings from
its joints using the forward kinematics function. The user-desired end-effector positions
and orientations (received from the surgeon console) are translated to the joint and motor
positions using inverse kinematics calculations. Then the amount of torque needed for each
motor to reach its new position is obtained from a Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID)
controller that minimizes the error between the desired and measured torque values. Finally,
the motor torque commands are transferred in the form of DAC commands to the motor
controllers on the USB interface boards, to be executed on the physical motors on each arm.
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Time constraints. The robot control software must complete each iteration of comput-
ing the new position of the robotic arms within time less or equal to 1 ms (millisecond).
7.3.2 Power Grid Infrastructure
A power system is composed of buses (representing substations) that are connected through
transmission lines. We use the voltage magnitude and angle for each bus to represent the
operational conditions of a power grid.
Figure 7.3.(b) shows a common communication structure used in a power grid, which
has three major parts: control center, substations, and field sites. The Control Center
uses SCADA Master, which collects data from substations, analyzes the data (using the
state estimation software), and issues commands (opening/closing breakers or adjusting
generations) to devices in substations to maintain and control operation of the grid.
The control center is connected to substations through a wide area network (WAN) as
substations can be distributed in a large geographic area. Traditionally, this control-network
is not open to the public Internet. However, to boost control efficiency, the control network
is often connected through corporate networks of a power system or through personal devices
(e.g., field engineering laptop operated by engineers working at field sites).
Control algorithm. To describe the physical process of a power grid, we can formulate
at each bus two power-flow equations, which specify the mathematical relations among the
system state, the generated power, the consumed power, and the power delivered to other
buses at each timestamp. The power-flow equations are nonlinear; solving them can obtain
the steady state of a power system. There are two groups of approaches to solve power-
flow equations. AC power-flow analysis uses iterative algorithms (e.g., Newton-Raphson
algorithm) to calculate solutions that are within a predefined error threshold. DC power-
flow analysis solves the linear approximation of the power-flow equations in order to get the
solution more quickly.
Time constrains. In power grids, the requirements to deliver measurements or control
commands can range from hundreds of milliseconds to several seconds [63]. For example,
commands to protect devices against short-circuit faults are required to deliver with 166
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milliseconds while commands issued by control centers to operate devices in substations can
take several seconds to finish.
7.3.3 Discussion
The intrusiveness of the control algorithms varies in different CPSs. Some cyber domain
commands may only tune the inputs to the physical process while others may significantly
modify the configuration of the physical process [179][180]. For example, in surgical robotic
systems, control commands are input values of differential equations, which specify the
movement of rotors and joints. In power grids, however, a system administrator can directly
control circuit breakers responsible for connecting/disconnecting transmission lines and thus
change the topology of transmission networks. The consequence is that the parameters,
instead of inputs, of power-flow equations are changed.
7.4 Challenges
The control operations in CPSs rely on continuous interaction between cyber and physical
components, which present new challenges in detecting potential attacks launched against
the system.
7.4.1 Attack Detectability
Cyber-physical attacks in CPS are difficult to detect by monitoring the cyber or physical
domains separately from each other. Table 7.1 uses power grids and robotic surgery systems
as examples to describe the challenges in the attack detection based on monitoring cyber or
physical domains alone.
It is difficult to detect and mitigate attacks based solely on the activities from the cyber
domain, due to two reasons. First, in many CPSs, the communication protocol in the cyber
domain usually lacks security characteristics, such as encryption/authentication, due to use
of legacy devices and demanding requirements of delivery time in network communication.
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Table 7.1: Challenge in detection of attacks in CPSs.
Challenges
Example Cyber-Physical Systems















Communication is in a plain
text.
Leaking of user commands
and state information from
the unencrypted data trans-
ferred through network and se-
rial links.
Malicious and unsafe
commands can be en-
coded in legitimate
formats.
Modification of a few bits
in network traffic can main-
tain the correct communica-
tion syntax.
TOCTTOU (time of check to
time of use) vulnerability al-
lowing malicious modification
of the control commands after
they are checked by the soft-
ware and before are communi-
cated to the hardware.
Inconsistency between
the state estimation
in the cyber domain
and the actual state in
physical process.
False data injection attacks on
measurements.
Lack of complex models for ac-
curate estimation of the sys-
tem dynamics and behavior of
robotic joints in real-time.
Real-time constraints on
control systems.
Control operations should be
delivered in a few hundred mil-
liseconds.
Real-time constraint of 1 mil-













Attacks are hard to dis-
tinguish from incidental
failures and human in-
duced safety hazards.
Contingency analysis evaluates
the consequence of incidents,
in which one or two physical
components are out of service.
Similar safety-critical impact
might occur due to unexpected
physical failures or uninten-
tional human errors.
Inadequate knowledge of
the global system state.
Periodically performing state
estimation can detect the con-
sequence of attacks based on
the collected measurements.
However, it is difficult for each
substation to decide the im-
pact of a command on the
whole power grid.
There are limited hardware re-
sources on the embedded com-
putational units in the inter-
face and the physical layer of
the robot to perform sophis-
ticated computations for esti-
mating system state.
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Consequently, attackers can easily perform reconnaissance by passively monitoring the com-
munication without generating anomalies in the cyber domain. For example, the DNP3
protocol, which is widely used in the U.S. power grids, still does not have any encryption
features. Second, the compromises of the physical process can be crafted by changing one
valid control command to another valid command, without violating any protocol syntax,
control flow, or the performance of communication network. For example, modification of
a single bit in the DNP3 packets that deliver commands to control the circuit breakers can
change the on/off state of the breaker. Consequently, the existing intrusion detection sys-
tems that usually rely on the anomaly of the syntax (such as the length of the commands
or range of a field in network packets) or signatures of abnormal events can become inef-
fective against such compromises [73]. Similarly, surgical robots rely on unprotected serial
links (e.g., USB, RS232, or FireWire) for transferring commands and feedback between the
cyber and physical components. A maliciously crafted change in new coordinates delivered
to the motors through a USB channel might not raise any anomalies in the communication
protocols, but could cause a sudden jump in the robotic arms and damage to the physical
system [174].
It is also difficult to detect and mitigate the attacks based solely on the activities from
the physical domain. Today’s CPSs rely on traditional safety procedures that are originally
designed to remedy accidents caused by unexpected physical failures, which occur locally.
However, the safety procedures can become ineffective against malicious attacks. In power
grids, traditional contingency analysis considers only low-order incidents (i.e., the “N-1”
or “N-2” contingency in which one or two devices are out of service). Consequently, it is
impractical to construct a black list of the possible attacks for a large-scale system, which
could cause coordinated failure across the grid. On the other hand, surgical robots have
a hard limit on the maximum allowable torque threshold for the physical motor; however,
this cannot detect malicious modification of the motor command values that are within the
range specified by the threshold but still cause deviations that result in safety violation.
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7.4.2 Diagnosis
Attacks are hard to distinguish from incidental failures and human-induced safety hazards.
For example, a malicious attack on a surgical robot by carefully changing the motor torque
commands could result in a sudden jump of the robotic arm. Similar sudden jump behaviors
due to unexpected physical failures or unintentional human errors are also observed in actual
practice [174]. Furthermore, although many cyber-physical attacks cause safety violations,
the violations themselves do not reveal the entry point of the attacks and the malicious
activities in the cyber domain. Without such information, it is a challenge to identify the
vulnerability exploited by attackers and thus to perform the appropriate response or remedy
actions (e.g., software patching or updating operational procedures).
7.4.3 Real-Time Constraints
Cyber-physical systems usually have strict requirements on timely delivery of control oper-
ations. However, those requirements can span across different ranges. For example, power
grids need to deliver the commands in the range from several hundred milliseconds to several
seconds [63], while the surgical robots are required to perform control computations within
only a few milliseconds [174]. As a result, it is difficult to propose a runtime detection
mechanism that is appropriate for all range of CPSs. With stringent real-time constraints
on the control system operation, any real-time detection and mitigation actions must com-
plete within those constraints to avoid deviation in system dynamics, leading to potential
damage [174].
7.5 Detection Principle
In this section, we describe the detection principle (see Figure 7.4) and its realization in the
context of power grid infrastructure and surgical robotic systems. Because attacks are ini-
tiated in the cyber domain and manifest in the physical domain, the detection mechanisms
should combine the knowledge (and runtime data) from the two domains to capture a com-
plete system view and enable attack detection. Specifically, we integrate security monitoring
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in the cyber domain with the control algorithms used by the physical domain to estimate
the consequences of suspicious activities.
Figure 7.4: Detection principle and its application to target CPSs.
As shown in the top flow chart in Figure 7.4, we obtain two pieces of information from the
communication between cyber domain and physical domain (i.e., commands and measure-
ments). From the measurements, we estimate the current state of physical processes; from
the commands, we extract the parameters related to control operations. Based on the mea-
surements and the commands’ parameters, the control algorithm estimates (ahead of time)
the system impact of the control command execution and hence allows us to determine
whether the command is malicious.
In the table in Figure 7.4, we explain the detection principle and its application in the two
target CPSs. The first row of the table (“Common Principle”) gives common principles that
can be applied to accurately observe commands, collect trusted measurements, and build
control algorithms. The second (“Robotic Surgery”) and the third (“Power Grids”) rows
summarize the implementation of the identified principles in the two target CPSs.
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Observability of commands. In order to accurately obtain the parameters of com-
mands, we need to increase the visibility in the cyber domain, which includes the control
software, communication network, and computing platforms. Many current CPSs use pro-
prietary protocols, which network monitors cannot fully understand. The goal of increasing
the visibility is to improve our awareness and understanding of what is really happening
rather than what we believe should have happened in the cyber domain. Also, we can ob-
tain a better understanding of the interactions between the cyber and physical components,
which can help in designing efficient and effective detection mechanisms against the targeted
attacks.
Collection of measurements. Trusted measurements are essential to make an accurate
estimate of the impact of the control commands on the system state. However, collecting
trusted measurements is not easy, as many attacks (marked by “A” in Figure 7.1) focus
on compromising measurements of CPSs to reduce observability of physical domain. Conse-
quently, on detecting cyber-physical attacks, we can take advantage of the detection methods
proposed to protect the integrity of measurements [34].
Control algorithm. We need to employ the control algorithms and estimation tech-
niques to look ahead to the changes in states and the dynamics of the physical system upon
execution of control commands. The operation of physical systems (e.g., the power flow in
power grids or the movements of robotic arms in surgical robots) can be accurately esti-
mated using nonlinear dynamic models of the system. Most control algorithms rely on the
computation of differential equations to run such models, which can take a long time to
finish and thus make real-time monitoring difficult. Even though existing optimization tech-
niques and linearized models can reduce the computation cost of the state estimation, fusing
the information on the activities observed in the cyber domain (e.g., the network activities)
with multiple estimated measurements from the physical domain can further optimize the
computation and reduce the detection latency.
Discussion. Note that this detection principle complements the ongoing efforts to secure
the computing environment in CPSs, such as using virtual private networks and adding
encryption and authentication features to communication channels. In the cases in which an
insider attacker can bypass such security mechanisms (e.g., the Stuxnet attackers obtained
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a valid security certificate [6]), the detection technique proposed here can help to reveal the
malicious intentions behind activities that appear normal to system operators but are unsafe
when propagated to the physical system.
7.5.1 Detection in Robotic Surgical Systems
Observability of commands. We retrofitted the hardware interface board (custom USB
board) in the control system of the RAVEN surgical robot such that the detection mechanism
based on the dynamic model (details in the next paragraph) receives all control commands
sent by the control software and monitors them before they are executed on the physical
robot.
Collection of measurements. As shown in [174], software running in the programmable
microcontroller (e.g., firmware) of the hardware interface board can become an attack target.
Once attackers penetrate the interface board, they can compromise measurements, to indi-
cate the wrong physical state. However, this is less likely compared with attacks targeting
the control software running in the cyber domain, since gaining remote access to the interface
board and changing the firmware requires passing through several more barriers. One solu-
tion to ensure the integrity of the firmware is to apply remote attestation periodically [181]
or to compare measurements observed at different locations.
Control algorithm. To estimate the impact of the control commands, we enhanced
the control algorithm and safety mechanisms of the surgical robot by developing a software
module that models the dynamical behavior of the robotic actuators. To describe the phys-
ical process of the surgical robotic system, two sets of second-order ordinary differential
equations were used to describe the dynamics of the robot joints, and DC motors and the
corresponding cable tension for the joints, respectively. The fourth-order Runge-Kutta and
explicit Euler methods were used to calculate the solutions to these equations using the nu-
merical integration solvers. The challenge in developing the model was to be able to perform
estimations within the time constrains of the robot’s single iteration through the control
loop (1 ms for the RAVEN II robot). To reduce the computational cost while maintaining
the model accuracy as well as the system real-time guarantees, we modeled the robot manip-
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ulator dynamics using the first three (out of seven) degrees of freedom only (two rotational
joints plus one translational joint). This is reasonable because the first three joints are posi-
tioning joints that contribute most to the instruments’ end effectors’ positions, whereas the
other four degrees of freedom are instrument joints, mainly affecting the orientation of the
end effectors.
Our experiments showed that we can more accurately and preemptively detect the adverse
consequences of control commands in the physical system (e.g., abrupt jumps of robotic
arms) compared with the existing software safety checks and emergency stop in the RAVEN
II robot. Furthermore, with the help of the simplified model, we can also complete the state
estimation and detection within the real-time constraints of each control loop.
7.5.2 Detections in Power Grid Infrastructure
Observability of commands. To accurately obtain the parameters of control commands,
we extended Bro, a runtime network traffic analyzer, to support DNP3 and Modbus, network
protocols widely used in U.S. power grids. The analyzers allowed us to extract semantics
related to control operations from network traffic [21]. Consequently, we distinguished crit-
ical control commands that can operate devices in substations and thus change operational
conditions of the power grid.
Collection of measurements. To obtain trusted measurements from substations, we
deployed network analyzers in both control center and substations in the power grid. By
comparing the measurements observed at different locations, we ensure that the measure-
ments are free from corruptions. Furthermore, we can apply methods proposed to detect
false data injection attacks to further protect the integrity of measurements [34].
Control algorithm. To estimate the consequence of commands, we used power-flow
analysis to estimate the state of power grids upon executions of the commands. One critical
challenge was that existing algorithms proposed for power-flow analysis have fixed param-
eters; using these algorithms, the detection latency could not always meet the real-time
requirements of delivering control commands.
To shorten detection latency while preserving detection accuracy, we proposed a new
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adaptive power-flow analysis and integrated it with real-time network analyzers [24]. Specif-
ically, we adapted the number of iterations that the iterative algorithm in AC power-flow
analysis used to estimate the power system state. Instead of statically fixing this parameter
(e.g., being fixed by one loop of iteration in [47]), we dynamically adapted the number of
iterations based on the parameters of control commands observed at runtime. Specifically,
when a disturbance of multiple devices is observed, the number of iterations to analyze it is
assigned as the average number of iterations that the classical AC power-flow analysis takes
to analyze the disturbance of each involved device (i.e., the N -1 contingency analysis). By
dynamically adjusting the number of iterations, we can save computation time to perform
accurate detection on more severe perturbations. Our experiments demonstrate that the
adaptive algorithm can reduce computation time by 50 percent compared with the classical
AC power-flow analysis and increase the accuracy by two orders of magnitudes compared
with DC power-flow analysis.
7.5.3 Response to Attacks
Unlike the general computing environment, it is difficult to remedy the impact of safety-
critical attacks in CPSs. Consequently, responses to detections need careful design.
In this section, we study the timeline of steps that occur when a control command is
executed in a CPS (shown in Figure 7.5); we use this timeline to analyze two categories of
response mechanisms: stop command execution and reverse command execution.
Figure 7.5: Timeline of steps of executing a command in example CPSs.
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The Execution stage encompasses the delivery and execution of a control command. In
surgical robotic systems, commands can result in the movement of rotors or joints. In power
grids, commands make changes to substation devices (e.g., opening circuit breakers). The
length of the execution stage can vary for the two CPSs. Surgical robots and their control
platforms are usually located in the same network environment (e.g., in a hospital network);
its execution stage can last not more than a few milliseconds. In a power grid, substations
can be located in a large geographical area; the wide area network communication can make
the execution of commands last for hundreds of milliseconds.
After command execution, CPSs can experience transient changes and ultimately reach
a new steady state. This period is represented by the State Transition stage. The state
transition can be described by differential equations, which can estimate the new steady
state if the corresponding CPSs become stable. Even if CPSs are stable, their new steady
state can still introduce safety violations. Examples include the rotors in surgical robots
moving out of safety range or transmission lines in a power grid being overloaded. When
safety violations happen, CPSs can use existing safety procedures to remove the violations.
For example, surgical robots can perform emergency stops if rotors move out of the safety
range. In power grids, safety procedures can avoid safety violations within a substation
(e.g., by disconnecting the overloaded transmission lines). However, these safety procedures
in power grids can introduce cascaded changes (represented by the Cascade Changes stage)
as more overloaded transmission lines are disconnected. These cascaded changes can put
power grids in an unexpected state or even cause physical damage.
Although the stop-command mechanism prevents malicious physical changes from being
initiated, it requires the attack detection to complete before a command is executed. Such
a response mechanism puts a strict time constraint on detection. On the other hand, the
reverse-command mechanism allows commands to execute first, and then remedies their
impact after the commands are determined to be malicious. This response mechanism gives
the detection algorithm slightly more time to evaluate the impact of the command. However,
it increases the risk of being incapable of timely recovery.
The implementation of control structures in surgical robotic systems and power grid infras-
tructures requires them to use different response mechanisms. In surgical robotic systems,
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the consequence of the command can have an instant negative impact on patients (e.g., an
abrupt jump of the robotic arm may cause serious injury to the patient). Consequently, in
the surgical robot, we use the stop-command mechanism to handle malicious commands.
The proposed dynamic model-based detection was directly integrated with surgical robots
and can stop the malicious movement of rotors and joints [174].
In power grids, the intrinsic inertia of devices in substations and the use of wide area
network for communications can take the grids a long time (e.g., on the order of minutes for
the automatic generation control) to reach steady state. In this CPS, we use the reverse-
command mechanism. We integrated the adaptive power-flow analysis with network traffic
analyzers to enable timely detections of malicious commands. Also, the adaptive power-flow
analysis reduced the detection latency, which allowed us to take advantage of the existing
mechanism in power grids to cope with accidental commands (e.g., reclosing logics deployed
in intelligent relays [24][67]).
7.6 Conclusions
Even though CPSs can have very different characteristics in terms of control algorithms,
configurations, underlying infrastructure and communication protocols, and real-time re-
quirements, they share similar challenges in protection against malicious attacks. In this
chapter, we discuss two CPSs, namely surgical robotic systems and power grid infrastruc-
ture.
To overcome the challenge of detecting cyber-physical attacks, we introduce a general
principle for the detection, which combines the knowledge of both cyber and physical domains
to estimate the adverse consequences of malicious activities on the physical processes and
prevent system damage. We discuss how to apply the identified principles to implement
detection methods specifically designed for the two target CPSs.
In future work, we plan to further explore how this detection principle can be applied




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
8.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we use cyber-physical interdisciplinary approaches to detect and prevent
control-related attacks that aim at introducing physical damage in power systems. The
presented approaches are based on in-depth analysis of malicious activities occurring at three
stages of the attack life cycle, i.e., “penetration” stage, “preparation” stage, and “execution”
stage. The attack analysis integrates both theoretical analysis (e.g., using control theory
and power system analysis) and numerical simulation over real-world configurations and
measurement data.
To detect malicious activities that adversaries use to execute attack strategies, we integrate
a DNP3 analyzer in Bro and propose a semantic analysis framework. The DNP3 analyzer
becomes the first network IDS that fully supports communication protocols used by SCADA
systems in power grids. The analyzer developed based on Bro leverages the proposed adap-
tive power flow analysis algorithm to perform timely and accurate detection of malicious
control commands observed from a vulnerable SCADA network. To demonstrate the usage
of the semantic analysis framework, we study an example intrusion response mechanism that
targets malicious commands attempting to open multiple transmission lines. We study the
impact of control-related attacks and evaluate the proposed semantic analysis framework on
IEEE 24-bus, 30-bus, and 39-bus systems, and a 2736-bus system. The proposed adaptive
power flow analysis algorithm introduced at most a 0.8% false-positive rate and a 0.01%
false-negative rate in our experiments. The semantic analysis could complete a detection in
about 200 ms, even for the large-scale test system, which makes response to the intrusion
practical.
To further increase power systems’ resilience against control-related attacks, we integrate
SDN into power systems’ communication infrastructure. We have discussed the opportunities
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that SDN may bring to smart grids for improving resilience, and the corresponding challenges
that still remain. Specifically, we have successfully applied SDN into the design of self-healing
networks and of the randomized communication networks for power systems.
In order to restore the lost measurements from devices that are compromised by the
control-related attacks, we present an innovative, self-healing mechanism for communication
network used to deliver PMU measurements. After a cyber-attack, the mechanism uses SDN
to change the configuration of the network switches, so that the compromised PMUs/PDCs
are isolated to prevent further propagation of the attack while the uncompromised PMUs are
reconnected to the network to “self-heal” and therefore restore the observability of the power
system. Specifically, ILP models are formulated to minimize the overhead of the self-healing
process while considering the constraints of power system observability, hardware resources,
and network topology. The proposed greedy heuristic algorithm reduces computational
complexity. We evaluate the self-healing scheme, including both the ILP models and the
heuristic algorithm, on PMU networks over both IEEE 30-bus and 118-bus systems. To
demonstrate the optimality and the performance of the proposed methods, we compared
them to a baseline method, which randomly reconnects PMUs to uncompromised PDCs.
The experimental results show that the ILP model can reduce the latency of reconfiguring
communication networks by up to 75% compared to the baseline method when hardware
resources are limited. Compared to the ILP model, the proposed heuristic algorithm takes
less than 25% more overhead on average to reconfigure communication networks, but it takes
much less time (by at least one order of magnitude less) to obtain the solution on how to
reconfigure the networks.
In order to preemptively foil adversaries in the attacks’ preparation stage, we present the
design of Raincoat, which randomizes data acquisitions performed in SCADA systems. Rain-
coat manipulates network flows to transform a single deterministic data acquisition request
into multiple rounds of data acquisitions of randomly selected online/offline devices. While
online devices respond with real measurements, Raincoat spoofs measurements on behalf of
offline devices. To spoof measurements that follow physical models of power systems, we
include in Raincoat an algorithm that generates decoy measurements. Decoy measurements
mislead attackers into designing (i) false data injection attacks that cannot pass the state
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estimation, and (ii) control-related attacks whose probability of generating physical damage
is less than 5% in a real-world power system. Evaluations done in both cyber and physical
domains in power systems show that Raincoat introduces a small overhead. The accuracy
of the state estimation using randomized data acquisitions is within ±2%, and the latency
of the data acquisitions increases by less than 6%.
8.2 Future Work
In the future, we are interested in using system and network virtualization, cyber-physical
interdisciplinary method, and big-data analytic to design a customizable security approach
that can be adapted based on the domain-specific knowledge of target applications; we
will consider different types of attack models, as well as a broad range of CPSs or IoTs
(Internet-of-things) that have different computing environments. In addition to attacks that
introduce damage, we will also consider attack models that can cause economic loss, the leak
of critical information, and other negative social impacts (e.g., using misleading information
to impact elections). The application-driven approach makes the security enhancement
suitable, effective, and efficient in CPSs and IoTs.
Trusted Computing Base by Network Virtualization in CPS/IoT
As SDN technologies are being deployed in today’s network infrastructures, physical net-
work resources can be dynamically assigned to different virtual domains. The virtualization
of network resources can become similar to the existing virtualization implemented on hard-
ware and operating systems.
In this direction, we will do research on adapting security approaches based on the system
virtualization and make them suitable in the “virtual” network environment. A specific
research direction will be to find a method and implementation to select network resources,
such as end hosts and communication links, to construct a trusted computing base (TCB)
for applications running in CPSs or IoTs. The TCB will serve as a root of trust. By
verifying communications with the TCB, we can extend the range of the trusted domain
when applications require access to more resources at runtime. Based on this approach, we
hope to design a customizable “security-as-you-go” mechanism for different applications, as
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the “one-size-fits-all” approach can have unacceptably high overhead. To achieve this goal,
we plan to follow two procedures:
• Make SDN fit into networks with different QoS (Quality of Service) requirements in
CPSs/IoTs. Many CPSs and IoTs have very different computing environments, such
as wireless networks that consist of energy-constrained devices running customized
embedded systems. As communication media change, control applications and security
monitoring that are implemented on top of those media should change accordingly. A
specific research topic will be the determination of how these applications can provide
trusted services despite unreliable network environments. We plan to integrate research
from the area of approximate computing with the existing security analytics. We
can identify the “approximable” security logs based on the monitoring of CPS/IoT
applications. Then we can add redundancies for “inapproximable” logs to ensure the
trustworthiness of security monitoring.
• Use knowledge of physical control operations to determine the range of the TCB. The
design of the TCB will involve a trade-off between the security and usefulness of appli-
cations used in CPSs/IoTs. A small TCB would be easy to maintain, but would require
more runtime overhead to ensure its secure interactions with untrusted resources. We
plan to focus on a few specific applications in CPSs, namely ones related to distributed
power generation in smart grids. We plan to build a “dependency graph” among the
cyber and physical components used in these applications. Then we can use formal
methods and graph theory to extract the components that are sufficient to observe
security properties. In addition, we will implement the theoretical findings in real
systems to evaluate their effectiveness and efficiency.
Economic Impacts of Cyber-Attacks on CPS/IoT
The majority of the existing research in the fields of cyber security and cyber-physical
systems focuses on the physical damage that can be caused by cyber-attacks in CPSs or IoT
systems. In addition to physical damage, obtaining economic benefits can be another motive
for attackers. Many CPS operators, such as power system operators and oil producers, decide
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on production based on auctions that receive bids from different suppliers. As auctions
are commonly performed over Internet-based platforms, their integrity, confidentiality, and
availability during the transaction have attracted security researchers’ attention. However,
there has still been a lack of work focusing specifically on auctions performed in CPSs or
IoT systems. The auctions in these contexts have unique characteristics because physical
constraints and models (e.g., the balance of generation and consumption in power systems)
must be observed continuously.
In this direction, we plan to do research on two threat models. In the first, attackers (e.g.,
a potential supplier) are working to compromise parameters related to the auction itself;
we will study whether such auction-related attacks can result in any perturbations of the
control operations or even damage to competitive suppliers. In the second threat model,
attackers are targeting the physical parameters and measurements of CPSs; we will study
how intelligently compromised information can corrupt the bids from competitive suppliers
and allow attackers to obtain economic benefits. What makes this research challenging
and also interesting is that suppliers can disguise themselves as users as well. In each
threat model, we will consider the trustworthiness of interactions among all three entities,
i.e., system administrators, suppliers, and users. If two of these entities are malicious, a
“coordinated attack” can be performed, e.g., malicious suppliers deliver misleading and
malicious information on behalf of some users. Based on the study of these threat models,
we can further design a verifiable and trusted auction platform that can protect the target
CPSs.
Event-Driven Data Analytics in CPS/IoT
Today’s CPSs or IoTs can generate large amounts of heterogeneous data, which provide
valuable information for detecting anomalies. However, data can be polluted by oversam-
pling, making the extraction of valuable information challenging.
Just as environmental benefits can be achieved by reducing production of pollutants (in-
stead of merely cleaning up pollution after the fact), we will use interdisciplinary expertise on
system and network designs to reduce the amount of “polluted” data while maintaining the
accuracy with which anomalies are identified. The choice of the range of data to be collected
can be modeled as a function of the control application that we are trying to protect and the
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events observed from the application. Based on the characteristics of the application, we can
decide on an initial set of monitors; that decision will be a trade-off between the detection
accuracy and the volume of data to be collected. As the control application continues its
execution, we can use the physical model to estimate the possible outcome of the application
and use this outcome to adjust the monitors to produce more focused data on the events
that are critical in detecting anomalies. Following this approach, we can further design new
analytics for the “refined” data.
Cyber-Physical HoneyNet
In this direction, we are interested in building a cyber-physical HoneyNet to include and
demonstrate the usability of our current and future research. Current HoneyNet projects for
CPSs mimic just their cyber-infrastructures. In this work, we plan to extend the previous
work by adding a mimic of physical infrastructures as well. There will be two major chal-
lenges in achieving that goal. The first is the need to craft measurements that can prevent
leaking of real measurements and follow the physical models in CPSs. The experience in
crafting decoy measurements that mislead attacks and follow the physical model in power
systems can help to achieve this goal in other CPSs, such as those in water treatment fa-
cilities. The second challenge will be to simulate the interactions of cyber and physical
infrastructures at runtime. Simulations of communication networks are often done in the
form of discrete events, while measurements and states in physical infrastructure change con-
tinuously. We plan to study ways to combine the simulations in these two domains without
affecting the accuracy of the simulations at runtime.
To demonstrate its usability, we will search for an opportunity to deploy the developed
HoneyNet in the public Internet environment after careful evaluations in laboratory envi-
ronments. Currently, we have limited access to security incidents that have occurred in
CPSs or IoT systems, because of the involved companies’ need for privacy. We hope to use
this cyber-physical HoneyNet to catch attackers who are specifically targeting CPSs and
IoT systems, and to analyze their activities in detail. The HoneyNet can be used to design




EXAMPLE BRO SCRIPTS TO IMPLEMENT
SECURITY POLICIES
A.1 Overview
In Chapter 3, we present the DNP3 analyzer and the semantic analysis framework to detect
the control-related attacks. The detection mechanism is built on top of Bro, a run-time
traffic analyzer. Bro provides a rich script language, which can facilitate implementing
security policies.
In Section 3.3.4.1 and Section 3.3.4.2, we present two example security policies to detect
attacks targeting power systems. In this section, we have implemented these two policies
(specified by state diagrams shown in Figure 3.4 and 3.5) by using Bro’s script language. We
hope to use these implementations to help system administrators working in power systems
and other industrial control systems. 1
A.2 Bro Scripts for Authentication Policy
In Table A.1, we present the snippets of Bro scripts for the authentication policy. We
use two event handlers, i.e., syslog message and dnp3 application request header, to check
(1) whether all DNP3 requests follow an authentication or not and (2) whether the DNP3
request with function code “0x03” (SELECT operation) is performed by privileged user,
such as ROOT. The interaction between these event handlers is achieved by using two global
variables, i.e., gUsrID and findSyslog. These two global variables store the information of
the latest authentication performed by SCADA master (see Figure 3.12) and stored in syslog
1Note that we have simplified the snippets for better understanding in this dissertation. Also, the scripts
are written based on the version 2.2 of Bro.
191
server. Based on this information, Bro uses dnp3 application request header to verify each
DNP3 requests observed at runtime.
In this example, we verify only one type DNP3 request. Verifications can be performed for
other requests (with different function codes or types of data objects) by using the similar
implementations.
Table A.1: Snippets of Bro scripts for the authentication policy.
global gUsrID : count = 0;
global findSyslog : bool = F;
event syslog message(c: connection, facility: count, severity: count, msg: string) {
if ( facility ≥ 16 && facility ≤ 18 ) {
gUsrID = facility;
findSyslog = T ;
}
}




if ( findSyslog ) {
if ( fc == 0x03 && gUsrID ̸= ROOT) {
print fmt(“ALERT, unauthorized operations.”);
}
else {
print fmt(“ALERT, unauthenticated operations.”);
}
}
A.3 Bro Scripts for Integrity Policy
In Table A.2, we present the snippets of Bro scripts for the integrity policy. In the table,
we use one handler, i.e., dnp3 analog input32 woFlag ; this handler will be called when Bro
observes a DNP3 network packet that delivers 32-bit analog measurements. We use the
source IP address to determine from which devices these measurements are delivered. If the
measurement is directly from a relay machine (see Figure 3.13), we store the values extracted
from this packet in a global variable, i.e., gReadFromRelay. Then when a DNP3 packet is
issued from the DNP3 slave, we verify that the values are not compromised by comparing
them to the stored ones.
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In this example, we verify only one type of data object, i.e., 32-bit analog measurements.
Similar verifications can be performed for other data objects by using other corresponding
event handlers.
Table A.2: Snippets of Bro scripts for the integrity policy.
global gReadFromRelay : count = 0;
event dnp3 analog input32 woFlag(c: connection, is orig: bool, value: count) {
if ( ( c$id$orig h == RELAY IP ) && ( is orig == F ) ) {
gReadFromRelay = value;
}
if ( ( c$id$orig h == DNP3 SLAVE ) && (is orig == F ) ) {
if ( value ̸= gReadFromRelay )





MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM FOR DETECTING FALSE
DATA INJECTION ATTACKS IN POWER GRID
B.1 Preamble
In this dissertation, we mainly focused on detection and prevention of control-related attacks,
which use malicious commands to cause physical damage to power systems. However, in our
most recent work, we have extended the SDN-enabled power systems, which are presented
in Chapter 4, to construct a multi-agent system among remote substations. The main
idea of the multi-agent system is to allow substations to exchange information without
the intermediation of control centers. The inter-substation communication increases the
redundancy of measurements used by SCADA systems and can help to detect false data
injection attacks. In future work, we plan to use the materials presented in this chapter
as a starting point to explore further applications, e.g., detection of control-related attacks,
based on this multi-agent system.
B.2 Introduction
Energy management systems (EMSs) in power grids rely on state estimation to obtain in-
formation about their operating conditions. State estimation is carried out based on the
topology of the power network and data readings taken from measuring units deployed
at local stations. The collected meter measurements are used to estimate state variables
which include bus voltage magnitudes and phase angles. Based on state estimates obtained
from the state estimator, control decisions and subsequent actions that directly impact the
operation of the power grid are made. To handle errors associated with noise and faulty
meters in state estimation, bad data detection (BDD) schemes are employed. BDD relies on
Chi-square tests and residual signals generated based on the squares of differences between
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measured data and estimated data [182].
Advanced power grid technology integrates varieties of digital computing and communi-
cation technologies, which exposes the power delivery infrastructure to malicious attacks.
Attackers with access to the power grid’s topology information can carry out false data in-
jection (FDI) attacks. As shown in [11][12][183][184], measurements compromised by FDI
attacks can bypass BDD schemes during state estimation. If the control center uses com-
promised measurements for state estimation, the resulting state estimate will mislead the
control center regarding the actual operating condition of the power grid inherently affecting
control decisions.
In this chapter, we propose a multi-agent system that detects FDI attacks targeting state
estimation in power grids. We logically partition a power grid into multiple sub-systems, each
comprising a substation and other substations directly connected to it through transmission
lines. Because off-the-shelf computing and communication infrastructures are deployed in
substations, we can deploy software-based agents in each substation and allow them to
communicate with each other. The agents facilitate the exchange of meter measurements
among substations that are included in each sub-system. Each agent can perform local state
estimation for its sub-system. In the absence of FDI attacks, state estimation results at
each sub-system are identical to state estimation results for the whole grid. However, in the
presence of FDI attacks, compromised measurements can bypass bad data detection during
state estimation for the whole grid; state estimation performed at each sub-system can be
used to analyze the compromised measurements and identify disparities. The main idea of
the detection is that FDI attacks determine the compromised measurements based on the
topological information of the whole power grid such as connectivity of each substation and
susceptance of each transmission line. However, the topological information for each sub-
system varies. As a result, the condition that hides compromised measurements from state
estimation for the whole grid can fail in the constructed sub-systems.
To evaluate the proposed strategy for FDI detection, we conduct experiments with the
IEEE 9-bus, 14-bus, and 30-bus power system using MATPOWER [19], an open source
MATLAB toolbox. For each system, we generate 1000 attack cases that can bypass BDD
schemes during state estimation for the whole grid. Then, we construct sub-systems at each
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bus in the power system and use state estimation at each sub-system to analyze all FDI
cases. In our experiments, we can detect all FDI attack cases with at least one agent.
B.3 Background
B.3.1 DC State Estimation
In state estimation based on the DC power flow model, we can correlate the measurement
vector z and the state vector x of a power system using the following linear regression model:
z = Hx+ e (B.1)
where H is the m × n measurement Jacobian matrix which encapsulates the topological
information of the power system [30], e.g., susceptance of each transmission line. We rep-
resent z as an m× 1 vector with each entry being a meter measurement. In this work, the
vector z comprises the measurements of real power flows at the receiving and sending end
of each transmission line and real power injections at each bus. x is an n × 1 vector with
each entry being the phasor angle at each substation. Also, e is an n× 1 measurement error
associated with each entry in z; we assume the measurement error is Gaussian noise. Using
the weighted least square criterion [185], a state estimate x̂ can be computed as follows.
x̂ = (HTRH)−1HTRz (B.2)
where R = diag(1/σ2i ), σ
2
i is the variance of the meter errors and i = 1, ...,m.
Meter errors, incorrect configurations, and maliciously injected measurements introduce
bad data which affects estimated states [182]. There are several techniques in place for
detecting bad data in the power grid. A widely used technique computes a residual between
the observed and estimated measurements and uses its L2 norm to detect bad data. When
bad data is present, the L2 norm increases beyond a preset threshold τ and converges in the
absence of bad data.
∥za −Hx̂a∥ > τ (B.3)
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B.3.2 False Data Injection (FDI) Attack
An FDI attack against the power grid modifies the measurement vector z transmitted to the
control center by injecting an attack vector a such that an incorrect measurement vector za
is received [11].
za = Hx+ e+ a (B.4)
In [11], Liu et al. show that while a randomly selected attack vector a is generally de-
tectable by the bad data detection system, the attack vector a that is carefully designed can
become undetected. Specifically if a is a linear combination of the rows in the topology ma-
trix H it will bypass the BDD. To construct an undetectable attack vector a, the attacker
needs to create an n × 1 vector c such that the entries in c correspond to targeted state
estimates in x resulting in:
a = Hc (B.5)
If a−Hc = 0, the attack vector a is undetectable by the BDD system provided the original
measurement z, which bypasses BDD. The L2 norm of the residual from Theorem 1 in [11]
becomes:
∥za −Hx̂∥ = ∥z + a−H(x̂+ c)∥ = ∥z −Hx̂∥ ≤ τ (B.6)
B.4 Proposed Multi-agent System for Detection of FDI Attacks
B.4.1 Multi-agent System Architecture
In today’s power grids, inter-substation communication plays a key role in ensuring local
protection at each substation [63]. When a relay in a substation performs protection activities
such as opening a circuit breaker to remove a transient short-circuit fault, the substation
reports this event to all its neighboring substations. The purpose of this communication is
to ensure that when protection activities fail, neighboring substations can perform back-up
protection to prevent faults from propagating to large areas.
Current power grids rely on off-the-shelf computing and communication networks to deliver
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(a) An example 5-bus System (b) A sub-system from bus 4
Figure B.1: Use agent to build a sub-system from a power grid.
measurements to control centers. On top of this communication infrastructure, we can install
a software agent in each substation. In addition to delivering measurements to the control
center, it delivers them to agents deployed at the neighboring substations periodically. Based
on the measurements collected from neighboring substations, each agent can build its own
sub-system in which the system state, i.e., the phasor angle of each substation, is consistent
with the state from the whole system.
In Figure B.1.(a), we use a 5-bus system as an example to explain the concept of build-
ing a sub-system. This power system has 5 buses, 5 transmission lines, 3 load units, and
3 generators. With respect to the DC power flow model, we can have 15 measurements
(considering real power flows at the receiving and sending ends of each transmission line and
real power injections at each bus). In the figure, we highlight the measurements with red
rectangles and letters. Note that the measurement of power injected at a bus is calculated
by taking away power consumptions from power generations. For example, at bus 4, we
have z14 = PG4 − PL4, where PGi and PLi represent power generations and consumptions
at bus i.
In Figure B.1.(b), we demonstrate how the agent at bus 4 builds a sub-system exclusively
based on the measurements from bus 3 and bus 5. The purpose of building the sub-system
is that (1) the agent uses the state estimation of the sub-system to obtain the same phasor
angle of the involved buses as estimated by the control center when no attacks occur; and
(2) the agent can detect compromised measurements in this sub-system while the false data
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injection attack can bypass state estimation for the whole grid. The sub-systems are created
based on the procedure stated in Table B.1.
Table B.1: Procedure to build sub-systems for agents.
Procedure: generate sub-system for agent at bus i
(1) Include bus i and its neighboring buses;
(2) Include the transmission lines that connect the buses selected at (1);
(3) Keep unchanged the real power flow measurements at the sending and receiving
end of selected transmission lines;
(4) For bus j ̸= i
(5) For transmission line k not selected at (2)
(6) If power flow P at line k is delivered into bus j
(7) Increase power injection at bus j by P
(8) Else




Using the procedure in Table B.1, we build a sub-system for bus i which comprises bus i
itself, its neighboring buses, and transmission lines that connect them. In this sub-system,
we still use the measurements at the receiving and sending end of transmission lines from
the whole power grid. However, the power injection at the neighboring buses of bus i is
adjusted with the power flowing to the rest of the power systems (blocked by a transparent
rectangle in Figure B.1.(b)), based on steps (4)–(12) in Table B.1. Following this procedure,
we can build the sub-system for each bus. In the sub-system, the power flow equations are
maintained for each bus, from which we can obtain the same phasor angles as those obtained
during state estimation for the whole grid.
B.4.2 Threat Model
We do not trust the communication networks that connect control centers and power grid
devices in substations. Consequently, we assume that attackers can compromise measure-
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ments while they are delivered to the control center. Also, we assume that measurements
exchanged between agents at different substations are not trusted. Even though agents at
substations collect untrusted measurements from other substations, the compromised mea-
surements which are crafted based on the topology of the whole power grid can fail to bypass
the bad data detection during state estimation performed at the sub-systems.
We assume that an agent uses local sensors to collect trusted measurements from its own
field site. In other words, we do not consider the attack case in which attackers can physically
manipulate sensors.
B.4.3 Formal Analysis
In this section, we demonstrate how we use state estimation at the sub-systems to detect
false injection attacks that are designed to bypass bad data detection during state estimation
for the whole power grid. Consider a power system with n substations, m measurements
and b transmission lines. As shown in Section B.3.1, the measurement vector z and the state
vector x are correlated by the Jacobian matrix: z = Hx+ e.
By following the procedure in Table B.1, we can divide a power system of n substations
into n sub-systems. Based on the topology of the ith sub-system, we can construct its own
Jacobian matrix H ′i. The entry in the state vector x
′
i is directly taken from the corresponding
entry from x. However, as shown in Table B.1, the entry in the measurement vector z′i is
calculated from the entries in z. Consequently, for the ith sub-system, the measurements





perform FDI attacks, they decide the attack vector a based on the measurement Jacobian
matrix H of the entire power grid. As shown in Section B.3.1, in order to bypass the bad
data detection, the attack vector a needs to satisfy the condition a = Hc [11].
Under FDI attacks, measurements are compromised as za = z+a. When the compromised
measurements are delivered to the agents deployed at other substations, we can determine
the corresponding compromised measurement z′a,i for the substation, based on the procedure
in Table B.1. Then each agent performs state estimation and bad data detection on each sub-













a,i − z′i), we can detect a false data injection




To demonstrate how agents use state estimation at their sub-systems to detect false data
injection attacks, we use the IEEE 9-bus system, whose transmission topology is shown in
Figure B.2. This power system has 9 buses, 9 transmission lines, 3 generation, and 3 load
units.
Figure B.2: Distribution of agents for a 9-bus system.
There are 8 state variables (we assume that the phasor angle of the slack bus is 0) and
18 measurements. We extract the measurement matrix H from MATPOWER [19]. In
Table B.2, we show the values in one randomly selected attack vector a. The attack vector
is injected into the observed measurement z to obtain za.
Based on the state estimation performed for the whole power system, we cannot detect
this attack vector because the L2 norm (weighted sum of squared errors) is within the
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BDD threshold (with the threshold τ set at 1.0228−2). In Figure B.3, we show that state
estimation performed by agents can detect this attack vector. The x-axis indicates the index
of the agent; the y-axis indicates the weighted sum of squared errors of the state estimation
performed at the corresponding agent. Because in the sub-systems monitored by agents
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, we have a′i ̸= H ′ic′i, the L2-norm at these agents becomes very large,
which makes it possible to detect compromised measurements.
Table B.2: Data for FDI attack generation.
c a = Hc z za = z + a
1 -17.3611 0.6700 -16.6911
0 10.8696 0.2897 11.1593
1 0.0000 -0.6103 -0.6103
0 0.0000 0.8500 0.8500
0 0.0000 0.2397 0.2397
0 0.0000 -0.7603 -0.7603
0 -16.0000 -1.6300 -17.6300











B.5.2 Evaluation of Detection Results
To further evaluate the proposed multi-agent system, we select IEEE 9-bus, 14-bus, and
30-bus systems, whose baseline profiles are included in MATPOWER [19]. For each power
system case, we randomly construct 1000 attack vectors using equation B.4, such that equa-
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Figure B.3: Bad data detection results for agents in IEEE 9-bus system.
tion B.5 is satisfied.
In each power system case, we perform on behalf of each agent the state estimation of its
corresponding sub-system. If the L2-norm from the state estimation is larger than the BDD
detection threshold, we detect the false data injection attacks.
Figure B.4: Probability for successful attack detection by individual agents for the 9-bus,
14-bus and 30-bus system.
Figure B.4 shows the probability that agents can successfully detect an attack for the
IEEE 9-bus, 14-bus, and 30-bus power systems. The markers show the actual probability
(number of successful detections/number of attacks) computed for a corresponding agent.
The x -axis is the agent index, and the y-axis is the fraction of attack cases considered. From
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the results obtained, agents with more interconnected substations have a higher detection
probability in comparison to agents with less than 3 substations interconnected. Individual
agents achieve detection for the overall system, with probabilities 0.82, 0.94, and 0.90 for the
9-bus, 14-bus, and 30-bus systems respectively for FDI attacks completely undetectable by
the power system in the absence of the proposed multi-agent system. Although a single agent
may not be able to achieve 100% detection, all deployed agents can make it challenging, if not
impossible, for FDI attacks to bypass the proposed detection. In Figure B.5, all generated
FDI attack vectors are detected by at least one agent.
(a) 9-Bus System (b) 14-Bus System (c) 30-Bus System
Figure B.5: Number of agents that detected each individual FDI attack.
Figures B.5.(a), B.5.(b), and B.5.(c) show the number of agents that detect a range of
attacks for the 9-bus, 14-bus and 30-bus systems respectively. The x -axis shows the number
of agents that can detect an attack, and the y-axis is the index for each of the 1000 FDI
attack scenarios considered. In other words, for a point (x0, y0) on Figure B.5, y0 cases are
detected by less than or equal to x0 agents. All agents simultaneously carry out detection
for all attack cases and the collective result are evaluated.
Figure B.6 shows the number of attacks that an agent at each bus detects. The index
of each bus is plotted on the x -axis while the y-axis shows the number of attacks that the
agent at this bus detects. The detection is distributed over all buses almost evenly. In this
case, it is challenging for attackers to bypass the multi-agent detection mechanism. This
means that an attack targeting any bus can be detected by at least one agent provided it is
a member of the sub-system.
To further evaluate the performance of our FDI attack detection strategy, the average
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Figure B.6: Number of attacks successfully detected at each bus by the corresponding
agents.
time taken by all agents to carry out state estimation (agents carry out state estimation
simultaneously) is compared to the time taken for entire grid state estimation. The results
obtained indicate that for the IEEE 9-bus, 14-bus, and 30-bus system benchmarks consid-
ered, the time taken for the agents to carry out state estimation is less than the time it takes
for entire grid state estimation. In the 9-bus system, while agents require 0.215 seconds on
average, the entire grid requires 0.23 seconds. For the 14-bus system, agents take 0.2000
seconds while the entire grid takes 0.2200 seconds and finally 0.2261 seconds against 0.4300
seconds for the 30-bus system.
B.6 Related Work
Liu et al. studied the problem of false data injection (FDI) attacks that target measurement
data used in DC state estimation and demonstrate that if an adversary has knowledge of the
network topology, he can craft an FDI attack to bypass the BDD schemes [11]. Since Liu et
al. introduced the idea of undetectable FDI attacks, a lot of research effort has gone into this
area. [34] showed that encrypting a carefully selected set of measurement devices can enable
detection of FDI attacks against DC state estimation. The authors showed that the number
of measurements that need to be protected to achieve FDI attack detection is equal to the
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number of total state variables. The strategy in [34] was extended in [13] to maximize the
number of encrypted meters. Dan and Sandberg took into account the fact that the power
network has a large number of measurement devices and encryption of as many devices as
state variables is not always practical or economically feasible [13]. They proposed algorithms
to deploy encrypted devices in parts of the network where their usefulness is maximized. In
addition, [186] provided solutions that an operator can use to arbitrarily select critical meters
to protect so that a FDI attack can become detectable. Furthermore, a detection framework
that employs a security manager, a managed switch, and security agents running alongside
critical nodes (controllers and edge nodes) was proposed in [187]. Each critical node is
monitored by a security agent connected to the security manager through a managed switch
capable of separating external and internal transmission. The security manager is protected
by conventional IT solutions and provides access control, firmware monitoring, vulnerability
patches and security policies to security agents which in turn monitor the critical nodes.
In [43], Yang et al. studied false data injection attacks and defense mechanisms. Specifi-
cally, they designed attack strategies that inflict maximum damage and proposed a defense
mechanism to make critical sensors more resilient to such attacks. The authors also de-
signed spatial- and temporal-based detection algorithms that the control center can employ
to detect and identify stealthy attacks.
Along with the studies on FDI attacks, there are plenty of works providing detections.
Kosut et al. leveraged the sparse nature of the FDI attack and proposed a detection test
based on the L∞ norm computation as opposed to the L2 norm [188]. The authors showed
that the L∞ norm accurately detects the presence of an injected sparse vector. In [189], a
strategy based on formation control was proposed to identify corrupted measurements from
phasor measurement units (PMUs). Specifically, a flocking-based modeling paradigm was
used to identify corrupted data during grid transient state. However, transient periods in
the power grid are brief, which makes this technique less practical.
In [190], Liu et al. proposed an adaptive partitioning state estimation (APSE) technique
to detect bad data injections in the smart grid, which is similar to the approach proposed in
this chapter. Specifically, APSE partitions the power network into several subsystems, and
the Chi-squares test for bad data detection is used to detect bad data for each subsystem.
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Upon detection of bad-data, the subsystems are re-partitioned over several iterations until
the bad data is located.
Compared to [190], the proposed multi-agent system has three advantages to detect FDI
attacks. First, it directly leverages the existing communication channels among substations
stipulated in [63], which makes the approach practical to deploy. Second, the proposed
multi-agent system is scalable, because the complexity of the computation performed in
each substation is related to the degree of a substation node (i.e., the number of substations
that are connected to it through transmission networks), which usually does not increase
with the scale of the power system [39]. Third, the proposed multi-agent system uses the DC
power flow model on small-scale sub-systems, which can easily used for run-time analysis.
Agents are distributed in each substation and can detect FDI attacks for the whole grid.
B.7 Conclusions
A multi-agent system for false data injection attacks in the power grid is proposed. Each
substation is assigned an agent created from a topology formed by a substation and its
neighboring substations. Agents are equipped with communication capability and facilitate
communication among substations. In addition, agents compute state estimates for their
respective substation and share this state information with each other. For each agent, the
state estimation must pass bad data detection. Measurement data is checked by each of the
agents and is only processed for state estimation if it passes state estimation at each agent.
The detection technique is demonstrated using the DC state estimation of the IEEE 9-bus,
14-bus, and 30-bus systems.
In future work, the multi-agent system will be extended to include attack identification,
i.e., to identify the exact measurements that are compromised, in addition to detecting the
presence of the attacks. The findings presented in this chapter are based on simulations; the
multi-agent system will be implemented on real-world hardware for further analysis.
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